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For most scholars of Romanticism, honor is a traditionalist value. It underwrites Edmund 
Burke’s defense against revolutionary radicalism; it is the code of medieval crusaders and 
tribal highlanders in Walter Scott’s novels; and it is a quality reserved for nobles such as 
Lady Catherine de Bourgh in Pride and Prejudice, who relies on honor to assert her 
privilege in the face of the rising middle-class. Despite these conservative connotations, 
The Life of Honor shows that early-nineteenth-century writers did not simply consider 
honor a reactionary ethos. Rather, they saw how honor could be progressive and 
egalitarian—a modern virtue that allowed them to grapple with the dilemmas of emerging 
liberal society. A personal sense of communal obligation, the modern honor ethic 
balanced the individualism emphasized by the republican political movement with the 
demands of a rapidly changing social order. Reading texts from a variety of authors and 
genres—Godwin’s Jacobin novel, Wordsworth’s autobiographical poetry, Scott and 
Austen’s historical fiction, and the brutal slave narrative of Mary Prince—I demonstrate 
how this ancient civic virtue was reinvigorated in response to some of the most pressing 
cultural questions of the day, conflicts between the self and society that could not be 




Because this modern form of honor emerged from post-revolutionary life, it was 
associated with a new political order: liberalism, a set of civic norms that began to thrive 
in the late-eighteenth-century and that still prevails in Europe today. While the Romantic 
honor code drew upon the liberal commitment to universal dignity and individual merit, 
Romantic honor simultaneously illuminated the conceptual problems of liberalism—its 
propensity to rank independence over obligation; to connect private commercial success 
with public virtue; and to abstract social predicaments from identity categories like race 
and gender. Responding to recent scholarship on the liberal disposition in Romantic 
pedagogy and nineteenth-century Realist aesthetics, The Life of Honor reveals the 
paradox of a civil society built around the pursuit of individual esteem and thus the wager 
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Honor and the Problem of Romantic Politics 
 
“Honour’s a very common word,  
By all and ev’ry where prefer’d. 
But what’s its meaning,—where’s the Key, 
That will unlock the Mystery? 
It seems to change in ev’ry street, 
And with each person that we meet.”  




Consider these two contrasting visions of honor in the Romantic-era. The first one 
comes from Coleridge, who writes the 1791 poem “Honour” from the perspective of a 
loutish (and hungover) young man.1 Reminiscing on the previous night’s activities, the 
speaker spurns the “laurels” of public recognition—and even his own private self-
respect—that had at one time been the reward for living an honorable life:  
 
 To such poor joys could ancient Honour lead 
When empty fame was toiling Merit's meed; 
To Modern Honour other lays belong; 
Profuse of joy and Lord of right and wrong, 
Honour can game, drink, riot in the stew,    
Cut a friend's throat;—what cannot Honour do?2  
 
In the modern age, honor is nothing but a virtuous cover for wanton behavior and an 
excuse for egotism. As a radically-inclined undergraduate, Coleridge also presents honor 
as an unearned privilege of the contemporary aristocracy, whose values come from 




By 1809, however, Wordsworth was making a vastly different claim about the 
role of honor in modern life. In his sonnet “Say, what is honour,” Wordsworth answers 
the framing question straightaway:     
 
Say, what is Honour?—'Tis the finest sense 
Of justice which the human mind can frame, 
Intent each lurking frailty to disclaim, 
And guard the way of life from all offence 
Suffered or done. When lawless violence 
Invades a Realm, so pressed that in the scale 
Of perilous war her weightiest armies fail, 
Honour is hopeful elevation,—whence 
Glory, and triumph. Yet with politic skill 
Endangered States may yield to terms unjust; 
Stoop their proud heads, but not unto the dust— 
A Foe's most favourite purpose to fulfil: 
Happy occasions oft by self-mistrust 
Are forfeited; but infamy doth kill.3  
 
Far from being an empty signifier used to justify unscrupulous behavior, honor is the 
chief virtue of civil society. Faced with the threat of French invasion—and the possible 
spread of “lawless” Jacobinism—Wordsworth’s sonnet draws heavily on Edmund Burke, 
whose contemporary revival of British chivalry tried to guard against the “lurking frailty” 
of national disrepute, a fate that in the cultural conflicts of the revolutionary age could 
register as worse than military defeat. But while honor seems deeply conservative—
portrayed as hierarchical and militant (“Honour is hopeful elevation,—whence / Glory 
and Triumph”), as well as baldly patriarchal in its ambition to protect the feminine nation 
and “her weightiest armies”—it is also inflected with republicanism.4 In an odd 




“finest sense/ Of justice which the human mind can frame,” a description that evokes 
William Godwin and the egalitarian values he put forward in Political Justice (1793).5 
Here, honor seems caught between aristocratic and radical principles, between nobility 
and equality, between one’s individual esteem and the civic duty he has to others. This is 
also to say that for major Romantic writers, honor could not simply be relegated to the 
past. It was a major part of the moral idiom of the age.   
One could admittedly see this modern revival of honor as traditionalist—or even 
reactionary—in nature. For many Romanticists, honor underwrites Edmund Burke’s 
defense against revolutionary radicalism; it is the code of medieval crusaders and tribal 
highlanders in Walter Scott’s novels; and it is a quality exclusive to nobles such as Lady 
Catherine de Bourgh in Pride and Prejudice, who rely on honor to assert their privilege 
in the face of rising bourgeois supremacy. But despite all of these conservative 
interpretations of honor, this dissertation will suggest that Romantic writers did not view 
honor merely as an antiquated ethos in the years 1789-1832. Rather, they saw how honor 
could be progressive and egalitarian—a modern virtue that allowed them to grapple with 
the dilemmas of emerging liberal society.6 (Indeed, Wordsworth’s poem reveals as much: 
it may be conservative in tone, but it is indebted to all sorts of progressive topoi—from 
the Godwinian rhetoric of universal justice, to its invocation of a “hopeful” future, a 
descriptor that suggests the utopian possibility at the heart of revolutionary political 
movements).  
In The Life of Honor, I argue that honor is best defined as the private awareness of 
public responsibility, a seemingly straightforward formulation that actually embodies a 




one’s obligation to the collective, honor balanced the emphasis on individualism and self-
creation that had grown out of the republican tradition with an increasing demand for 
social-consciousness, one that could address the dramatic changes in many areas of 
society—from the contentious political disputes of the 1790s, to the new mores of the 
literary marketplace, the tumult of the national financial system, and the resurgence of the 
abolitionist movement. As it pertained to these issues, it is clear that the Romantics did 
not just free honor from its ancient connotations. They also applied it to the dilemmas of 
modernity. 
Because this modern form of honor emerged from post-revolutionary life, it was 
associated with a new political order: liberalism, at once civic philosophy and a collection 
of norms that began to thrive in the late-eighteenth-century and that still prevails in 
Europe today.8 Responding to Romanticists like Frances Ferguson and Jerome 
Christensen—who have had a long interest in the development of liberalism as it related 
to the ideologies of Utilitarianism and Political Economy—and Victorianists like 
Amanda Anderson—who has recently investigated the liberal disposition in nineteenth-
century Realist aesthetics—I show how the particular civic virtue of honor highlighted 
the theoretical problems inherent in liberalism: its propensity to value independence over 
obligation, to connect commercial success with moral worth, and to abstract social 
problems from their material realities.9 Throughout this dissertation, I demonstrate how 
Romanticism reveals a conceptual dilemma in this emerging political order. Honor—an 
ethic of individual dignity crossed with communality—frames neatly the paradox of the 
society committed to liberal values: how could individuals maintain and cultivate private 




One way of understanding how Romantic honor related to liberalism is therefore 
not to see honor as a reaction against liberal values—a response that could make it seem 
like a purely partisan development—but to conceive of it as a supplement to the array of 
liberal tenets emerging in civic life. Romanticists are probably most familiar with 
Derrida’s notion of the supplement as a semiotic device that attaches itself to an existing 
concept as an addition or substitution (or both), which subsequently confirms and/or 
betrays the “natural” existence of that concept. Like Derrida’s supplement, honor throws 
into relief the contradictions between public and private life that liberal discourse tried to 
naturalize through all sorts of ideological strategies—the rhetoric of natural law, the 
blending of economic and environmental discourse, and the joining of affect to political 
procedure. Slavoj Žižek also captures this idea of the supplement (though in an 
expectedly Lacanian fashion) when he invokes the “obscene supplement”—an ethics or 
set of cultural practices omitted from the self-representations of a political system, but 
that are required for its function nevertheless.10 According to Žižek (who draws on 
Adorno) liberalism is not necessarily a set of coherent or profound moral values, as much 
as it is a practical machine—an array of institutions and juridical procedures that 
necessitates an ethical nucleus to give it deeper legitimacy.11 In this way, Honor could 
also be seen as an ethos that gave liberalism the moral freight it might not have had on its 
own. Highlighting liberalism’s contradictions and its ethical gaps, the sense of honor that 
developed in the Romantic era would go on to influence the ethics of later literary 
periods. Such a value, I claim, can help clarify the impulse by mid-century Victorians to 
reform classical liberal tenets associated with utilitarianism and laissez-faire economics, 




hallmark of European social democracy, a system whose ideas have been linked to the 
cultures of High Modernism in the early-twentieth-century. 
The conversion of an ancient value into a modern one was not without ideological 
conflict. Alert to the dramatic transitions in history happening all around them, Romantic 
authors from a variety of different genres and social positions underscore in their writings 
a dialectic between older “hierarchical” ideas of honor and newer “egalitarian” models, 
those forms of honor that would later prove crucial to the development of human rights 
and the protection of individual dignity as a cornerstone to civil society. Each of the 
following chapters thus portrays a historical shift in the meaning and significance of this 
virtue, showing the dialectical movement between what Raymond Williams called the 
“residual” ideas of culture—its traditions, habits, and indisputable norms—and its 
“emergent” ideas, those “new meanings and values, new practices, new relationships and 
kinds of relationships” that begin to achieve a kind of practical consciousness during the 
period.12 A literary history of value centered on the formal complexity of the language of 
honor and shame, The Life of Honor demonstrates how British Romantic writers became 
some of the first Western cultural figures to view honor as a phenomenon applicable 
problems of a world that did not simply look back to its past, but was more actively 
obsessed with its present and perhaps its—and our—future. 
The early-nineteenth-century conception of honor touches upon three themes, 
each of which plays a significant role in the following chapters. The first is the 
relationship of honor to the public and private spheres. Recently, scholars like Jeremy 
Waldron and George Kateb have argued that the meaning of honor changed in the late-




status and hierarchy to a more private idea of inherent dignity and inner worth.13 I 
demonstrate, however, that in the early nineteenth-century honor could register both 
communally and individually, often at the same time. As I have previous indicated, the 
second theme is the place of honor in the development of liberalism. Although the 
political historian J.G.A. Pocock has written about the connection of civic virtues like 
honor to the rise of the liberal-capitalist society in the eighteenth-century, many 
Romantic writers actually reacted against a form of honor that was tied to bourgeois 
customs and the institutions to which they were connected, showing that the idea of 
honor might cut across the various political ideologies that arose out of modernity.14 
Finally, the Romantic idea of honor is connected to affect, perhaps the predominant 
theoretical paradigm in literary criticism today. As a deeply felt moral value—and one 
that was long associated with dueling and feminine chastity—honor retained its 
emotional qualities well into the nineteenth-century. And yet, there is an important 
counter-discourse developed by Romantic writers that shows honor to be anti-
sentimental—allied more to sober, communal solidarity than to the vicissitudes of 
sympathy. After addressing each one of these three themes in greater detail, I will discuss 
my methodology, and the way in which this project intervenes in contemporary criticism 
on the politics of Romantic literature.  
 
Private and Public  
When one steps out onto the early-morning heath for a duel, it is a public affair. 
First, a duel of honor occurs between two people (almost always men—although Robert 




involves “seconds,” or those companions of the duelists involved in overseeing the 
fairness and procedure of the event. And despite a general wish to keep the duel isolated 
and out of sight of civil society, many duels had audiences—members of the populace 
who either heard about them through rumor or because they were tipped off. (Prime 
Minister William Pitt’s famous duel with George Tierney in 1798 is a great example—
highly publicized, an audience had gathered at Putney Heath to witness the potential 
death of arguably the most powerful figure in the world). Not only does dueling convey 
the very public nature of the honor ethic—an ancient practice meant to maintain one’s 
social reputation—but so does the array of titles, peerage, and entailment associated with 
the aristocracy. An “externalizing” of a moral quality, honor is literally something that 
can be attached to your name—the public form of identity—and economic position, of 
which your local community would be well aware (as Austen reminds us when her 
characters obsess over Darcy’s income of £10,000 a year). 
And yet, it was during the Romantic era that honor also began to be regarded as 
an internal virtue, something that was not inherited or even earned through great or heroic 
deeds, but that was provided to you by way of your inherent humanity. This is the 
alternative, private form of honor. Although the idea of the “innate dignity of man” had 
been conveyed by numerous evangelical sermons prior to the revolutionary age, 
Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) is one of the more 
influential texts to discuss honor as a private phenomenon.16 Even before Kant defines 
the categorical imperative, he considers the concept of Würde, which literally translates 
to “worth” or “value.” A better interpretation, however, is “intrinsic worth” or 




for a moment be brought into comparison or competition without as it were violating its 
sanctity.”17 Using pecuniary language here, Kant confronts directly the ancient 
understanding of honor as a virtue connected to class power and economic status. As a 
universal marker of inherent worthiness, honor did not need to be advertised by one’s 
financial wellbeing or their public reputation. This burgeoning idea of private honor was 
not just found in German metaphysics, but it was also adopted in the pamphlets and 
treatises of English radicals like Thomas Paine and Mary Wollstonecraft. Employing a 
slightly different idiom than Kant, Paine and Wollstonecraft refer to the private idea of 
honor as the “natural” or “native dignity of man.”18 Here, they modify an older, 
evangelical sense of dignity by fitting it to the dictums of natural law to which they were 
sympathetic. A part of early republican discourse, this progressive, universalist 
understanding of honor and dignity has had a broad and lasting impact: as the philosopher 
Kwame Anthony Appiah notes in his most recent book The Honor Code (2010), 
“[h]onor, in the form of individual dignity, powers the global movement for human 
rights.”19  
And yet, this shift from public to private—from an external, hierarchical sense of 
honor, to an internal, egalitarian version—was not as smooth transition as some scholars 
of honor imply. Michael McKeon has shown that the very distinction between these 
categories is a feature of modern life: “The modern separation out of the public and the 
private is therefore…a disembedding of figure from ground, an ‘explication’ of what 
tacitly had always been there.”20 Located in both public and private spheres, the 





Throughout The Life of Honor, I suggest how new ideas about honor in both 
public and private life developed from political contention, oftentimes adopting 
contrasting features of different post-revolutionary political ideologies. Thus, while one’s 
honor could be seen as private, universal, and partaking of the “leveling principles” 
associated with radical figures like Kant, Paine, and Wollstonecraft, because of the 
heterogeneous outcomes of the revolution, it could also retain the public and communal 
connotations associated with Edmund Burke. This phenomenon is exemplified by 
William Godwin’s idea of “true honor” addressed in chapter one: motivated by the same 
fear of post-revolutionary social dislocation as Burke, Godwin designs a virtue that 
eliminated the sentimentalism and obsession with rank that characterized Burkean 
chivalry, but that would maintain a sense of the general good throughout the radical’s 
quest for universal private liberty. Exemplified by these two major political figures in 
Romanticism, this new version of honor indicates an even larger recalibration of 
individualist and collectivist styles of governance, suggesting a style of civic commitment 
that could occur beyond the mediations of the traditional, Habermasian public sphere, 
where private citizens coalesce around supposedly egalitarian structures like the capitalist 
marketplace or the free press.21 
 If modern honor could not be premised solely on the transcendent sovereignty of 
the individual—the private “[a]utonomy [that] is the basis of the dignity of human and of 
every rational nature,” as Kant puts it—than it could also not fit neatly into categories 
around which the public traditionally oriented themselves; the culture of sensibility, 




public responsibility, honor announces the paradox that the modern political subject faced 
in the early-nineteenth-century. 
 
Liberalism  
Private dignity; egalitarian recognition; an overturning of the old hierarchies of 
rank and station—this is not just the language of modern honor, but also the language of 
liberal politics. And despite the persistent identification of honor with a regressive or 
medieval past, recent scholars have shown it to be a vital liberal norm, alongside 
freedom, privacy, and a regard for the rule of law. In her Liberalism with Honor (2002), 
the political theorist Sharon Krause identifies a “modified form” of honor that became 
“available to modern democracy” even after the revolution. Krause recognizes 
specifically the need of the modern liberal polis to rely on the “heroic qualities at the 
heart” of that virtue.23 While liberalism has long been connected to these idealisms, it is 
also related to the rise of the commercial society in the eighteenth-century and to the 
increasing influence of political economy on everyday life. Given the renewed attention 
of literary critics of the nineteenth-century to the development of the liberal society, a 
commonly-made point must be reiterated: the emergence of liberalism is at the same time 
the emergence of the bourgeois capitalist order, with each side drawing from the same 
idiom to describe their moral values. Hence, the freedom of choice is also the freedom of 
trade; the vaunted sense of individualism can be traced in part to the breaking away of the 
burghers from their former, feudal obligations; and the primacy of legal frameworks and 
documentation to organize society is also the contractualism used to protect economic 




liberal jurisprudence—and his maxim about letting “ten guilty go free rather than let a 
single person suffer” is often quoted in the most sincere way by Romantic writers.24 
However, in his Commentaries on the Laws of England (1775) Blackstone also advocated 
for the expansion of game laws that would keep the peasantry from encroaching on 
gentry lands, coerce them into other, non-self-sufficient forms of labor, and ultimately 
corral their weapons in order to avoid armed insurrections.25  
A prominent historian of the long-eighteenth century, J.G.A. Pocock sees honor 
as a tangible economic factor in the rise of the bourgeois liberal order. Focusing on the 
development of the republican tradition throughout the long-eighteenth-century, Pocock 
demonstrates how one’s honor—or their virtu—was associated less with the economic 
indices of the aristocracy and more with the manners of those in the commercialist 
classes, citizens whose public conduct in a growing international marketplace gave rise to 
a “commercial humanism.” As Pocock puts it, “a rights to things became a way to the 
practice of virtue, so long as virtue could be defined as the practice and refinement of 
manners.”26 Given the increasing influence of the bourgeois on cultural arrangements, 
one of the few modern ways to practice a civic virtue like honor was to become a part of 
the commercial society that legitimated it.  
In short, Pocock’s thesis about the rise of bourgeois liberal society meant that 
virtues like honor were mediated by property relationships. As Scott’s Rob Roy (1818) 
demonstrates, something like credit starts to become a trusted measure of one’s honorable 
responsibility in the early-eighteenth-century, perhaps more trusted in the public sphere 
than words or actions. (I read Scott’s novel as a touchstone for this shift from honor to 




phenomenon, revealing how the liberal bourgeois version of honor that had been reserved 
for commercial gentleman was a deeply problematic way to capture civic virtue and the 
feelings of responsibility that individuals felt towards their collective society. Thus, 
opposed to Rob Roy—which mostly defends the “decent honest[y]” of credit, that 
commercial form of honor—is a text like Jane Austen’s Emma (1816), which remains 
highly skeptical about specious financial representations of honor like credit, and seeks to 
replace them with a moral vocabulary derived from unmediated, face-to-face 
interactions.27 However, if novels like Emma seem to defy the tenets of bourgeois 
liberalism, this does not mean that Romantic writers wanted to reverse the wheels of 
history to a time before the revolution, an event that had conclusively legitimated 
bourgeois values from that point on. (Seeing in Emma a desire for a pre-revolutionary 
time happens to be one of the more traditional ways to read the novel; as a conservative 
text that promotes the traditional mores of an idealized old England, and therefore 
celebrates Britain’s recent victory against Napoleon at Waterloo). Instead, I suggest that 
texts like Emma, The Prelude (1805), and even Godwin’s supposedly Jacobin novel 
Caleb Williams (1793) ultimately imagine alternative sociopolitical futures for post-
revolutionary England, and center the moral lives of those future on their own hypotheses 
about honor, a virtue that might address a major contradiction in the incipient liberal 
project.  
What was this contradiction? On the one hand the liberal ideology associated with 
the Revolution promised to bestow universal rights and individual sovereignty to all 
members of the polis—making society fairer, more egalitarian, and more liberal in the 




much of the revolution was based meant a continued or even intensified stratification of 
the classes, a reinvigorated sense of cultural hierarchies, and growing fault lines in social 
cohesion. In other words, the egalitarianism of the revolutionary project could never be 
truly realized until it addressed the systemic inequality that was built into the very 
bourgeois model from which it was derived.  
Such a paradox did not go unaddressed—even by the figures most associated with 
perpetuation of liberal ideals. While major pre-revolutionary figures like Rousseau in his 
Discourse on Inequality (1755) excoriated the private property relations upon which the 
bourgeois system was based, even a radical like Thomas Paine—who waxed in 1791 that 
commerce was “capable of carrying mankind”—advocated for a system of social 
insurance to which all members of a landed society would contribute.28 Paine’s early 
vision of the welfare state in Agrarian Justice (1795) was intended to be an institutional 
solution to a system that seemed to undercut its own ideological claims to equality and 
personal freedom. But Paine also realized that it would take more than a structural change 
in the market to check the inequality that naturally occurs in a capitalist society. It would 
take a moral imperative, “a revolution in the state of civilization” Paine says, “[to]…give 
perfection to the Revolution of France.”29 Another way of putting this is that in terms of 
its own self-representation the liberal project had to find an ethical foundation if it was 
going to do justice to its highest ideals. The Romantics, I argue, were the cultural figures 
that first responded to this paradox in liberalism, and honor was one of the major virtues 
to which they turned in order to account for its conflict between individualism and 
communality. In doing so, these writers also tried to revise a bourgeois, individualist idea 




cornerstone of the liberal society. They hoped that the communal side of the virtue might 
limit liberalism’s potential to turn citizens into chilly utilitarians—rational calculators of 
their own private advantage.   
The growth of the liberal society has been a popular concern in recent literary 
criticism, undoubtedly owing to the tumultuous path that liberalism has taken since the 
fall of the Berlin wall and the infamous proclamation of the “end of history.” What this 
disruption has entailed is both various and profound: a swift reorientation from an 
industrial to a financial economy, the rise of global ideological conflict, a dramatic 
capitalist collapse, and—even as I write this—the uncovering of an extensive, almost 
preposterous, digital surveillance apparatus born and raised in supposed bastions of 
freedom. In writing about the long development of liberalism’s mores and institutions, 
critics have also seen a way to connect discrete literary periods together that have long 
been separated by convention. For instance, in her recent book Genres of the Credit 
Economy (2008), Mary Poovey discusses the growth of the British financial system from 
the late-seventeenth-century through the mid-nineteenth-century, and links the creation of 
new literary genres to the rise of paper money, stocks, and speculative instruments.30 
Other critics like Jerome Christensen and Stephanie Kuduk Weiner have premised their 
studies on the widespread influence of republicanism before the tumult of 1789, 
establishing it as the dominant political ideology in Europe well before the Bastille. 
(Indeed, this scholarship corresponds to a shift in the interpretation of the politics of the 
French Revolution by historians, many of whom followed Francois Furet’s famous 
“revisionist” thesis in claiming that the revolution was not a sudden uprising of the 




liberalism would take in Europe). Christensen bases much of his argument in Lord 
Byron’s Strength (1993) on Pocock’s ideas of virtue and commerce—implying the 
continuity of eighteenth-century liberal commercial practices in Byron’s time—while 
Weiner’s Republican Politics and English Poetry (2005) looks at a slightly later period in 
English history, addressing the relationship between republican politics and literature 
from 1789 to the 1874.31 In their focus on commercialism, the growth of republican 
politics, and the incremental development of institutions oriented around the rising 
middle-classes, all of these texts imply the continuation—or even flourishing—of a late 
seventeenth-century bourgeois ideology into the Romantic period.   
I do not debate the predominance of this particular type of bourgeois thinking 
during this time—indeed, the premise of the Life of Honor is that the liberal project is 
intimately linked to Romantic literature and culture. But Romanticism does not just 
enshrine the values of this bourgeois genealogy. It also reacts against them. As Immanuel 
Wallerstein points out, the French Revolution—that seminal break in history—inspired 
not one but three predominant modern political ideologies: conservatism, liberalism, and 
Marxism; all of which are in a dialectical relationship with one another. If we take 
Wallerstein’s thesis to heart, then the Revolution is an event that does not just allow for 
the fulfillment of an ideology based on commercial and personal freedom in-development 
since the late-seventeenth-century, but it also challenges the very foundations upon which 








If honor as a civic virtue could inhibit the development of an unemotional, 
instrumental society, what was honor’s relationship to the passions? In other words, did 
Romantic writers want the light of Reason to be accompanied by the warmth of honor?33 
Honor—having been long associated with dueling, physical chastity, and one’s deeply-
felt reputation or “character”—is seemingly inextricable from emotion, fervor, and the 
body. For the Romantics, these affective parts of honor were in part a remnant from the 
classical age. In Pope’s translation of The Iliad (1721), Nestor exhorts equivocate Greek 
warriors to “be men: your generous breasts inflame / With mutual honour, and with 
mutual shame!”34 Such a physical feeling of honor was not just tied to masculinity or the 
military enterprises. Women’s honor was habitually thought of as a private, physical 
quality that was susceptible to injury—especially through sexual misconduct or harm. 
Yet, for all of its deeply personal associations, a woman’s honor was at the same time 
externalized and public, a social measure of her reputation that was largely out of her 
control. This is one of the legendary double standards of the honor ethic: while men could 
conceivably recover their dignity through their own heroic acts and deeds, women would 
have to rely on the shifting tides of public opinion to restore a sense of their good 
character.35 Well-known novels like Samuel Richardson’s Pamela (1740) and Pierre 
Choderlos de Laclos’s Les Liaisons Dangereuses (1782) highlight this phenomenon in 
their narrative structure, using the epistolary form to emphasize the sociality of the 
protagonist’s honor or virtue—code of course for her chastity.  
And yet, since the mid-sixteenth-century, the sensation of honor and shame was 




instance, Falstaff provides a very famous critique of honor during the battle of 
Shrewsbury: “[W]hat is that honor,” Falstaff asks himself, “Air. A trim reckoning!”36 
Mere ornamentation without function, honor is an empty word.  In a society increasingly 
committed to the use of “public reason” the impassioned concept of honor was seen as 
capricious, unreliable, and, perhaps worst of all, meaningless. 
In the wake of the revolution controversy of the 1790s, however, honor and its 
affective criteria were infused with widespread cultural credibility. Responding to what 
he perceived as the dislocating and decadent selfishness of the Jacobins, Burke called on 
British citizens to cultivate a “delicate sense of honour” as a cultural defense against the 
radicals of the French Revolution, who decried stale customs and the hegemony of 
historical precedent.37 Burke sets against the heartless individualism of the 
revolutionaries this civic form of honor. For him, it is precisely the emotional qualities of 
honor—its “manly sentiment” and “sensibility of principle”—that had harmonized the 
collective social world in the past.38 Not merely a revival associated with conservative 
thinking, feelings of honor and dignity also become important to Romantic authors across 
the political spectrum. In The Cenci (1819), for example, Percy Shelley connects 
sympathy to the dignity of certain types of art; and twelve years later in her History, the 
escaped slave Mary Prince argues for the enduring dignity of the body as a way to 
reclaim her honor. Occupying a range of moods and emotional states, the embodiment of 
honor and shame in the Romantic era could also be politically progressive. Austen, for 
instance, demonstrates how Romantic women writers move honor away from its 




national shame—in some ways the opposite of honor—as a way to instill visceral 
revulsion in the slave trade.  
 However, in the Life of Honor I contend that this civic virtue contained a double-
gesture. Although the Romantics continued to promote the feeling of honor as a way for 
citizens to connect with each other on a local level, many recognized the perils of a larger 
political culture based entirely on the sentiments. Even while viewing the emotions as an 
indispensable part of the era’s concept of social relations, these writers were critical of 
the paradigm of sensibility and its over-application to collective problems. They saw how 
the age’s “structures of feeling” could obscure systemic injustices, keep networks of 
power firmly entrenched, and divert citizens from the best solutions to communal 
predicaments.39 Thus, honor simultaneously propagated and reacted against a political 
culture committed to sensibility and affect. This double-gesture is illustrated by William 
Godwin’s Caleb Williams, a text that critiques Burke’s sentimental version of modern 
honor because of the way it blinded progressive reformers to the structural biases of 
contemporary institutions. But, instead of trying to the eliminate idea of honor—an 
approach taken by legions of humanists from the sixteenth-century onward—authors like 
Godwin and Burke attempted to apply it to the divergent political projects of modernity: 
while Burkean conservatism used the idea of honor to emphasize the innate morality of 
intimate social connections, Godwin’s anarchism linked it to a broader idea of innate 
social responsibility, one that could be divorced from the culture of sensibility and the 
artificiality of contractual obligations. The famous slave narrative The History of Mary 
Prince (1831) also emphasizes this binary. On the one hand, the slave narrative detaches 




within the exotic figure of a black woman, showing how feelings of honor could 
encourage identification with others who were seen as foreign or wholly different. On the 
other hand, the text also hints that feelings of sympathy encouraged a state of passivity 
that obstructed the political action required to abolish the slave trade once and for all.  
All of these texts begin to theorize a new ethical paradigm that could respond to 
the problematic role of the sentiments in liberal thought, which, as Daniel Gross notes, 
has a history that extends all the way back to the British republican movement following 
the English Civil War.40 Instead of just indicating a certain mood or social feeling, honor 
was increasingly regarded as one’s duty to others, regardless of the emotional connection 
you had with them, or the sympathetic links you shared. In other words, one didn’t 
necessarily have to feel for a person or a group in order to act honorably towards them. 
Another word for this virtue is solidarity—a unity of popular interests that is greater than 
the individual affections people share with one another.  
It is not usually Romanticism but Anglo-American Modernism that is credited as 
the first literary movement to fuse anti-sentimentalism with social commitment. 
Following the First World War, circles of Modernist luminaries like the Bloomsbury 
group turned against the sentimentalist idiom of previous decades, even as they adopted 
and expanded the proto-socialism of the late-nineteenth-century. What they were 
gestating was in fact a new approach to the liberal society: social democracy, a system 
that merged the values of liberal autonomy with socialist collectivism, but also taught the 
left to value solidarity over sympathy in its struggles going forward.41 One of the aims of 
The Life of Honor is to suggest a prehistory to this narrative by showing how Romantic 




century before the rise of Anglo-American literary High Modernism. If in 1913 solidarity 
was for the socialist organizer Eugene Debs “not a matter of sentiment, but of fact, cold 
and impassive as the granite foundation of a sky scraper,” it owed much to what William 
Godwin called “true honor” in 1793, a virtue that “refuse[d] any danger or suffering by 
which the general good may be promoted”.42 Even in the Age of Sensibility, those in 
civic life had an intensely complicated, even skeptical, relation to affect. 
Current criticism has seemed much less skeptical about the place of affect in 
literature, culture, and politics. “The Affective Turn” has been an extremely influential 
movement in literary criticism over the past twenty years and has a dialectical 
relationship with the rising interest in bourgeois liberalism. Obviously, this political 
system has always relied on emotion to serve its aims. Take, for instance, the moral 
sentiments that supported the logic of political economy in the eighteenth-century, or 
even, as Sara Ahmed points out, the post-9/11 rhetoric of fear that made possible illicit 
foreign intervention and an expansion of Anglo-American world power.43 Emotions of 
course also rely on political organization for their development. In this vein, Joel Faflak 
and Lauren Berlant have written compellingly about how modern liberal democracy 
essentially invented the feelings of happiness and optimism.44 
Romanticists have long been aware of the place of emotion in the history of 
political thought.45 Prominent in their criticism—and also discernible in the contours of 
affect theory—is a focus on sensibility, a communal awareness of certain feelings and 
sentiments that can bind private lives to a larger social consciousness, or, as Raymond 
Williams famously articulated, to a “structure of feeling.”46 Evoking Williams, Thomas 




states that capture the aesthetic qualities of certain historical divisions in the Romantic 
period. “As the presupposition for maintaining any cognitive or…emotive relationship to 
the world whatsoever, ‘mood,’” Pfau says, “is ontologically anterior to the realm of what 
may be logically verified and discursively represented as knowledge. It is in the nature of 
“mood” not to be reflexively aware but, as the substratum of conscious awareness and 
representation, to resist discernment, particularly where attempts are made to positively 
consciously fix it in representational form”.47 Though the “Romantic mood” is not a 
political category per se, there is still a working assumption that feelings precede thought.  
Indeed, this is one of the effective premises of affect theory. Feelings have a kind 
of a priori veracity—an innate truthfulness that, by extension, substantiates their moral 
value. The equation of truth with emotion—the reason of passion—also fulfills a 
longtime ambition of many writers at the turn of the nineteenth-century: to square the 
feelings with the intellectual pursuits of public life; to define the political imagination as 
reason in her most exalted mood. Following the lead of the Romantics, current 
philosophers like Martha Nussbaum call the emotions “essential elements of human 
intelligence…[and] part of our reasoning capacity as political creatures,” and cultural 
critics like Ahmed show how a sense of national feelings illustrates the “emotive nature 
of publics.”48 Even if certain emotions can delude individuals and distort public 
arrangements, one has merely to strip away those “bad” layers of feeling in order to find 
more amenable sentiments. Thus, while Berlant criticizes the false optimism produced by 
“affective structure[s]” of attachment, her appeal is for not less but more optimistic desire 




Indisputably, these critics reveal how much modern politics relies upon affect. 
But we might question whether more affective connection is the key to resolving 
sociopolitical problems. Recently, literary critics from a range of fields have started to 
challenge this proposition. Vivasvan Soni investigates the shortcomings of the 
eighteenth-century moral sentiments in his Mourning Happiness (2010)—keenly noting 
that “[s]ympathy, then which promised to serve as a bridge between self and other, 
betrays its promise and leaves the self embroiled with its own emotions, which it 
imagines to have come from the other.”50 And, writing in the wake of global economic 
crisis of 2008, Walter Benn Michaels argues for the impotency of “affective images” to 
effect mobilization against neoliberal capitalism.51 Following these critics, The Life of 
Honor explores how post-revolutionary British literature confronted the problematic of 
affect-oriented politics. I demonstrate throughout how the new civic form of honor 
theorized by Romantic literature allowed writers to be of two minds about affect. On the 
individual level, the rhetoric of feeling and sympathy was often paired with honor in 
order to make the civic virtue more egalitarian and applicable to traditionally 
marginalized identities. On the communal level however, these same Romantic writers 
preferred to use honor as a sober replacement for the sentiments, skeptical about the 
ability of feeling to address broader, more pervasive cultural problems.  
Although this seems like a paradox, the connecting together of these two notions 
is not totally outlandish—indeed, it is one of the foundational oppositions of 
Romanticism. Despite the popular opinion that the Romantic era was driven almost 
entirely by the temperaments, a key part of early-nineteenth-century discourse was also 




Romanticism does not just show how “irrational” energies and desires became legitimate 
influences on politics—and how sensibility was ultimately recognized as a key part of 
civil society—but also registers a backlash to those energies. Orrin N.C. Wang has 
recently called this the sobriety of Romantic discourse, a “renunciation or policing of the 
senses” that is just as much a part of Romanticism as its stereotypical excesses.52 Not just 
applicable to life between the years 1789-1832, Wang’s theorization of Romantic 
sobriety also applies to today’s critique of affect—in particular, how emotions might 
obscure the conditions of political crises. In the words of one of affect theory’s most 
influential critics, Brian Massumi, “the media-borne affective conversion circuit upon 
which political power increasingly relies for its legitimation obscures the actual dynamics 
of [crisis].”53 Massumi could just as well have been talking about the conservative 
contributions to the pamphlet wars of the 1790s, which radicals like Paine and 
Wollstonecraft critiqued as melodramatic and overwrought, deceptive in their 
sensationalism. There is a dark-side to affect, and it is written into the civil discourse of 
modernity.   
 
Methodology and Chapter Descriptions  
In the following chapters I rely for the most part on formal textual analysis, 
tracking discrete changes in the language associated with the honor ethic in order to 
illustrate its development over time. It might appear that terms like “honor” and “dignity” 
are used interchangeably, or that one indiscriminately replaces the other throughout the 
course of an argument. This is not philological carelessness as much as it is an intentional 




changes in culture(s). The early-nineteenth-century is a particularly fruitful period to 
witness these changes, and it is replete with what Raymond Williams famously called 
keywords—language that “record[s], investigat[es] and present[s] problems of meaning 
in the area in which the meanings of culture and society have formed.”54 Almost all of 
my chapters investigate the tension created by these semantic variations. This is also to 
say that while my chapters follow each other in a regular chronology—and are even 
constructed with a straightforward narrative—they are not strictly historical. That is, they 
do not appeal solely to the authority of empiricism nor do they rely on the singular 
concept of “history” as a methodological foundation. (After Nietzsche, who can really do 
either?) Instead, my impulse is to find in Williams’s formalism—and its investigation of 
semantic “problems of meaning”—a path to the speculative enterprise of criticism itself; 
to see formalism as a way to recognize the historical possibilities inherent in any 
contestation of meaning, rather than use it to uncover definitive historical 
transformations.  
Although my formalist approach to literary history has a long lineage—owing to 
cultural historians like Williams, traditional historians like Pocock, and even New 
Historicists like Marjorie Levinson—my research also incorporates a new formalism born 
out of the digital humanities.55 The mining of massive amounts of text, the visualization 
of broad thematic relationships through digital applications, and the ability to engage 
easily with lesser-known influences on a primary work through online archives are all 
formalist in nature, technologies that make up what Franco Morretti has called the 
practice of “distant reading;” using aggregated data to perform more comprehensive 




and new critical practices. While I rely on Google’s NGram viewer to visualize spikes 
and dips in the frequency of the word “credit” throughout a large archive of texts from 
1750-1815, my analysis on the moral dimensions of credit turns on the venerable practice 
of close-reading, giving Austen’s contextual cues and character quirks their full due.   
This combination of old and new formal practices—with its Romantic suggestion 
of an interlaced temporality—leads to a more conceptual methodological ambition: a 
reconsideration of the concept of civic virtue in light of the sociohistorical diversity of 
Romanticism. Above, I invoked Immanuel Wallerstein’s idea that the French Revolution 
gave rise to not one but three major political ideologies in modernity: liberalism, 
conservatism, and Marxism. Although the modern notion of honor has been attached to 
the development of liberal society, I emphasize throughout this dissertation how much 
honor owed to the two other major political formations to which Romantic modernity 
gave rise. Thus, while honor sounds conservative on the surface—and brings to mind the 
old sentiments of chivalry, the protocols of the aristocracy, the rituals of the land-gentry, 
the mythos of Burke or Scott—it also communicates the liberal belief in individual self-
worth and universal dignity, what Wordsworth called “the native and naked dignity of 
man” in the Preface to Lyrical Ballads (1802).57 And if the discourse of honor in the 
Romantic era reflects both progressive and traditionalist positions, then it also has proto-
Marxist elements. Rather than being a metaphysical—or deontological—virtue, the 
modern honor ethic could be premised on a critique of bourgeois institutions and the way 
in which they shaped English culture. The social relations produced by the British 
financial system, the Atlantic slave trade, and the literary marketplace were all thrown 




revolutionary firmament, the Romantic notion of honor reflects the diverse features of 
these three emerging political ideologies. It was communitarian like Burkean 
conservatism, abstract and individualist like Enlightenment liberalism, and like Marxism, 
its very definition was premised on a critique of the bourgeois social dynamic.   
The Life of Honor explores the interconnection of these three modern political 
ideologies by locating key concepts from each of them within a single virtue. In this way, 
it tries to avoid historicizing Romantic literature through the lens of a single post-
revolutionary politics, whether it is republicanism, proto-socialism, or even reactionary 
royalism.58 Thus, not only do I follow A.O. Lovejoy’s observation that there is not one 
but many different Romantic movements, but the example of the Romantic New 
Historicism, which attested to the sociopolitical heterogeneity of the Romantic era.59 
Texts like Marilyn Butler’s Romantics, Rebels, and Reactionaries (1981), for example, 
set the aristocratic traditionalism of German Romanticism alongside the defiant 
radicalism of many English and French Romantics; and much of Jerome McGann’s 
criticism replicates the political complexity of the Romantic era by blending Marxist 
ideology critique and liberal pragmatism.60 While this study is indebted to Romanticists 
over the last thirty years who have engaged history and historiography in their 
scholarship, it also uses this engagement to frame a new—and exigent—set of questions: 
can there be such a thing as a political commitment that subtends the many ideologies 
that Romanticism provided to modern life?61 Does the rupture of a stable political order 
preclude the possibility of a single civic virtue uncoupled from affect, nationalism, or an 




Chapter 1 theorizes the emergence of a modern sense of honor by focusing on one 
of the most famous ideological quarrels of the 1790s, the conflict between Edmund Burke 
and William Godwin. Prompted by the anarchic tendencies of the Jacobins and what he 
believed was their lifeless, utilitarian philosophy, Burke’s Reflections on the Revolutions 
in France (1791) proposed a revival of honor for the modern age, a virtue derived from 
the time-tested principles of chivalry, hierarchy, and above all from the shared sentiments 
that bound together the social order. Well-known for being a radical take on conservative 
politics, William Godwin’s Caleb Williams represents the potential outcome of living 
under such a sentimentalist honor code: a relentlessly skeptical protagonist—cut in the 
mold of radical British dissenters—is cowed by the emotional demands of chivalry, 
ultimately unable to think about anything but the psychic bond he has with his master. 
Instead of trying to eliminate a sense of honor from public life, however, Godwin offers 
an alternative version within the novel itself. Motivated by the same fear of post-
revolutionary social dislocation that afflicted Burke, Godwin presents what he calls “true 
honor,” a virtue that would grant citizens a universal sense of dignity and instill in them 
an awareness of the general good—even while it eliminated the sentimentalism and 
obsession with rank that characterized Burkean chivalry. A short coda focuses on Percy 
Shelley’s closet drama The Cenci (1819). By applying Godwin’s principles to a portrait 
of his degraded heroine Beatrice, Shelley suggests that aesthetics may project a sense of 
dignity similar to Godwin’s “true honor.” However, because art has the ability to 
moderate and direct the passions, Shelley’s play seems to revive the sentiments that 




Located somewhere in between Burke’s traditionalism and Godwin’s radical 
philosophy, Wordsworth develops a modern sense of honor early in his career. Chapter 2 
presents this development in a biographical reading of Wordsworth’s “great decade” 
from 1798-1808. Addressing chronologically a variety of different texts—the 
Advertisement to the Lyrical Ballads (1798), the Preface to the second edition (1800), the 
ballad “Michael” (1800), the “Residence in France” sections of the 1805 Prelude, and the 
hawkish treatise The Convention of Cintra (1808)—this chapter addresses Wordsworth’s 
early career as a struggle between two types of honor: a conservative value of hierarchy 
and status that continued to function in the day’s literary market for “dignified” literary 
productions, and a progressive value of egalitarianism and equity, one that would allow 
poetry to appeal to the “native and naked dignity” inherent in all mankind regardless of 
their commercial well-being. Against readings that claim Wordsworth’s became 
increasingly conservative as his career progressed, this chapter shows how he in fact 
models a classic paradox inherent in liberal politics: the conflict between market 
distinction and social equality.  
If the second chapter focuses on the associations between honor and cultural 
capital, chapter 3 focuses on the relationship of honor to real capital. The rising civic 
importance of British finance capitalism in the early eighteenth-century meant a greater 
emphasis on the moral dimensions of economic language. Honor and disrepute were thus 
increasingly synonymous with terms like credit and debt. This is no more evident than in 
Walter Scott’s Rob Roy, an adventure whose young protagonist ventures into the thick of 
the 1715 Jacobite rebellion in order to rescue errant bills of credit and redeem the honor 




international credit system—and a utopian vision of infinite financial expansionism that 
might prove to be, as Berlant describes it, cruelly optimistic—Jane Austen remains 
unconvinced of credit’s moral rectitude. Emma (1816) offers a subtle critique of credit as 
a moral concept, and posits a solution: replaces the dubious morality of finance with a 
more substantial ethos of honorable trust in the other. This move from the financialized 
world-system in Scott’s novel to the quaint affairs of Austen’s Highbury prefigures the 
proposals of many contemporary critics of liberal capitalism: a move from global to local 
politics. The coda to this chapter investigates how two popular film remakes of these 
novels—Rob Roy (1995) and Clueless (1995)—represented honor in the hyperactive 
credit economy of the neoliberal era.  
 Emma suggests that a modern honor ethic could revitalize a sense of communality 
within limited, Burkean social circles. The text in my fourth chapter, however, shows 
how a national sense of honor and shame could motivate the entire British public against 
an international institution: the Atlantic slave trade, an enterprise within which every 
citizen was implicated either directly or indirectly. Known for its brutal descriptions of 
punishment—and the indomitable heroine that resists them—The History of Mary Prince 
(1831) is usually seen as a slave narrative that advances the affective arguments for 
abolition in a particularly forceful way. Its explicit set-pieces of violence and sexual 
humiliation were meant to appeal to the sentiments of British readers and to provoke in 
them an instinctual repulsion towards slavery. Unfortunately, this tactic meant that slaves 
would be regarded as permanently degraded, and that their humanity could be 
acknowledged only in spiritual or abstract ways. Mary Prince and her editor Thomas 




of honor and dignity to Prince’s physical body. In doing this, the History addresses the 
prejudice concerning the wantonness of the black female body long-held by both 
abolitionists and colonialists, and demonstrates how the late abolitionist movement 
played a large part in reimagining traditionalist versions of British honor—with all of its 
militarism, chauvinism, and whiteness—to make the virtue more egalitarian and 
inclusive. In a concluding section, I show how the text’s invocation shame—in some 
ways the opposite of honor—converts the public injustice of slavery into a private, 
visceral mood that would be unavoidable to the laymen British reader. 
 If the sociohistorical heterogeneity of Romanticism makes impossible the very 
idea of a single civic virtue, is honor thus the representative ethical sign of the early-
nineteenth-century—an imperative that exceeds political categories? And if its excess is 
also temporal—not merely touching upon the institutional foundations of the liberal 
project, but also the teleologies upon which it was based—does this mean that honor 
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Soliloquies in Praise of Chivalry: 
Burke, Godwin, Shelley and the Performance of Honor 
 
I. 
 On May 27, 1798, the Prime Minister of England shot at another member of 
parliament from a distance of thirty feet. William Pitt the Younger—the Tory leader who 
had presided over the government for nearly fifteen years—had been called out on the 
floor of the House of Commons by the Irish MP George Tierney.1 When Tierney 
objected to Pitt’s proposal to increase naval spending, Pitt claimed that Tierney was 
willfully obstructing the defense of the country. A short exchange between the two men 
proved ineffective at quelling their disagreement, and they met days later for a duel on 
Putney Heath complete with “seconds,” those men charged with overseeing the procedure 
and fairness of the duel, a practice by now almost universally frowned upon by society. 
Upon missing each other with their opening shots, Pitt fired his pistol into the air 
signaling an amenable end to the conflict. Honor had been restored and the two men were 
satisfied.2 However, many sources report that the pistols had never been loaded by the 
seconds: although the sensationalism of the event remained in-tact, death or harm was 
never a real possibility. Other sources report that a small audience had been tipped off as 
to the duel’s secret location and that they had gathered to witness one political party’s 
spectacular demise. These accounts are not just frivolous details.3 Not only do they prove 
how important honor was to the political life of the tumultuous 1790s, but such accounts 
show how melodramatic the ethic of honor could be. Affective and theatrical, the duel of 




for Pitt and Tierney, the duel was not just about private retribution but public recognition 
on the great stage of history, a time whose predominant metaphor was a “theater of 
revolution.”  
 Pitt and Tierney’s duel is just one example of the public role played by honor, a 
virtue undergoing a significant revival during the Napoleonic era, but one that was also 
changing its moral outlook following the profound democratic developments across 
Europe: no longer reserved for the aristocracy alone, there were hints that honor could 
soon be available to every ordinary citizen by way of merit, reputation, and civic 
responsibility. In an effort to take seriously this changing culture of honor in the 1790s—
and to better understand its nature as a phenomenon of modernity instead of antiquity—
this chapter turns to one of the decade’s most famous gothic texts, William Godwin’s 
Caleb Williams (1794), a novel whose characters cannot help but be taken-in by displays 
of honor. Demonstrating the importance of this virtue to both Britain’s conservatives and 
her dissenters in the aftermath of the French Revolution, I begin by tracing a familiar late 
eighteenth century politic debate between the conservative Edmund Burke and the 
dissenter Godwin in order to see how a modern honor ethic took shape during the post-
revolutionary era. A subsequent reading of Caleb Williams shows two distinct forms of 
honor at play in the contemporary life of Britain’s citizens—what Raymond Williams 
may have called a “residual” form and an “emergent” form of cultural mores. For most 
readers the first form of honor has been obvious: Caleb Williams is centered on a 
pernicious version of chivalry. Ostensibly a decent moral sentiment, the “residual” form 
of chivalric honor is portrayed by Godwin as an archaic, martial ideology to which even 




“emergent” version of honor that could be an indispensable part of the contemporary 
subject and his self-realization. In other words, while Caleb Williams shows the old, 
chivalric honor as a practice based on passionate antagonism, it a new, more democratic 
type of honor as an ethos that upheld burgeoning notions about human dignity, a notion 
that has now become fundamental to contemporary understandings of social justice and 
universal human rights. 
 Revealing the charms and pitfalls of chivalry in the age of Burke, Caleb Williams 
represents the honor ethic on the precipice of historical change. While the novel 
continues a longstanding historical critique of honor, instead of doing away with Burke’s 
discourse of honor, Godwin attempts to transform it by playing Burke’s sentimental 
language game. The next section investigates affected, performative culture of honor in 
the late-eighteenth century and the political reactions it provoked during the 
revolutionary controversy. Adding to the fine historicist work on revolutionary-era 
chivalry from critics like David Duff (and to J.G.A. Pocock’s influential model of 
bourgeois modernity based on “Virtue, Rights, and Manners”), I trace the radical political 
reaction specific to Burke’s performative language in the Reflections—those “soliloquies 
in praise of chivalry” that troubled Godwin’s contemporaries Thomas Paine and Mary 
Wollstonecraft.4 But unlike Paine and Wollstonecraft—who denounce Burke’s chivalry 
as outmoded and archaic and proclaimed the eventual disintegration of the honor ethic by 
way of reason— Godwin presents a disconcerting parable of the reasoning, political 
figure caught-up in performances of sentiment. Caleb’s infatuation with the sentiments of 
honor demonstrates a disconcerting fusion between private feelings and public practices, 




primacy of affect in literary studies and political theory. With regards to Gary 
Handwerk’s and John Bender’s own political readings of Caleb Williams—and to 
Amanda Anderson’s new work on the individual “character” of liberalism—this fusion 
would also proves especially problematic to the emerging liberal political subject called 
to separate public procedures from private beliefs, to separate, in other words, the 
mechanisms of justice from the contingencies of feeling.5  
But Caleb Williams doesn’t just wallow in the moral chasm created by Burke’s 
account of modern chivalry. Instead, it finds a solution to the problems presented by this 
public, sentimentalized honor code, the moral sentiment that binds Caleb to his antagonist 
Falkland in a “morbid” version of intersubjectivity. Without eliminating honor altogether 
or contending that it be completely contained within the subject as a form of inherent 
dignity, the novel shows the virtue to be a form of private self-regard that can, 
paradoxically, only be thought of communally. As a novelist and political philosopher, 
Godwin precipitates a movement away from chivalry—where individuals defended their 
own private reputations in public—to what might now be called a human dignity, a 
foundational principle for contemporary human rights and, as of late, philosophical 
cosmopolitanism. Widely regarded as having a deeply pessimistic take on modernity, it 
Caleb Williams, then, can be read as simultaneously advancing modernity’s cause, 
transforming honor—the Burkean ancient concept of public recognition—into dignity, a 
moral idea of private worth that does not have to rely totally on the premise of universal 





A coda takes us twenty-five years into the future to investigate the legacy of 
honor within the larger Godwin circle. Tied to Godwin by marriage and shared reformist 
politics, Percy Shelley recovers in The Cenci what Godwin calls “true honor” throughout 
Caleb Williams. Shelley, however, nuances “true honor”—and its stoic responsibilities 
towards the common good—by reviving certain private and sentimental features that 
were pernicious in Godwin’s novel, features that, for Godwin, would ultimately 
overwhelm and destabilize an individual’s responsible, public character. Similar to Caleb 
himself, Shelley’s heroine Beatrice Cenci is subjected to a system of brutal honor 
practices that seem insurmountable, and, much like Caleb, Beatrice attempts to stand 
against the cruel public performances of patriarchal honor that are used to annihilate her. 
But The Cenci does what Caleb Williams cannot do by ultimately redeeming its 
protagonist, a redemption that is enabled by Beatrice’s removal from the gothic bounds of 
the play and made possible by Shelley’s own act of sentimental identification with 
Beatrice’s portrait, and its “simplicity and dignity.”6 Shelley argues that the passions 
must continue to play a role in the development of the modern political subject, and that 
an aesthetic appreciation of “dignified” objects across social lines may be one way to 
redeem the pernicious sentimentalism associated with Burke. When paired with each 
other, Godwin and Shelley show the development of one of Britain’s most prominent 
virtues as it stretched across a major period in history and incorporated a spectrum of 
political ideologies; from the public sentimentalism of Burkean chivalry, to a more 
private “rights-based” concepts of radical, individual dignity, to a reformist hope in the 







Addressing both the ethical and affective turns in literary studies, critics in recent 
years have focused on the moral sentiments. But while joy, anger, and even the more 
heterogeneous moods have been used to thematize late-eighteenth-century politics and 
society in particular, honor has been given little direct attention, despite its blending of 
affect and morality and the major role it played in the culture and society of Britain in the 
1790s.7 Yet, honor has figured in diverse academic conversations about contemporary 
ethical life and speaks to many of our own cultural concerns today: heightened political 
antagonism (although we no longer duel), the importance of public reputation in an age 
of internet scrutiny, the possibility of universal dignity in a world of different cultures 
and identities, and the assurances of an increasingly unsteady financial system based on 
credit—that fiscal form of honor that in late capital has come to define the character of a 
nation state.8 Finally, the notion of honor and dignity has played a major role in the work 
of public intellectuals like Charles Taylor, Martha Nussbaum, and Kwame Anthony 
Appiah over the last twenty years.9 As Appiah reminded us in his book The Honor Code 
(2010), “[w]e may think we have finished with honor, but honor isn’t finished with us.”10  
With honor commanding the attention of its characters in a nearly compulsive 
way, Caleb Williams seems to take Appiah’s remark literally. Proclamations regarding 
nobility and reputation are abundant throughout the text, and many follow a kind of 
performative logic, where the language of chivalry has acute material effects on the 
present day.11 “The slightest breath of dishonor” is said to “have stung [the despotic 




confession from Caleb Williams that will clear his reputation; Caleb himself exclaims, “I 
honour you! I conjure you!” to his beloved Laura (a speech act that is followed, 
coincidentally, by a description of a speech act or a “conjuration” out of thin air).12 Full 
of what J.L. Austin called the illocutionary part of performative utterances—promises, 
oaths, and curses that speak to the ability of language that “do things” to the world—the 
novel also dramatizes the effects of these utterances, especially as they relate to the 
feelings and sentiments generated by honor. In other words, the affect of chivalry is 
intimately tied to what Austin dubbed the perlocutionary effect of performative language, 
and the result it has on the impulsive, sometimes fickle sentiments of the listener.     
The affect associated with these “honor performatives” are most associated with 
the novel’s memorable villain, Ferdinando Falkland, a perfectly despicable honorable 
gentleman long connected by historicist critics to Edmund Burke. Falkland’s connection 
to Burke is manifested with especial clarity through their similar semantics: Falkland’s 
obsession with maintaining an honorable “character” sounds very much like Burke’s 
lament in the Reflections about the modern loss of ancient chivalry, “which has given its 
character to modern Europe,” while Falkland’s consistent deferral to the rigid “laws of 
honor” echoes Burke’s deferral of political rule to a prior authority vested by national 
sensibility, the “native plainness and directness of [British] understanding.”13 Even 
Falkland’s peculiar “habits of sensibility” link him to Burkean sentimentality and 
antiquarianism. “[I]mbib[ing]…chivalry and romance…[from] the times of Charlemagne 
and Arthur,” Falkland is affected like Burke by the overwhelming feeling of history, 




Burke shows himself to be painfully alive to the slights of chivalric honor in the 
Reflections. In a memorable scene, Burke recounts a vision of Marie Antoinette, rising 
atop Versailles: 
 
It is now sixteen or seventeen years since I saw the queen of France…and surely 
never lighted on this orb…a more delightful vision. I saw her just above the 
horizon, decorating and cheering the elevated sphere she just began to move in, 
—glittering like the morning-star, full of life, and splendor, and joy. Oh! what a 
revolution! and what an heart must I have, to contemplate without emotion that 
elevation and that fall! Little did I dream that, when she added titles of veneration 
to those of enthusiastic, distant, respectful love, that she should ever be obliged to 
carry the sharp antidote against disgrace concealed in that bosom; little did I 
dream that I should have lived to see such disasters fallen upon her in a nation of 
gallant men, in a nation of men of honour and of cavaliers. I thought ten thousand 
swords must have leaped from their scabbards to avenge even a look that 
threatened her with insult.—But the age of chivalry is gone.—That of sophisters, 
œconomists, and calculators, has succeeded; and the glory of Europe is 
extinguished for ever. Never, never more, shall we behold that generous loyalty 
to rank and sex, that proud submission, that dignified obedience, that 
subordination of the heart, which kept alive, even in servitude itself, the spirit of 
an exalted freedom. The unbought grace of life, the cheap defence of nations, the 
nurse of manly sentiment and heroic enterprize is gone! It is gone, that sensibility 
of principle, that chastity of honour, which felt a stain like a wound, which 
inspired courage whilst it mitigated ferocity, which ennobled whatever it 
touched, and under which vice itself lost half its evil, by losing all its grossness.15 
 
The passage interrupts the Reflections’ polemic about present-day republicanism by 
moving into recollection. Although Burke’s “delightful vision” seems to recollect the 
images of Marie Antoinette in a kind of Wordsworthian panorama—moving from the 
beholder who “saw her just above the horizon” to the beheld now endowed with ethical 




descriptions of the Queen accumulate as she “decorat[es] and cheer[s] the elevated 
sphere…glitter[s] like the morning-star,” revealing Burke’s rising emotions, and the 
affective nature of royal visions. Soon after, Burke escapes this syntactical pileup with a 
personal glimpse into the moment of writing, as he exhorts his own heart “to contemplate 
without emotion that elevation and that fall.” The passage moves from a purely 
descriptive expression of things past, to the performance of Burke’s own present act of 
writing. The historical representation of Marie Antoinette blends with Burke’s concurrent 
self-soothing. While Burke’s memory of the queen places chivalry in the past, his 
reaction creates a chivalric sensibility that exists in the present.  
Burke’s performativity here is not necessarily made evident by speech acts alone, 
or illocutionary causes, but by sensations that chivalric honor creates in its hearers, or the 
perlocutionary effects inspired by Marie Antoinette.16 The queen is not just an empty set-
piece, but the “morning star,” or Venus, who rises onto center stage surrounded by 
attendants.17 Replicating the familiar iconography of Venus Anadyomene (the birth of 
Venus), her presence has a powerful ethical legacy: to honor Venus meant honoring both 
the erotic and celestial versions of love. Burke catches both versions of love in this 
passage. The queen’s celestial “splendor” leads to “distant, respectful love” and shows a 
dignity “concealed in that bosom.” With this in mind, chivalry could signal veneration at 
a polite distance. But other parts of the passage are anything but distanced, replete with 
Eros and corporality, implying the direct physical reactions of audience enraptured by 
Marie Antoinette’s beauty and aura. Burke’s final list of chivalric “effects”—where civic 
terms like “principle,” “honor,” “courage,” “nobility, and “virtue” mix with erotic terms 




how much chivalry turns politics into a sensational art form. With its emphasis on 
honor’s causes and effects, Burke’s passage on Marie Antoinette is foundationally 
performative. For Burke, the modern sense of honor is not just the pronouncement of 
fealty to ancient custom but the affective connection to chivalry that one can experience 
in the present day.   
Burke’s description attempts to evoke nostalgia by taking readers back to the 
ancien régime. But apostrophes (like Burke’s instinctive “Oh!”) return readers to the 
present, linking chivalry to direct physical reaction. If Burke can reply so strongly to the 
glory of monarchy, it seems the age of chivalry might not be gone. The phrase that 
follows is politically resonant, as well, connecting contemporary upheavals to ancient 
principles of honor. When Burke exclaims, “What a revolution!” he could, of course, be 
referring to the astronomical motion of the morning star to which Marie Antoinette is 
compared. But “What a revolution!” is more likely a sarcastic remark on the French 
disturbance that prompted the Reflections—and an implied comparison to the Glorious 
Revolution in 1688, what Burke believed to be the only successful revolutionary model. 
Another reading gives more weight to the royalist tradition: the ascension of the queen 
and her fortification of the contemporary honor ethic may have, in fact, been the real 
revolution, one that already occurred “sixteen or seventeen years” hence. Indeed, after his 
“delightful vision” of the Dauphiness we might have expected Burke to say “What a 
revelation,” with a kind of religious awe. But through apostrophic moments with 
distinctively historical connections to the revolutionary era, perfomative rhetoric shows 




By co-opting the word “revolution” to describe Marie Antoinette—and, by 
extension, chivalric honor—Burke also invalidates republican principles in a formal way, 
showing that revolutionary modernity, with its dangerous leveling principles, will always 
carry within it the seeds of a hierarchical honor ethic. The new republicans fail to 
consider chivalric values because they do not have the abilities to react to these 
performatives. Their dependence on reason and utility— the theories of “sophisters, 
œconomists, and calculators”—make them unable to comprehend Burke’s experiential 
paradoxes about honor. They cannot “behold …that proud submission…dignified 
obedience…[and] subordination of the heart, which kept alive, even in servitude itself, 
the spirit of an exalted freedom.”18  
Progressive figures responded to these and other moments in the Reflections in the 
well-known “pamphlet war” of the early 1790s. Infamous for its dramatic description, 
radicals noted how Burke’s treatise muddled painting with theater, straying from the 
generic purity of a sober political pamphlet. But another way of putting this is that the 
Reflections blurred the line between representative and sensational language. Thomas 
Paine attacked Burke’s style with especial vigor. He likened the Reflections to a “tragic 
painting,” a flat melodrama that did not depict the revolution accurately.19 According to 
Paine, the theatricality of Burke’s prose annulled the veracity of his argument because 
such theatrical prose made chimerical history. But Paine was also aware of the way that 
the Reflections may have been received by readers. He believed that the pathos Burke’s 
fabrications might inspire in readers would obscure their ability to reason. Burke’s “facts 
are manufactured for the sake of show,” says Paine, “and accommodated to produce, 




he is writing History, and not Plays.”20 Winning hearts and not minds, Burke’s prose had 
the potential to reproduce similarly maudlin readers, those who were too emotional to 
care about the authenticity of his history. In other words, Paine takes particular issue with 
the perlocutionary, affective side of Burke’s performative pamphlet. He worries about the 
effects of a type of speech not calculated to convey truth, but to evoke sensation. Not 
only does Paine indict Burke for getting his facts wrong, but he reprimands Burke for 
using a type of language that is unconcerned with the representation of facts proper and 
more concerned with the sentimental performance of political speech.  
Also responding to Burke’s description, Mary Wollstonecraft’s Vindication of the 
Rights of Men (1790) noted that many of Burke’s chivalric set-pieces were made to elicit 
“sensual prejudice” and that they “[threw] a graceful veil over vices that degrade 
humanity.”21 Anticipating Derrida—who asserts that the performative “pass[es] off as 
ordinary an ethical…determination”—Wollstonecraft shows how the “natural,” affective 
speech act might shroud underlying contexts and systems.22 Burke’s “sensual prejudice” 
is his sensational language, that which obscure pre-determined ideologies long 
entrenched by political systems.  
Imbedded in Paine and Wollstonecraft’s pleas for truth and ideological 
demystification is a stylistic indictment of linguistic performativity. Paine and 
Wollstonecraft are clear: political reality should not be falsified by imaginative genres, 
whether they are painting or drama, nor should political discourse be calculated to 
produce sensuous effects on readers. Paine also condemns Burke’s chivalric pretensions 
by declaring that recent history shows no sign of an abiding honor ethic. In short, the age 




such contrived performances in the Reflections—has been relegated safely to the past, 
“pass[ing] quietly to the tomb of all other follies.”23 Hence, not only is the performative 
language of honor a “folly,” or epistemologically false, but it is absurdly presentist: of 
course honor is obsolete. While arguing for republican principles, Paine tries to unravel 
the nationalist tradition of chivalry as both a linguistic fantasy and a dated narrative, and 
replicates much of the longstanding secular critique against the honor ethic: honor is 
always passé and to practice it means invoking a history without substantial connections 
to modern life—it means living in a story of the Old World.  
Paine’s second point is connected to his first: if one were to practice honor, such a 
practice would be theatrical fancy. Like Ferdinando Falkland, it would mean performing 
as if that Old World still existed. Like Caleb Williams, it would mean giving in to 
quixotic belief and not reason. Radical politics’ fight for the future would then mean 
ceding no ground to such performative “folly.” Fellow radical Godwin, however, seems 
to more accurately represent—and thus more ably critique—Burke’s honor ethic. By 
accommodating the performative rhetoric of honor found in the Reflections, the novel 
Caleb Williams shows honor’s real, ongoing consequences on contemporary life.  
 
III. 
The Rights of Man, Vindication of the Rights of Men and Caleb Williams are all 
well-known responses to Edmund Burke. They criticize Burkean chivalry for its 
pernicious effects on contemporary life. But where Paine and Wollstonecraft want to 
either bury the honor ethic as a defunct narrative or lift the “veil” of its theatricality, 




honor, and how fanciful performance and performativity inexorably affects the world. In 
other words, the novel argues that performativity and theatricality are not the bogeys of 
the real like they are in Paine and Wollstonecraft, but tropes of current and very real 
political culture.24 
The novel’s introductory scene to the life of Ferdinando Falkland makes honor 
patently theatrical while speaking to the performative nature of chivalric honor suggested 
by Burke. Mr. Collins’s account of Falkland’s early life begins with nothing less than a 
duel of honor. On a trip to Italy in his “gloss of youth,” Falkland intervenes in the 
romantic proceedings of Count Malvesi, a Roman noble.25 Malvesi sends a challenge to 
which Falkland must respond, bound as he is to the rigid “laws of honor.”26 According to 
the Collins, Italy, is a seat of honorific vengeance whose cavaliers “[believe] that an 
indignity cannot be expiated but with blood, and…that the life of a man is a trifling 
consideration in comparison of the indemnification to be made to his injured honour.”27 
Driven by a similar love for ancient chivalry and nobility (and the honor ethic that 
motivates them), Falkland immediately bonds with the young noblemen of Italian 
society. But although he has “imbibed all the peculiarities” of archaic Italian custom, 
Falkland has no lineage to defend—there is nothing said about his familial past and very 
little about any noble heritage.28 Driven by his imagination alone, Falkland finds the 
manners and customs of earlier stories and romances “something to imitate.” A type of 
tribal honor—where families compel respect through titles and inheritances—fits 
Falkland much less than a “performative” honor, where the imitation of ancient, romantic 




Faced with Malvesi’s challenge, Falkland nearly takes the field for a duel, but 
before the encounter occurs, it is diffused by Malvesi’s love interest, who describes the 
situation as a misunderstanding. Malvesi offers a profound apology, which Falkland 
accepts. But Falkland confronts him. “It was lucky…that in our interview of yesterday 
you found me alone,” says Falkland, “[I]f the challenge had been public, the proofs I had 
formerly given of courage would not have excused my present moderation; and, though 
desirous to have avoided the combat, it would not have been in my power.”29 In private, 
the challenge does not affect Falkland. It is only in the presence of an audience where the 
rules of honor apply. In his retort to Malvesi, Falkland exposes the duel for what it is: a 
type of theater requiring an audience.  
Falkland’s almost detached explanation of honor as a type of theater reflects his 
unusual relationship to chivalry. Although Falkland is swept up in the imaginative thrill 
of chivalry and romance—and obsessed with the possibility of their being slighted—
Falkland is also strangely distanced from the sentiments associated with them, making 
honor seem both artificial and natural. This difficulty in separating formal customs from 
“sincere” behavior highlight way in which rote customs—code in the 1790s for Burkean 
political tenets—could overtake sounder moral judgments. Characterized by its 
combination of affected naturalism and instrumental formality, the honor code starts to 
explicitly sound like an ideology, or a constructed public belief system that is made to 
seem natural or autochthonous.30 Of course, this scene also resonates with the structural 
guidelines of Austin’s theory of linguistic performativity, which emphasized the rules and 
procedures that undergird the natural, “ordinary” behavior of everyday life. While 




makeup (its performativity) reflects the original radical critiques of Burkean principles—
and their melodramatic coloring of sociopolitical life in late-eighteenth century Europe—
it also provokes larger questions about the character of ethics in modernity: is the ethical 
act one’s own if it has already been codified? Is the agent truly ethical if he simply 
recapitulates prior behavior?31 Doe ethics lean more on public practices (or “custom”) or 
upon private affects (or “nature”)? Finally, can one rely on the historical and mythic 
imaginary of Britain to provide ethical guidance to the public in the wake of a 
revolutionary fissure in history?  
The mythic imaginary is on display later in the novel, this time in the form of a 
successful—or “felicitous”—public performance of honor, one that demonstrates the 
pernicious effects that overwhelming chivalric sentiments could have upon a wider 
populace. During the history of Falkland’s early years, Falkland and his rival Barnabas 
Tyrell sit at a small-town meeting in front of the resident poet, Mr. Clare. Having become 
something of a local celebrity known for his mannerly behavior and, Clare is exhorted by 
a crowd to read Falkland’s poem “Ode to the Genius of Chivalry.” When Clare recites it, 
 
The beauties of Mr. Falkland’s poem were accordingly exhibited every 
advantage. The successive passions of the author were communicated to the 
hearer. What was impetuous and what was solemn were delivered with a 
responsive feeling, and a flowing and unlaboured tone…[The hearers] were for 
the most part plain, unlettered, and of little refinement. Poetry in general they 
read, when read at all, from the mere force of imitation and with few sensations 
of pleasure; but this poem had a peculiar vein of glowing inspiration. This very 
poem would probably have been seen by many of them with little effect; but the 
accents of Mr. Clare carried it home to the heart. He ended: and, as the 
countenances of his auditors had before sympathized with the passions of the 





Although it is Mr. Clare who reads it, the “Ode to the Genius of Chivalry” seems to be a 
perfect performative utterance for Falkland, directly inspiring effects in its audience. 
Indeed, Godwin’s account allegorizes the function of the performative utterance, in that 
his description concentrates on the “successive passions…communicated to the hearer,” 
what the poem does instead of what it is. Like Burke’s paean to Marie Antoinette, the 
effects of the honorable imagination are “carried…home to the heart” of those attending 
to its glory.33 In this sense, the title of Falkland’s poem is apt. The “genius” is chivalry’s 
animating daemon and the spirit that brings widespread inspiration to those who practice 
it. Falkland’s poem could just have easily been called “An Ode to Chivalry.” Yet, as a 
fantastical figure, “genius” locates the honor ethic in the imagination. Falkland’s 
imaginative poem does not just contain a series of empty representations of honor—
examples from “chimerical history” as Paine might call them.34 Because the poem acts so 
palpably on its contemporary audience, the “genius of chivalry” also communicates the 
ability of the ethic to function in modernity, a metaphysical figure that produces real 
effects on the sentiments. The poem captures the power of Falkland’s honor code, 
showing that honor is as functional as it is fanciful. As a poem without a text—like honor 
without a code—“Ode to the Genius of Chivalry” insinuates that all honor needs is a 
convincing performance to make it real. 
Here, the focus is on the whole circuit of performative transmission: the 
illocutionary act of the poem itself, and the perlocutionary effects of its utterance. Oddly, 
the actual content of the poem is omitted. Like the “contents of the fatal trunk” which 
stand to reveal the narrative of Falkland’s ethical lapse later in the novel, the contents of 




Much like Caleb, the specific ethical nature of the poem’s contents “are of little moment” 
to how that ethic affects others.36 Caricaturing Burke’s performative “soliloquy in praise 
of chivalry” through a poetic monologue, Godwin hints at how the ideological structures 
of the performative utterance—appropriate context, suitable speaker, receptive audience, 
materialized effects—are obscured by the sentimental reactions to it. 
Additionally, Falkland’s poem can tell us about the duplicitous way such an ethos 
operates upon the novel’s public institutions. As a conventional performance in a town 
square, the poem of honor has a universal effect on all those listening, touching “a 
peculiar vein of glowing inspiration” in even the most “unlettered” interlocutors.37 Much 
like a “felicitous” performative utterance, the effects of the honor ethic are realized by 
ordinary people instantly. They have Burke’s “just prejudice.” But the performance of the 
ethic also cows the audience into obedience. Instead of rising in unadulterated applause, 
they “[emulate] each other in declaring their approbation.”38 As interlocutors, the 
audience finds honor both affective and ideologically pacifying.  Incarnating and 
spreading chivalry through a space of “public meeting,” like a circulating political 
pamphlet, the ode hints that honor is no longer strictly the ethos of the aristocratic court.39 
Clare’s ability to evoke sympathy from an audience who is “plain, unlettered, and of little 
refinement” turns him into another Burkean voice espousing the hierarchical principles of 
chivalric honor to a common assembly—the widespread reaction to the “Ode” broaches 
the possibility that chivalric honor transcends class, as the people join the poet in 
“proclaiming their approbation” for its ideals. Yet, the audience’s mere “emulation” of 
approbation, and their marked separation from the “cultured” Clare throughout the rest of 




the real class differentiation that the ethic of chivalric honor reinforces (Falkland’s 
“mentoring” relationship with Caleb has the same feel: the servant Caleb aspires to the 
nobleman Falkland’s moral rectitude, even as that rectitude proves to be Caleb’s 
oppressor). 
Mirroring the townspeople’s reactions to Falkland’s “Ode on the Genius of 
Chivalry,” Caleb also becomes caught up in the performative effects produced by 
Collins’s narrative in the first book of the novel. Upon hearing Falkland’s back-story of 
honor and retribution, Caleb says his “veneration was excited for Mr. Clare…[and] I 
found a thousand fresh reasons to admire and love Mr. Falkland.”40 Like the 
townspeople, he identifies with honor’s perlocutionary effects of veneration and 
unrequited love, re-constituting the chivalric honor ethic presented in the opening 
narrative and carrying it into his own present situation. But unlike the townspeople, Caleb 
has been warned about the folly of honor by Collins himself in a narrative that challenges 
and condemns chivalric honor in public life. For instance, in the opening narrative Clare 
warns Falkland about honor’s fatuousness after the ode is read, the brutish squire 
Barnabas Tyrrel is shown to represent feudalism’s cruel exploitations, and Collins 
exhorts Falkland to be passive in the face of public slander and challenges to duel.41 
Instead of considering this opprobrium seriously, however, Caleb reacts to it with 
romantic reverence, confirming that he is deeply affected by the honor ethic even after 
being exposed to its detrimental social outcomes.  
This is especially disturbing given the revolutionary nature of Caleb’s insights: he 
could be the perfect candidate to reveal the ideological perils of chivalry. With his 




early in the novel—and a fateful trip to a Bastille-like prison later on—Caleb has an 
historical affinity with Jacobin revolutionaries and English dissenters, many of whom 
were being tried by the British government during Godwin’s composition of the novel. 
But while Caleb seems like a progressive crack in the bedrock of the social conservatism 
dramatized in the text, he stands steadfast in support of chivalric honor, further proving 
the hold the ethic has on modernity and adding another complication to the sociopolitical 
dangers that it might present to contemporary life. Despite all of the early evidence of 
honor’s rending the fabric of society, Caleb has a deep-seated attraction to the affect of 
honor—its sentimental nature provokes admiration, veneration, and excitation.  
Unlike Falkland, whose honor ethic is more often than not an instrument of public 
coercion and personal reputation, Caleb’s honor becomes a measure of his own private 
chivalrous rectitude. In this way, Caleb and Falkland respectively caricature the public 
and private aspects of Burke’s modern honor ethic. While Falkland represents the 
supposed communalism of chivalry that hides a hierarchical power structure, Caleb 
stands for the pleasing sensations of chivalry that inoculate us from the truth. Caleb and 
Falkland’s relationship to one another is also a sort of diabolical reflection of Burke. If 
Burke claimed that chivalry holds society together in shared belief—a sort of voluntary 
ideology—then Falkland and Caleb’s chivalry will not allow them to escape one another. 
It binds them together in a kind of morbid intersubjectivity. Beyond illuminating a 
problem of modern identity, Godwin’s focus on honor highlights two important theories 
of subject-formation in political modernity: Caleb is at once a subject of Althusserian 
interpellation, where the citizen is fashioned entirely through the ideological apparatus of 




Falkland), as well as an extreme version of liberal privacy, where one is free to hold 
beliefs despite those beliefs’ irrationality or detriment to society.   
One way to articulate Caleb’s impasse is to return to the perimeters of 
performative rhetoric. Caleb is stuck between the theoretical poles of such rhetoric, 
between the performative utterance itself and the contextual history which allows it to 
function. On the one hand, Caleb knows that Falkland’s honor ethic has a dark, secretive 
history. The murder of Tyrrel and the conspiracy against the Hawkins’s were expunged 
by way of Falkland’s gentry status. Pursued by Falkland’s various henchmen and plots, 
Caleb finds the world abetting Falkland’s reputation: “[t]he whole country in arms 
against [him],” Caleb fears that his story will never overcome the ideological power of 
Falkland’s position, or a society calibrated to favor that position.42 He has unveiled the 
real systemic supports of an ongoing honor ethic, the felicitous historical contexts of the 
utterance. On the other hand, Caleb remains under Falkland’s personal spell. Bewitched 
by Falkland’s imagination and the implacability of his character, Caleb believes that 
sheer intention is the only thing needed for Falkland’s affective performances.  
As Falkland’s sensibility and persistence work on Caleb, he starts to conflate 
Falkland’s cultural advantages with pure performative strength—his history with his 
affect. Falkland moves from being a figure revered by Caleb for his gentility and 
manners, to a figure revered for his omnipresent nature. To use Caleb’s words, he is 
“astonished at the super-human power Mr. Falkland seemed to possess, of bringing the 
object of his persecution within the sphere of his authority.”43 Because of his Caleb’s 
own overinvestment in the chivalric imaginary and its performative sentimentalism, 




version of what Burke called “sensual prejudice.” For the progressive reader in 1794, the 
most terrifying moment in Caleb Williams might not be Caleb’s incarceration or the 
internalization paranoia caused by constant pursuit and persecution. It may, in fact, be 
Caleb’s final tribute to Falkland: even while disavowing the “poison of chivalry” which 
corrupted Falkland’s character, Caleb uses the same archaic rhetoric of chivalry to 
consecrate him, turning the everyday pronouns “you” and “your” into the elevated “thy” 
and “thou.”44 This final scene marks the moment where Godwin’s critique of honor truly 
goes gothic, where Caleb turns from Falkland’s antagonist into his unequivocal, 
performative double.   
If Caleb Williams remains a well-known Jacobinical exposé of the social iniquity 
underpinning supposedly disinterested modern institutions, institutions extending Burke’s 
“just prejudice” of honor and chivalry, then the novel is also seemingly more complicated 
than old-fashioned ideology critique. Instead of capturing the first wave of Western 
political radicalism in modernity, in some ways Caleb seems to be more of a 
contemporary radical who has been made cynical by a prolonged fight against injustice: 
he knows all of the institutional biases, and yet refuses to act on them. This sort of 
quiescence resonates with a claim made by Slavoj Žižek, who says that the post-
enlightenment subject can recognize systemic biases, and then cynically denounces his 
agency: “he knows very well, but…” By the end of the novel, Caleb knows very well that 
the honor ethic is not some ethos of natural sensibility and manners, but he still persists in 
honoring Falkland.45  While Daniela Garofalo also has Žižek’s cynical subject in mind in 
her recent reading of the novel, she reads chivalric honor as a failed ancient ethic (what 




impotence. This is far from the case, though: replicated by Burke and Falkland and 
smuggled into modern life by way of performativity, it is clear that honor is an all-too 
potent ethic in Romantic era.46  
But Garofalo does recognize the inherent intersubjectivity of honor, a practice that 
binds together two or more individuals. In fact, one’s honor is such a public perception—
regulated as it is by social custom and publicity—that it might be said to be in the hands 
of others. The novel’s initial anecdote about Falkland, the Italian noblemen, and the 
averted duel establishes this fact: Falkland admits that honor needs an audience. Honor is 
an ethic (and not an inherent moral) precisely because it presupposes the involvement of 
others.  
Caleb Williams takes this phenomenon to the extreme, connecting any sense of 
individuality to the public recognition of one’s own status. Although Caleb and Falkland 
struggle to assert the innocence of their respective characters shows how essential honor 
can be to a notion of the private self, Falkland and Caleb’s sheer reliance on one another 
shows how much the self is based on public recognition. Caleb articulates this paradox in 
one of his famous last lines. After finally asserting his innocence and triumphing over 
Falkland in their second courtroom encounter, Caleb feels a deep emptiness. No longer 
acknowledged by another subject—even another subject who slanders his reputation—
Caleb cites a strange lack of self. “I began these memoirs with the idea of vindicating my 
character,” Caleb says, “I have now no character that I wish to vindicate.”47 Combining 
hero worship and dejection, Caleb’s closing statement is a complicated moment. 
Although Falkland as the ideological effigy that gives Caleb’s life meaning, this meaning 




not need to be asserted (or performed), Caleb feels an evacuation of his “character.” At 
the very moment Caleb vindicates his own subjectivity he finds it negated. This is 
troubling not just because it shows a figure who willingly vacates his own subjectivity, 
but because it deconstructs any kind of sociopolitical vindication (with all of the 
reformist imperatives surrounding that word during the 1790s). Caleb fights hard to 
defend a subjectivity that is, in the end, determined only by that fight.  
Here, there is the chilling implication that all ethical encounters risk moving from 
a governance of the self around others, to the repudiation of self due to superfluous 
concern with others. Caleb and Falkland both embody this concern, sharing an obsession 
with reputation. They are co-dependent subjects. They create one another’s “character.” 
They are morbidly intersubjective.48 In fact, Caleb and Falkland’s morbid 
intersubjectivity presents a salient challenge to a legacy of philosophy that has assumed 
the mutual benefits of intersubjective practices. Whether those benefits come in the form 
of phenomenological empathy (for Husserl), or in the form of a discursive foundation that 
supports a thriving, rationalist public sphere (for Habermas), Godwin’s portrayal of 
public honor practices focuses instead on the social pathology of such intersubjectivity: it 
is precisely the phenomenological binding of Falkland to Caleb that erodes any empathic 
identification Falkland might have with his former servant, and it is precisely the degree 
to which Falkland manipulates the public systems of civil jurisprudence and mass 
printing that determines the irrational characterization of his enemy. With its many 
scenes of public confrontation and its purchase on contemporary technologies that can 
make “bad publicity” rapid, Caleb Williams prefigures an age of internet slander, where 




disseminating misinformation instantly.  Thus, while the novel dramatizes the already-
hazardous effects of the honor ethic in the 1790s, it also suggests the potential for honor-
practices to contaminate contemporary public life today. Caleb Williams not only 
represents “things as they are” during the Anti-Jacobinical turn in the early 1790s, but 
seems to presage the widespread moral traditionalism that swept through British society 
during the Napoleonic wars and might still resonant today—things as they will be. 
 
IV. 
But Godwin did not give up on honor entirely in 1794. Located within Caleb 
Williams is another version of the honor ethic, one that might counteract the dangerous 
effects of chivalry upon the modern institutions and public perception. Because of the 
book’s textual strategy—which disseminates narrative across a field of different voices, 
genres, and episodes— such a revision of honor can be lost under the many layers and 
textual mediations of Caleb’s narrative. (And for this reason, one could even say Caleb 
Williams makes futile any private values). However, it is this very pluralism of voices 
that implies an important change to the original version of chivalric honor found 
throughout the novel: that while honor and dignity may be experienced by each person 
individually, they can only be practiced communally. Godwin does not so much prioritize 
private morality over civic or public virtue—an assumption fairly made about the original 
architect of anarchism—as much as he restructures Burke’s understanding of private and 
public experience when it comes to modern honor and dignity.49 The revision of honor 
and dignity taking place in Caleb Williams also seems to have influenced Godwin’s 




relied upon ideas of universal benevolence and the moral sentiments underpinning an 
individual’s civic obligation, then this new version of honor seems to respond more 
realistically to the dangers of such affects—those contingent and irrational sentiments 
that drive contemporary public life—while offering a rejoinder to our own current critical 
fascination with the affective component of politics.  
A discourse on “true honor,” as Godwin puts it, comes from an oftentimes 
overlooked figure in the text, Falkland’s caretaker Mr. Collins, who suggests to Caleb 
early in the novel that honor might be “in [one’s] own keeping” and immune to the 
intersubjective pitfalls of “reputation” or chivalric pretension.50 Collins’s at first seems to 
reframe the virtue as a radically private form of integrity—instilled by reason and 
bolstered by the essential laws of justice.51 This moment echoes Godwin in Political 
Justice, where, despite repeatedly censuring courtly practices and audacious titles and 
etiquette, the term “honor” is preserved. Eliminating its public and performative 
elements, “[t]rue honour,” Godwin writes in Political Justice, “is to be found only in 
integrity and justice.”52 With connotations of liberal self-governance—or the private 
moral imperative associated with  Kant—Godwin suggests that one’s honor might be 
located deep within the individual. Private honor would have no need then for retribution 
or even intersubjective recognition but would be closer to a categorical imperative—or a 
principle unto itself. This incipient liberal viewpoint (where morals are rooted in a 
private, personal sovereignty) could serve as a counterpoint to the sinister 
intersubjectivity embodied in Caleb’s paranoia, the sense that a public always has access 




But “true honor” is more complicated than this. From a closer reading, it is clear 
that Collins’s definition does not connote a totally private, internalized principle—a 
stoicism for the modern age. Instead, “true honor” means prioritizing the public good to 
one’s own internal reputation or sensibilities. In an early scene, Collins advises Falkland 
against dueling, and in the process exemplifies “true honor”: 
 
“Dueling is the vilest of all egotism, treating the public, who has a claim to all 
my powers and exertions, as if it were nothing, and myself, or rather an 
unintelligible chimera I annex to myself, as if it were entitled to my exclusive 
attention. I am unable to cope with you: what then? Can that circumstance 
dishonour me? No; I can only be dishonoured by perpetrating an unjust action. 
My honour is in my own keeping, beyond the reach of all mankind. Strike! I am 
passive. No injury that you can inflict, shall provoke me to expose you or myself 
to unnecessary evil. I refuse that; but I am not therefore pusillanimous: when I 
refuse any danger or suffering by which the general good may be promoted, then 
brand me for a coward!”54  
 
Not only is dueling or any performance to restore one’s private honor “the vilest of all 
egoism,” but it results in the addition of a chimerical double that can only give “exclusive 
attention” to the self.55 (This is also an early premonition of Falkland and Caleb’s 
“morbid” intersubjectivity, the extreme focus on the other that is actually a pathological 
form of individualism). But Collins’s remedy is not simply to make one’s honor “beyond 
the reach of all mankind,” or to dedicate it to the higher laws of “just actions”—to make 
it, in a sense, more private, more sovereign, and more legalistic. Instead, it is to promote 
the “general good” over and above personal offense—to recognize the larger claims of 
public stability despite of private injury. Although Collins does not eliminate the 




responsibility to eliminate communal danger or suffering, not from a public defense of 
one’s own character.56  
 In Collins’s description, one finds a more socially-conscious honor code 
gesturing towards modern doctrines of human rights—with their emphasis on personal 
dignity and the obligations to eliminate suffering. But although these doctrines of rights 
have in some ways been modeled on the French Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789) 
with which Godwin would have been familiar, Collins’s description here suggests a 
different foundation for rights in political modernity, one that might speak to citizens of 
our own era whose dignity seems to go increasingly unrecognized by a liberal state. 
Instead of resting human rights on the foundations of freedom or property—familiar 
liberal concepts that are dependent upon individual sovereignty—Collins seems to 
suggest that their foundation could be honor, or a sense of private dignity that provides a 
person with an instant obligation to a larger public or “general good.”57  
 Indeed, Collins’s own story can be read as an allegory of the sociopolitical 
movement away from such a private sovereignty based on property and liberty and 
towards a communal conception of dignity based on the recognition of others.58 Starting 
off as a steward and caretaker of Falkland’s property, Collins upholds the proprietary 
foundation of sovereignty characteristic to liberal rights, and thus tacitly supports 
Falkland’s ideological use of honor as a means for public repression.59 However, when 
Collins returns years later from his management of Falkland’s West Indian plantation, he 
is the shadow of his former self.60 While Caleb attributes Collins physical decline to a 
disagreeable climate, Collins’s harrowing condition could be the result of years of 




virtue in liberal modernity—in this case, this structure is the illiberal institution of 
slavery, the most glaring hypocrisy of enlightenment ideals. Even though Collins’s 
disillusionment parallels Caleb’s own cynicism towards liberal institutions throughout the 
novel, unlike Caleb, Collins dissociates himself from Falkland and his property, and 
administers his own conception of honor by validating Caleb and what remains of his 
dignity. Indeed, Caleb’s final request to Collins to make public his extended confession 
embodies of such an honor code, to “refuse any danger or suffering by which the general 
good may be promoted.”61  
Such an allegory might even extended to Godwin’s complex relationship with 
Rousseau, who was a major influence on Godwin’s political development, but one whose 
influence Godwin was reassessing at this point his life.62 While Godwin allies here with 
Rousseau in the Discourse on Inequality (1754) regarding the social dislocation created 
by private property, he seems to reject two major components of that treatise: the 
“natural” superiority of compassion and sympathetic relationships in the social order that, 
in the context of Caleb Williams, are often a cover for ideologically-motivated power 
grabs; and the place of honor itself in civil society, which, according to Rousseau, was 
nothing but pure egoism.63 “True honor” may make Rousseau’s “natural compassion” 
irrelevant to ethics, but it also dissolves the excessive focus on the self in modern society 
with which Rousseau was concerned. In addition, it can clarify some major conceptual 
differences in Rousseau’s and Godwin’s ideas of the political order, especially as they 
relate to early liberalism. While “true honor” is imbedded in the individual subject that is 
valorized by liberal politics, its emphasis on the individual’s inherent responsibility 




interest—pitfalls that were mitigated, at least in Rousseau’s case, through a social 
contract, a medium of which Godwin was highly skeptical.64  As a positive civic virtue 
instead of a prohibition to the ego, Godwin’s vision of honor strikes a salutary balance 
between the individualist and communalist strains in his own political outlook while 
participating in the larger conversation surrounding early liberal governance.  
The proponent of “true honor” in Caleb Williams, Collins can be seen as a gruff, 
even unsavory character in Godwin’s novel—to contemporary readers, a precursor to the 
liberal subject hardened by excessive disinterestedness and ultimately concerned with the 
protection of private property across a burgeoning empire. But Collins’s redemption 
might be found in the way that he re-conceives honor for modernity, moving it out from 
the archaism of the public duel, removing the affective and sentimental components that 
can prove dangerous when manipulated by men like Falkland, and separating honor from 
modern liberal insinuations like procedural law and private property, both of which are 
represented as socially corrupting in Godwin’s novel. In Collins theory of honor there 
might even be found a nascent version of cosmopolitanism (albeit Collins is someone 
whose harrowing colonial experience gives the global aspect of cosmopolitanism a 
darker, more gothic tinge). Just as Kwame Anthony Appiah finds in his own conception 
of cosmopolitanism as an “ethics in a world of strangers,” Collins finds in honor 
something that takes seriously the individual dignity of others—as Appiah says, “the 
value not just of human life but of particular human lives”—even while regarding a large, 
abstract, perhaps unfamiliar public, or “common good,” as the foundational principle for 
justice.65 If Collins truly does live up to his principle of honor at the end of the book by 




rebuttal to a longstanding criticism of cosmopolitanism as an ultimately bourgeois 
practice of living that is available only to those who can afford it.66 Left harrowed by an 
ethos underwritten by property and ownership—and perhaps even penniless after his 
abdication—Collins nonetheless returns as “uncommonly judicious,” invoking his own 
ideas of honor against Falkland, the very figure who upheld the chivalric honor ethic to 
begin with.67        
As a virtue that can manage contingencies (like insults and personal slander) and 
prizes public stability, Collins’s honor ethic underscores what many scholars have seen as 
Godwin’s own movement from an individually-rooted ethics espoused in the first edition 
of Political Justice, to a more communitarian engagement with ethics at the end of the 
1790s.68 The fictional companion to Political Justice, Caleb Williams gave Godwin the 
imaginative license “study” (as he put it in his original title) whether a moral philosophy 
predicated on metaphysical reason would square with the passions of everyday life. And 
indeed, as critics have noted, most of Caleb Williams rejects outright the major premises 
of Political Justice, transcendent rationalism and innate human benevolence. But if “true 
honor” does not admit of these premises, it acknowledges the possibility of a more 
permanent moral framework that can withstand the shocks of societal disorder, irrational 
personal antagonisms, and biases created through affective states and sensations. In what 
is one of the novel’s many instances of gothic doubling Godwin’s progressive version of 
honor here starts to sound like Burkean chivalry. For both writers the honor ethic can be a 
way to refocus people on the stability of the greater good after the violent aftershocks of 
the revolution both at home and abroad. But this doubling also transfigures Burke: where 




its performative, public affects—Godwin’s “true honor” operates from the outside-in, 
from a responsibility to the commons that in turn can bequeath dignity to the private 
subject.  
Even if Godwin became more amenable to affect, sentiment, and the “irrational” 
passions as his career progressed, this new ethic of honor seemed to counteract the many 
impassioned political manifestations of the decade—from dueling to conservative 
nationalism–with its own medicine. Indeed, Godwin’s critique of honor throughout the 
novel may serve as a kind of reply to our own critical moment, where individual 
sentiment and affect are seen to increasingly determine all manner of political action and 
ethical practice—like Caleb Williams this is also, perhaps, much to the obfuscation of 
systemic biases and injustices within political arrangements.69 This does not mean that 
ceding the social order to feelings and the passions is a recipe for mass delusion or 
ideology with an empirical face. The quest for the neurological basis of intention; the 
quantification of morality in the political subject; the artistic appeals to the emotions of 
state and institutional protestors—all of these recent examples in scholarship align with 
Godwin’s conviction in a continuing enlightenment and search for liberating wisdom, 
especially on the level of the individual.70 But the portrayal of honor within Caleb 
Williams proves that affect does not exactly have to mean delusion or ideology: the 
sentiments of chivalry do not delude Caleb as much as they obfuscate history and 
context, they do not blind Caleb as much as they captivate him. Instead, chivalry might 
be thought of less as an ideology than what Raymond Williams called a “structure of 
feeling”—that which ties the thoughts, codes, and contexts of social life to an immediate 




“true honor,” however, checks impetuousness of affect to which Raymond Williams 
alludes. In his turning away from impulsive dueling, Collins refuses to perpetrate “unjust 
action” caused by the “powers and exertions”, and replaces it by considering the larger, 
and more storied social affairs of the “general good.”  
Collins’s speech to Caleb is one of the few instances of direct, normative ethics in 
Godwin’s text, one that allows the “fictitious adventure” of the gothic novel to be 
simultaneously taken as a “valuable lesson.”72 In the midst of its chivalric atavism, Caleb 
Williams suggests—if only for a moment—that honor may yet emerge as valuable to the 
progressive modern subject, and that it might not just inflict its residual harm upon him. 
 
V. 
Connected to one another by philosophical and political pedigree, Caleb Williams 
and The Cenci also have similar moral outlooks. Both gothic works critique honor as an 
ethos supported by a patriarchal ideology (although honor takes the form of chivalry in 
Caleb Williams and papacy in The Cenci). And, like Godwin’s novel, The Cenci account 
for honor through performative language—a rhetorical category seldom explored in the 
criticism of The Cenci itself, but one perennially associated with Shelley. Finally, 
Shelley’s famous closet drama of 1819 revisits familiar political questions of the 1790s 
by resurrecting Godwin’s conflict between the idealization of the private self and the 
necessity of enduring, public relationships.73 But, in a more sincere effort to restore the 
dignity of the persecuted figure at the center of the play, Beatrice Cenci, Shelley’s drama 
breaks from away from Godwin’s portrayal of a “cynical” post-enlightenment subject 




disinterested set of principles represented by “[men] of true discernment,” Shelley 
suggests that honor might be provided to the subject who is moved by feeling. 
Exemplified by the “simplicity and dignity” of Beatrice’s portrait, Shelley attributes to 
aesthetic beauty a singular form of honor that contrasts with the play’s structure of ethical 
“casuistry”—or the legislation of a cruel honor code through warped laws and 
procedures.  
Written with an eye on Godwin’s ideas on moral necessity and justice, Beatrice 
Cenci has long been recognized as an ethical link between Caleb Williams and The 
Cenci. 74 But the two works also share a key value: a deviant honor system arranges most 
of the relationships in The Cenci, as well. For instance, Count Cenci’s monstrous acts are 
framed by his sense of patriarchal honor; the judgments of the Pope are similarly tied to 
an uncompromising, hierarchical loyalty to canon law; and Beatrice experiences a distinct 
sense of shame and disgrace—honor’s antithesis—for the crimes visited upon her and for 
the ones that she engages in. Brutal patriarchy, zealous papacy, and unjust laws all inform 
The Cenci’s tribalistic honor codes, and each owes something to Godwin’s earlier 
investigation of honor in Caleb Williams. As much as he was inspired by the introduction 
of an eminent, resilient central character in the day’s closet dramas (from Coleridge’s 
Ordonio in Remorse to Byron’s eponymous protagonist in Manfred), Shelley also derives 
from Godwin a key narrative device: the singular individual outcast from society by 
certain intractable social or political structures. This gothic paradigm is framed by the 
political turbulence of Godwin and Shelley’s respective heydays (1794 and 1819), 





Both texts also depend on performative rhetoric.76 Loaded with unspoken 
insinuations, implied utterances, and indignities that are never voiced—actions too 
shocking for words—Shelley’s drama also abounds with vows, curses, and pacts, 
performative utterances that supposedly establish the ethics of the characters: as the 
prelate Orsino says, “[w]ords are but holy as the deeds they cover.”77 This comment on 
the obfuscatory power of words can be taken, however, as a self-referential remark about 
the structure of language throughout the entire play. Unlike Caleb Williams, where 
performative utterances of honor and chivalry seem natural to everyday life, The Cenci 
seems to expose the artifice of performativity by showing how speech acts can be made 
to obscure deeply immoral acts (another covert dig on the supposed “naturalness” of 
Burke’s performative honor ethic). Much of the compulsion to obscure deeds with words 
has to do with a sense of underlying menace throughout the play. Cenci’s frequent 
invocation of a patrilineal curse—which is a sinister inversion of the biblical, paternal 
blessing—is used to justify his maniacal behavior; Catholic confession is not a speech act 
that effortlessly unburdens of the soul to a divine representative, but that is coerced by the 
threat of violence. And, in the most famous example of performative menace, Beatrice 
refuses to utter the “word…one little word” that would bring Cenci’s crime of incest to 
light.78 Here readers see that The Cenci’s performatives (made up of oaths, curses, and 
confessions) are overtly artificial, speech acts that cover over behavior instead of 
constituting it.  
By denaturalizing the performative speech act in these instances, Shelley hints at 
the unsoundness of performative rhetoric itself, the verbal structure upon which the 




him this far. While Falkland’s “naturally affected” performances of gentlemanly honor 
obscure the ideology of aristocracy and feudal tyranny, Caleb is bound to the fantasy of 
chivalric honor precisely because of its affective, naturalizing qualities. By contrast, 
Shelley’s speakers—in lyric poems and closet dramas alike—are much more reflexive 
about the limits of performative language and the “felicity” of its effects on the others. In 
Beatrice’s case, this means that oaths, promises, and other professions of honor often fail 
to cause any remarkable change in the behavior of different agents or upon the material 
conditions of the world in which they inhabit. These illocutionary professions of honor 
lack perlocutionary effects, or, if they do have a perlocutionary component, they are not 
the correct or “felicitous” effects that one would expect to attend patrimonial veneration 
and esteem. For Beatrice, to honor the father through professions of loyalty is precisely 
not to feel the reciprocal affect of chivalry, what Burke called “that subordination of the 
heart, which kept alive, even in servitude itself, the spirit of an exalted freedom.”79 In 
other words, to honor is simply to profess fealty without feeling any positive, or 
“exalted,” effects of servitude—it is to live under the ideological conditions of a 
patriarchal honor system without having any of Burke’s comforting, if delusional, 
sentimentalism to allay the injustices and brutality that chivalry might present.  
In a purely formal sense, then, The Cenci expands Godwin’s radical fight against 
the “just prejudice” of chivalric custom by undermining its foundations in performative 
rhetoric and sentiment. This denaturalization of chivalric language corresponds with 
recent arguments made by James Chandler and Mary Finn, who see The Cenci’s 
transposition of purely formal procedures into ethical action as a type of casuistry; that is, 




the emotional outcomes that judgment might entail.80 Chandler and Finn’s arguments 
about the casuistic nature of depraved papal laws and household rules can be seen as 
another instance of the play’s distorted performativity: while illocutionary speech acts are 
rampant, they are often infelicitous and perverse. Thus, casuistry is not just a type of 
case-law used to imprison and condemn Beatrice—the ethical apparel clothing unethical 
judgments—but it is also an example of the vexation of performative language itself, that 
customary, “ordinary” speech that obscures the ideological conditions of its context.  
Like Burke’s original “soliloquy in praise of chivalry” the performative utterances 
in The Cenci keeps the old world of honor alive, even if they propagate none of its 
comforting mythos: Cenci’s curse does not die with his body. In a memorable moment, 
Shelley conveys the near supernatural power of the performative—speech which creates 
real conditions. When the assassins Marzio and Olimpio set upon Cenci the moment 
before they slay him, Cenci is sleeping: he is, for all intents and purposes, ethically dead, 
unable to commit deeds or misdeeds. But Cenci suddenly speaks in his sleep, words that 
remind Marzio of a “father’s curse.”81  Even without the power of intentional speech, this 
scene shows how performative ethics haunt the play. Part of its very textual 
subconscious, ethical acts in The Cenci are not just legislated top-down, but transmitted 
from some of its deepest places.82 In other words, the patrilineal honor ethic does not just 
stand for simple tyranny but an entire structure of domination. Shelley contorts Burke’s 
presentist form of chivalry into a gothic menace, a ghost of political regression that 
always haunts the present. 
Thus, part of Beatrice’s redemption comes from her understanding that speech 




pay fealty to them in spoken performances of respect and esteem, patriarchal honor can 
no longer function. Shelley even reveals the artificiality of such performativity in a 
metacritical moment in the preface, when he calls Beatrice’s role an “impersonation on 
the scene of the world,” linking rhetorical performativity and theatrical performativity. 
Making Beatrice’s very existence an aesthetic phenomenon, Shelley offers a larger, 
nearly Nietzschen criticism about the constructedness of all ethical paradigms: not only 
do ethics stem from language and all of its underlying contingencies and ideologies, but 
moral identity itself is an consequence of one’s aesthetic. Indeed, Shelley claims to move 
beyond good and evil in the preface, when he says that he “sought to avoid the error of 
making them actuated by my own conceptions of right or wrong, false or true: thus under 
a thin veil converting names and actions of the sixteenth century into cold impersonations 
of my own mind.”83 
Like Godwin, Shelley explores the connection of performativity and ethics, 
analyzing the old, patriarchal honor system that found new life due to the conservative 
triumphalism after Waterloo. Yet, in keeping with his radical forebear, Shelley does not 
dismiss honor as totally regressive, brutal, or patriarchal. While the honor ethic still has a 
place in his conception of character, Shelley revises Godwin’s more stoic version of 
honor to accommodate an “artistic sentimentalism” that preserves feeling, sympathy, and 
the other forms of affective sociality. In his preface to the play, Shelley offers a version 
of honor that recalls Collins’s declaration in Caleb Williams that “honour is in [one’s] 
own keeping.” Directly following Shelley’s admission that, unlike poetry, drama is not 




Beatrice’s portrait in the Colonna Palace, one that he views as “one of the loveliest 
specimens of the workmanship of Nature:”84 
 
“Undoubtedly, no person can be truly dishonoured by the act of another…In 
[her] whole mien there is a simplicity and dignity…The crimes and miseries in 
which she was an actor and a sufferer are as the mask and the mantle in which 
circumstances clothed her for her impersonation on the scene of the world.”85  
 
For Shelley, the patriarchal, public honor in The Cenci is, in literal terms, a façade—
nothing but the cloak of power. His claim that “no person can be truly dishonoured by the 
act of another” seems to confirm it, and his references to mask, mantle, and 
impersonation portend to the larger critique of artificial, performative ethics that follow 
in the melodrama. This aesthetic interpretation of morality is common in Shelley. While 
the “workmanship of Nature” looks like a conventional Romantic conflation of nature 
with art, the “mask and mantle” of real conditions prefigures one of the central maxims of 
Shelley’s “Defence of Poetry” (1821). Here, poetry is said to “[lift] the veil from the 
hidden beauty of the world…and the impersonations clothed in its Elysian light stand 
thenceforward in the minds of those who have once contemplated them as memorials of 
that gentle and exalted content which extends itself over all thoughts and actions with 
which it coexists.”86  
However, the preface from The Cenci is not just a nascent version of Shelley’s 
more famous aesthetic and ethical philosophy, but returns to Godwin’s earlier notion of 
“true honor”—a principle of identity accessible to the “man of true discernment”—that 
puts communal responsibility at the heart of the individual. Although the semantic 
parallels between Godwin and Shelley run deep—“No person can be truly dishonoured 




Caleb Williams and reviving the concept “true honor” from Political Justice—the moral 
theory that Shelley offers in the preface modifies Godwin’s “true honor” in crucial ways. 
First, it makes the ethic of honor even more radically social than Godwin does, removing 
honor from the heart of the private subject and putting it into the hands of another. The 
preface suggest that the other is Shelley himself, who looks upon the portrait of Beatrice 
Cenci and finds in her a “simplicity and dignity” that would not otherwise manifest itself 
in the play, which critics have seen as putting Beatrice in an uncomfortable space 
between condemnation and canonization. Instead of leaving audiences to their own 
interpretive devices regarding Beatrice Cenci’s honor, Shelley intercedes, encouraging 
the reader to assume the existence of her “simplicity and dignity” preemptively through 
an iconic, public representation: the portrait in the Colonna palace that is available for all 
to see. Shelley does not just seem to emancipate Beatrice from her tragic situation, but he 
also expands the social reach of the honor ethic so that it may include public personas 
that appear to be beyond all civic redemption. These personas of course include 
emblematic closet-drama protagonists like Beatrice Cenci—whose vows of vengeance 
and patricide can be considered “pernicious mistake[s]”—and well-known reformist 
agitator poets like himself, writing as he was in one of the hottest years of domestic 
political turmoil in the nineteenth-century.87  
Beyond its psycho-biographical connections, this new form of honor also realigns 
the categories of privacy and publicity that troubled Godwin so much Caleb Williams. In 
this case, one’s honor is not exactly “beyond the reach of all mankind,” as Mr. Collins 
puts it in Caleb Williams, responding to Falkland’s. The “simplicity and dignity” that 




contrary, in mankind’s safe keeping. While this new idea of honor expands the notion of 
self-worth like Godwin, it is also a response to Godwin: where Mr. Collins says that 
honor is supposed to keep the “common good” at the heart of private self-worth, Shelley 
shows that Beatrice’s private self-worth is part of public safekeeping and recognition.  
The final difference between Shelley and Godwin’s vision of modern honor is 
their relationship to sentiment, affect, and feeling. As I argued above, Godwin is highly 
suspicious (at least in the 1790s) about the place of affect in sociopolitical life, and in 
Caleb Williams this suspicion manifests itself as a response to Burkean sentimentalism. 
Shelley, however, roots personal dignity and honor in sentiment. Placing aesthetic feeling 
ahead of ethical action, Shelley asserts that “[t]he highest moral purpose aimed at in the 
highest species of the drama, is the teaching the human heart, through its sympathies and 
antipathies, the knowledge of itself; in proportion to the possession of which knowledge, 
every human being is wise, just, sincere, tolerant and kind.”88 The tenet that “no person 
can be truly dishonoured by the act of another,” appropriately comes afterwards.89 Hence, 
for Shelley honor—or “simplicity and dignity”—is not strictly aligned with a “moral 
purpose,” or with a species of benevolence that someone like Godwin thought would be 
common to society, but with a public “illustration of strong feeling” that can inspire 
private sympathy and recognition in others. Moral didacticism may have been nearly 
impossible for such an overtly amoral drama like The Cenci. But Shelley avoids 
contradiction when he argues that art instills moral strength in the viewer by provoking 
passion and feeling. In other words, the private honor of a representation may be in the 
hands of another, but it is radically particular in its own way, escaping historical, 




Burke’s soliloquy to Marie Antoinette, Shelley’s reading of Beatrice’s portrait is also a 
moment where the representative takes precedence over the performative: the singular 
dignity of the image trumps the demand to keep alive the values of the past—which, in 
Beatrice’s case, was defined by injustice.90 
Well before the publication of The Cenci, the values of “simplicity and dignity” 
had been associated with aesthetics. The next chapter investigates a major Romantic 
figure that strengthened this association, William Wordsworth. (Indeed, right before 
Shelley exhumes Beatrice’s dignity in his preface, he invokes Wordsworth’s famous line 
about the “real language of men”).91 Although dignity and honor are two of the adjectives 
that Wordsworth assigns to poetry most often in the Preface to Lyrical Ballads, they are 
not just incidental terms for Wordsworth. Instead, the moral provokes a crisis in 
Wordsworth’s sociopolitical outlook directly following the release of his first major 
volume of poetry: should honor apply only to those works of literature that aspire to the 
highest and most noble cultural inclinations, or should it be egalitarian in its nature, found 
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An Inheritance New Fallen: 
The Dilemma of Honor in Wordsworth’s Poetics and Politics 
 
 
“Mr. Wordsworth has thought too much of contemporary critics and criticism; and less 
than he ought of the award of posterity, and of the opinion, we do not say of private 
friends, but of those who were made so by their admiration of his genius. He did not 
court popularity by a conformity to established models, and he ought not to have been 
surprised that his originality was not understood as a matter of course. He has gnawed too 
much on the bridle; and has often thrown out crusts to the critics, in mere defiance or as a 
point of honour when he was challenged, which otherwise his own good sense would 
have withheld. We suspect that Mr. Wordsworth's feelings are a little morbid in this 
respect, or that he resents censure more than he is gratified by praise.”  
—Hazlitt, The Spirit of the Age 
 
“Culture also has its titles of nobility…” 





Godwin and Burke shared a similar fear about the communal dislocation that 
might have accompanied the expansion of radical republicanism—thus Godwin’s 
advocacy for “true honor,” an egalitarian virtue that would provide even the most ardent 
proponents of revolutionary liberté a sense of social solidarity.1 It is also clear that 
Thomas Paine and Mary Wollstonecraft may have inspired Godwin’s egalitarian version 
of honor when in The Rights of Man (1791) and the Vindication of the Rights of Men 
(1790) they argued for the “natural” and “native dignity of man,” a phrase long used in 
evangelical sermons to denote the universal worthiness of all humans, that was now being 
pulled into secular political discourse.2  
But these newer reformed versions of honor did not have to be radically 




ancient honor codes, but inflected them with the modern idea of merit. If honor was not 
necessarily available to all men by nature of their innate humanity, it could be won by 
those who participated in careers open to talent. In a similar vein, the rise of Britain’s 
commercial society throughout the eighteenth-century was founded on what Pocock 
describes as the link between virtue and commerce, where personal emblems of honor 
were connected directly to one’s worthiness in the marketplace.3 In modernity, climbing 
the ranks of the honorable elite meant building good credit and keeping up amenable 
relations with other professionals. This relationship between dignified man and dignified 
industry was dialectical: to be honorable meant not only conveying trustworthiness in 
your commercial reputation, but it also meant producing commodities that conveyed a 
certain aesthetic nobility—goods or services that comported with the bourgeois’ notions 
of rank and cultural capital. Thus, while the rise of the professional classes meant the 
slow death of the nobility historically, the commercial society continued to thrive on the 
very hierarchies of value for which the conservative, royalist paradigm had always 
depended.  
This chapter argues that these two, contrasting forms of honor provoke a larger 
question about civic values in the early-nineteenth century: would honor be egalitarian 
and widely available to all segments of society, or would it continue to signal exclusivity, 
denoting ancient rank and hierarchy through the structures of the modern market? Such a 
conflict, I argue, is illuminated in the work of one of the era’s renowned scrutinizers of 
modern value, William Wordsworth. Over the years, the poetry produced around the 
Lyrical Ballads (1798-1805) years has been fecund for critics largely because it contains 




name just a few.4 Here, I suggest that this poetry can also be characterized by a conflict 
between the two modern versions of honor outlined above: a bourgeois form of 
“honorable” commercial production that continued to emphasize inherently conservative 
principles of hierarchy, distinction, and reputation through the operations of the 
contemporary literary marketplace, and a radical form of honor allied to the republican 
movement, one that stressed the egalitarian dignity of all persons no matter their 
economic or sociopolitical status. Not only can a focus on honor deepen nineteenth-
century scholars’ understanding of one of the major virtues that mediated between private 
and public life during a period of civic upheaval, but Wordsworth’s predicament with 
these two forms of honor also reveals a larger problem in liberal modernity: the 
contradiction between distinction and equality, an especially palpable problem to those 
living in the post-revolutionary era. If this problem has been a concern in Western civic 
life since Plato, in the early-nineteenth-century such a conflict of value seemed to find a 
solution in the rise of liberal society. Why was this the case? In short, liberalism tried to 
synthesize market hierarchy with civic egalitarianism by combining together two 
discourses: the vocabulary of political economy and the rhetoric of universal rights.5 And 
yet for Wordsworth—and for those of us living through the many crises of the neoliberal 
society—the tension between market values and social values remains evident. While 
new scholarship has demonstrated how Wordsworth balanced Royalist and Republican 
principles following the revolution, the poet’s dilemma with honor also shows him to be 
a perspicacious critic of the emerging liberal society and its incongruities.6  
The Advertisement to the Lyrical Ballads, its Preface, and the lyric “Michael” 




progressive form of egalitarian dignity. Ultimately, however, a section of the 1805 
Prelude suggests that poetry—like the modern political subject—might distinguish itself 
without abiding by the inherent hierarchies of the market. A coda addresses 
Wordsworth’s 1809 pamphlet The Convention of Cintra, which incorporates the poet’s 
previous reflections on the civic purpose of honor. Even though the pamphlet has been 
read as verifying Wordsworth’s conservative drift, a version of his more equitable 
version of honor keeps The Convention from being an entirely traditionalist document. 
Because the Convention allows for these two contradictory sociopolitical versions of 
honor to function without provoking any more debate from Wordsworth, it seems to 
indicate Wordsworth’s acquiescence to the contradictions of liberal modernity at a certain 
point in history. Such a change, I argue, can reframe our larger understanding of the 
poet’s political trajectory.    
While Romanticists such as Jerome Christensen have associated the honor ethic 
with Byron’s commercial persona, honor is also one of William Wordsworth’s favorite 
words.7 It is used over one-hundred-fifty times throughout his canon, appearing fifty-
percent more often than the term “sympathy,” and nearly as often as the word 
“memory.”8 It is significant in many contexts, appearing as a major designation of 
value—as when Wordsworth invokes the “the honourable characteristic of Poetry” in the 
opening line of the Advertisement to Lyrical Ballads—and as the primary concern of 
poems like “Say, What is Honour,” a civic-minded sonnet from 1807.9 Wordsworth’s 
prolific use of honor throughout his canon implies that the poet recognized both the 
cultural value and the semantic breadth of the term in late-eighteenth- and early-




dignity—one’s immutable, inner worth—started to merge with honor as a variant 
expression. Although Kant’s Groundwork (1785) sets the elite notion of honor (Ehre) 
against the egalitarian sense of dignity (Würde), Johnson’s Dictionary (1755) runs the 
two words together in its definition: “Honour, ȏń-nŭr. s. dignity, reputation, virtue.”10 In 
short, by the late eighteenth-century both definitions were interchangeable, but also in 
tension with one another. As Appiah and Elizabeth Anderson point out, much of this 
tension owed to the revolutionary political climate.11 Honor and dignity were starting to 
shed their associations with patrician inheritance, nobility, and rank—their classist 
connotations—and becoming inherent qualities available to all people. Thus, while 
Wordsworth’s appeal to the defense of national honor against Napoleonic expansion is 
deeply—almost parodically—Burkean in the 1808 pamphlet The Convention of Cintra, 
other uses of honor show a latent republicanism. For instance, Wordsworth answers the 
titular question of “Say, What is Honour” straightaway with an homage to Godwin’s 
Political Justice: “Say, what is Honour? Tis the finest sense / Of justice which the human 
mind can frame.”12 
While this reliance on honor appears to be a natural part of Wordsworth’s 
thinking and vocabulary (or, as James Chandler has put it, part of his “second nature”), 
like so much of the poet’s ideological development it also belies a deep-seated paradox.13 
In the quote from the epigraph, Hazlitt implies that honor had two specific connotations 
for Wordsworth that did not necessarily comport with one another. The first sense that 
Wordsworth had about honor was that it was a signifier of professional reputation and 
literary dignity—Pocock’s version of honor that had become fundamental to bourgeois 




challenged” by cultural guardians of the literary marketplace. And yet, the second sense 
of honor that Hazlitt attributes to Wordsworth does not concern the cultural capital of his 
poetry or its commercial legitimacy, but the radical qualities of its content; the 
egalitarian—even revolutionary—capacity of poetry to address itself to what Wordsworth 
called “the native and naked dignity of man,” and to disregard those “established models” 
of canonical decorum Hazlitt identifies in favor of a truly democratic 
representationalism.14 How were these two versions of honor to be squared? How could 
the young, lake country poet produce works that would bring him fame and attention in a 
discriminating literary marketplace while also addressing people of all ranks and 
identities?   
 
II. 
Honor is the first virtue of Lyrical Ballads, evoked even before Wordsworth’s 
well-known appeals to “the deep power joy” or the “sympathies of men”.15 The opening 
sentence of the Advertisement to the 1798 London Edition reads, “[i]t is the honourable 
characteristic of Poetry that its materials are to be found in every subject which can 
interest the human mind.”16 What is the “honourable characteristic of Poetry”? Why does 
Wordsworth appeal here to honor as a standard of popular taste—instead of manners, 
custom, or other traditional forms of judgment?  
At first glance, the Advertisement seems to approach honor as an egalitarian 
virtue. For Wordsworth, poetry is honorable because it touches upon “every subject 
which can interest the human mind.”17 Following this logic, the “honorable characteristic 




or identities without explicit reference to their rank or station in life—to provide “a 
natural delineation of human passions, human characters, and human incidents.”18 Such 
an aesthetic offers a vision of public unity through shared experience, one that would be 
effective in bringing together the populace in the face of the ideological and civil turmoil 
of the 1790s.19 However, despite the appearance of some Burkean referents—the sober 
“delineation” of social order, the communality associated with a broad appeal to 
“human[s],” the initial impulse to define honor as a species of chivalry or nobility—this 
opening line is not as conservative as it at first seems. By connecting honor to the 
unlimited capability of poetic representation, Wordsworth echoes some of the more 
radical theorizing about the nature of honor that was emerging at the end of the century: 
that honor is a universal virtue available to all segments of society, that it is a quality 
interred in the “human mind” instead of shared bloodlines, and that it is innate—or 
“native”—instead of inherited.20 No longer reserved for the aristocracy alone, the honor 
ethic here starts to fall under the influence of Wordsworth’s “leveling muse,” and aligns 
itself with the original experiment in Lyrical Ballads “to ascertain how far the language 
of conversation in the middle and lower classes of society is adapted to the purposes of 
poetic pleasure.”21  
And yet, the Advertisement is not just an early declaration of Wordsworth’s 
ethical and aesthetic philosophy—it is also a promotional text. Because honor is invoked 
in a document intended to announce the cultural and commercial worthiness of 
Wordsworth and Coleridge’s poetic endeavor, the word could also be a synonym for 
literary capital. Connoting the majesty, gentlemanliness, or elevated virtuousness of 




with which Wordsworth was familiar, especially Shaftesbury’s Characteristics, which 
links the highest species of representation to the most dignified virtues. An astute reader 
of Shaftesbury, Wordsworth would have also been familiar with his thoughts on 
judgment—and the Whiggish way in which polite gentleman could cultivate “relish or 
good taste” through the “open and free commerce of the world.”22 Equating the freedom 
of personal exchange with the autonomy of markets, Shaftesbury’s text provides 
Wordsworth with a theory of taste rooted in the emerging liberal-capitalist order, and the 
way it would rely on the old words of distinction to signify the new ideal of merit. 
Here, a contradiction appears in one of Wordsworth’s first and most prominent 
uses of the term honor. It exists between the democratic idea of honor that was being 
propagated by Wordsworth’s republican contemporaries—and its application to an 
“honorable” sort of poetry that speaks to (and for) all citizens—and the continued use of 
honor as a signifier of noble status and elite literary distinction. The genre of the 
Advertisement contributes to this paradox because a modern idea of egalitarian honor 
appears within the very text intended to sell Wordsworth’s poetry to a “dignified” literary 
establishment, under whose authority literary reputations were made.  
At first glance, the way that honor signifies both ethics and commerce reflects 
Pocock’s ideas about the rise of the bourgeois liberalism in the eighteenth-century, where 
ancient civic virtues like honor had a symbiotic relationship with modern market culture, 
and “the right to things [became] a way to practice virtue[s]” in the public sphere.23 For 
Pocock, the democracy of the polis was at the same time the democracy of the market, in 
which anyone (read, any idealized white male subject) could stake their fortune in a 




business relationships the language of esteem and recognition that had at one time been 
exclusive to the gentry and landed classes. Reflecting this thesis, Romanticists have also 
recognized a marketing strategy in the language of the Advertisement. Expanding upon 
Chandler’s influential argument about Wordsworth’s debt to Burke, Thomas Pfau notes 
that the Burkean symbolic of courts, public etiquette, chivalric honor, and other “species 
of courtesy” start to become mediated by a literary market oriented towards bourgeois 
taste—an imperative that emerges in order to show the superior value of goods and 
services that are in competition with one another.24 Additionally, Clifford Siskin argues 
that the rise of post-industrial labor meant a poetic “experiment” for Wordsworth that 
would be moved away from aristocratic patronage and reoriented towards middle-class 
exchange and work.25 The Advertisement reflects this new, commercialist version of 
literary evaluation by taking the conferral of dignity and honor out of the hands of critics 
and their “pre-established codes of decision” and by putting into the hands of readers 
whose consumption habits would in the end determine artistic merit.26  
If, as these scholars argue, Wordsworth has accustomed himself to the consumer 
society, then the tension between the hierarchical sense of honor and the more democratic 
version seems to be resolved: honor can still connote rank and distinction, but, because it 
is available to all those participating in a fair, public marketplace supposedly based on 
merit, it continues to feel egalitarian. Wordsworth can thus have it both ways: he can 
produce a volume like Lyrical Ballads in the hopes of radically democratizing the 
subject-matter of poetry, even while making conservative appeals to canonical propriety 
and the chivalric imaginary that would distinguish the volume in the eyes of the book-




However, would Wordsworth’s statement about the egalitarian ability of 
honorable poetry to address “every subject” also apply to those who are disenfranchised 
from the bourgeois structures of commerce—a primary subject of the poet’s work? In 
other words, although the literary market leads to the democratizing of a once-aristocratic 
honor ethic, is it a democratization that Wordsworth sees undercut by commerce’s 
continued perpetuation of social stratification?  
It is not clear that Wordsworth accepts the new hierarchies of modern literary 
commerce uncritically. While readings of the Advertisement have emphasized 
Wordsworth’s hope that poetry will transmit a kind of purified sensibility—an encounter 
with natural pleasure limited by the sobriety of habit—the text also offers an important 
diagnosis of the collective biases of taste, one that includes the marketplace within which 
Wordsworth operated.27 In order to avoid “that most dreadful enemy to our pleasures, our 
own pre-established codes of decision,” Wordsworth argues that judgments about poetic 
“dignity” flow from a different lineage, one based upon a “natural delineation of human 
passions.”28 At first, this seems as if it is a thinly-veiled political statement against 
aesthetic judgments formed through a conservative—even feudalist—paradigm of value: 
the worthiness of poetry is determined by its conformity to inherited rules or conventions, 
and its canonicity established by a certain deference to older masters, instead of appealing 
to the more “natural delineation” of universal human passion. However, while the 
Advertisement reflects the political language of the day, Wordsworth’s statement must 
also be read in light of an anxiety over the success of Lyrical Ballads in the literary 
market. Both Wordsworth and Coleridge needed money to finance their trip to Germany 




rate—they were having trouble securing a stable publisher.29 In addition to their financial 
problems, Wordsworth and Coleridge had larger professional concerns about Lyrical 
Ballads that involved the construction of their reputations. The poets had a legendary 
uneasiness about the volume’s reception by various literary “authorities” (friends like 
Robert Southey amongst them, who slammed the collection as a “Dutch attempt at 
German sublimity”).30  
Because the lake poets’ were so focused on their own professional identity in 
1797-8, Wordsworth’s writing about the honor and dignity of poetry can just as well 
apply to the modern kind of judgments made by a readership influenced by market 
society. Given this, Wordsworth’s trouble with “pre-established codes” does not just 
anticipate Hazlitt—who saw in the Lyrical Ballads a republican critique of aristocratic 
principles—but also Bourdieu, who argues that in the age of capital, art could only be 
legitimated (or made honorable) when deciphered through the “cultural code[s]” of the 
bourgeois. (Eerily reminiscent of Wordsworth’s “pre-established codes,” Bourdieu’s 
“cultural codes” is in fact the standard English translation of the term used throughout 
Distinction). Not only do these prejudices keep readers from the universal human 
pleasures that poetry provides, but they circumscribe “the honorable characteristic of 
poetry”—its ability to address a wide segment of humanity—by invalidating people 
whose opinions have not been codified by certain commercialized ways of seeing and 
judging art; the same figures that in Wordsworth’s poetry are shown to be left behind at 
the onset of industrial modernity. 
Wordsworth’s Advertisement to Lyrical Ballads is the first major text of his to reveal a 




the notions rank and privilege. While the Advertisement offers few solutions to this 




In some ways, an honorable reputation is exactly what Wordsworth sets out to 
defend in the 1800 Preface to Lyrical Ballads. Even though he admits that Coleridge 
pushed him into writing the text in order to rationalize their poetic endeavor, 
Wordsworth’s other “choice of…purpose” is to spare readers “any unpleasant feeling of 
disappointment, and that I myself may be protected from the most dishonorable 
accusation which can be brought against an Author, namely, that of an indolence which 
prevents him from endeavouring to ascertain what is his duty, or, when his duty is 
ascertained, prevents him from performing it.”31 But while Wordsworth’s concern about 
“dishonorable accusations” made against his professional “duty” appears to project an 
anxiety about the favorable ranking and honorable reputation provided by those in the 
book-trade—and by literary friends like Southey—other parts of the Preface reveal a 
continued discomfort about the institution of literary taste.  
Most notable is Wordsworth’s reflection on the existence of a modern “contract” 
between poet and reader that directly follows the remark about “dishonourable 
accusations:” 
 
It is supposed, that by the act of writing in verse an Author makes a formal 
engagement that he will gratify certain known habits of association; that he not 
only thus apprizes the Reader that certain classes of ideas and expressions will be 




symbol held forth by metrical language must in different æras of literature have 
excited very different expectations : for example, in the age of Catullus, Terence, 
and Lucretius and that of Statius or Claudian ; and in our own country, in the age 
of Shakespeare and Beaumont and Fletcher, and that of Donne and Cowley, or 
Dryden, or Pope. I will not take upon me to determine the exact import of the 
promise which by the act of writing in verse an Author, in the present day, makes 
to his Reader; but I am certain, it will appear to many persons that I have not 
fulfilled the terms of an engagement thus voluntarily contracted.32  
 
The terminology of “formal engagements,” “terms of an engagement,” and “voluntarily 
contract[s]” gives the passage both a vocational and a political tone, signaling that in 
modernity, that “act of writing in verse” is both a political and occupational decision. Not 
only must modern works accept a contract of arranged rules or risk falling out of the lists 
of national cultural nobility, but they must also—as Christensen and David Bromwich 
have argued—choose their inheritance.33 In other words, poets must preserve in a kind of 
literary aristocracy the honor and dignity of poetry by employing the bourgeois rhetoric 
of choice. This rhetorical blend of royalism and contractualism resembles Burke—who, 
in a similarly formal way, championed the English constitution in order to preserve the 
inheritance of stable, national culture. But the conservative political message of the 
passage is also crossed with the more Whiggish language of commerce. Here, propriety 
and property meet: the “act of writing in verse” is also a professional choice about 
maintaining an honorable public reputation through the structures of literary commerce.   
It is not clear, however, that Wordsworth wants to make such a choice. If 
anything, Wordsworth’s initial language in the excerpt—“it is supposed that”—shows 
him to be non-committal, perhaps ventriloquizing readers’ expectations about the 




conceding to them entirely. In light of this hesitancy, the passage looks quite different. 
The “unpleasant feeling of disappointment” that might be felt by readers has to do instead 
with Wordsworth’s conscious abdication of his occupational duty to supply noble cultural 
material. Although the Preface seems to detail a professional code of honor—one that 
serves as a contract for vocational conduct “in the present day”—it is not obvious that 
Wordsworth abides or wants to abide by its “terms of engagement.”34 Indeed, just 
moments before this passage on literary inheritance, Wordsworth suggests that readers 
break with lines of poetic entailment, abandon the inherited standards of judgment from 
the past, and reassess the grounds for what the poet calls the “public taste.” This break 
does not necessarily mean that Wordsworth wanted to retain the dignity of poetry through 
a new bourgeois model of judgment, where honor could be a sign for cultural capital. 
Given Wordsworth’s cageyness with contracts and vocational agreements, it can instead 
mean renouncing the very agreement that turns honor into bourgeois status—a break with 
a literary connection to the past that functions in the present day as a professional 
contract.  
Although it is later in Wordsworth’s career, the extended Preface from the third 
edition even echoes Mary Wollstonecraft—and her oft-used radical idiom of the “native 
dignity of man”—in claiming that poetry is an “homage paid to the native and naked 
dignity of man, to the grand elementary principle of pleasure, by which he knows, and 
feels, and lives, and moves.”35 Tellingly, Wordsworth places the dignity of poetic 
production in direct contrast to the work of “a lawyer, a physician, a mariner, an 
astronomer [and] a natural philosopher,” all of whom have obligations that are unique to 




way the “elementary principle of pleasure” known to all men, but also because it rejects 
the limitations of occupational custom. In the modern world of professional distinctions, 
categories, and ranks, poetry remains a democratic art. 
Despite these flashes of progressive rhetoric, contemporary Wordsworthians may 
be inclined to see moments from the Preface as some of the strongest evidence of 
Wordsworth’s drift towards a conservative worldview, one based on preserving the 
hierarchies of culture in the face of potential invasion.37 The Preface, for example, 
excoriates the “dishonorable melancholy” brought on by “lower” and potentially foreign 
genres like gothic literature and German tragedies; and there is also its famous reference 
to the “invaluable works of…Shakespeare and Milton,” which become for Wordsworth a 
form of canonical patrimony in the modern age.38 (Wordsworth even continues to equate 
the aristocratic notion of honor to middle-class work in the fifth book of the 1805 
Prelude, when he calls Shakespeare and Milton “Labourers divine!”).39  
And yet, much of this grandiosity about honorable literary inheritance—and the 
royalist overtones it conveys—contrasts with the “humble subjects” in Lyrical Ballads.40 
“Michael” is one of these subjects. The closing poem of the 1800 second-edition, 
“Michael” has been read by Mary Jacobus as sanctioning an old, hierarchical form of 
honor.41 While Michael’s modest sheepfold is lost as an inheritance to his profligate son, 
Jacobus reads the structures patrimony and ancient entailment in Wordsworth’s opening 
benediction to “youthful Poets, who among these hills / Will be my second self when I 
am gone.” 42 However, if the language in the Preface is any indication, Wordsworth 
remains ambiguous about his own ideas about patrimony and inheritance, as they are now 




commercial institutions upon fundamental moral connections, the urban economy in 
which Michael’s son Luke participates in order to save his father’s inheritance—to 
literally save his patrimonial honor—ultimately disrupts the covenant between them. As 
Pfau points out, however, this disruption is not due to capital does bursting onto the scene 
within the narrative of the poem, suddenly unleashing its revolutionary energies on the 
old agrarian world. Modern business has, in fact, already circumscribed the very familial 
commitments that Michael intended to shore up: Luke goes to the city to pay off debts his 
family incurred by underwriting a profligate, city-dwelling nephew engaged in the world 
of buying and selling.43 In this way, the narrative of Michael’s ancient commitment to his 
family seems already encapsulated by a world of capitalist interest. The old patrimonial 
link between father and son that Jacobus sees reestablished in the introduction is on the 
contrary unsettled by the poem’s final image: Michael’s cabin and sheepfold now 
commodified as “The Evening Star” inn—an inheritance converted into bourgeois 
property. 
Did Wordsworth believe in 1800 that a he was fighting a battle against the values 
of the modern commercial society that would be unwinnable? Was there any way for him 
to assert “the honourable characteristic…in every subject” without its being overtaken by 
the hierarchies of capital? What Wordsworth needed was to redefine honor itself. In the 
1805 Prelude, he would.  
 
IV.  
The very idea of The Prelude conveys the tension between hierarchical values and 




conflict between the two versions of honor on display in the poet’s early career. This is 
the case in part because of its hybrid genre. The poem’s vernacular content—its everyday 
encounters, intimate reflections, and personal crises—is mixed with its epic ambitions. In 
The Prelude Wordsworth not only attempts to compete with the loftiest poetry in the 
modern English tradition, but also tries to elevate autobiography to metaphysical heights, 
a goal that was in keeping with the bourgeois ideal of self-valorization and promotion. 
This conflict between hierarchy and egalitarianism in the poem—between vertical and 
horizontal values—is at the same time a conflict between left and right. The Prelude is 
also a story of political disillusionment, chronicling Wordsworth’s shift from republican 
patriot to reconstructed Tory. Its account of Wordsworth’s partisan metamorphosis 
reinforces the political malleability of honor—a civic virtue that in the post-revolutionary 
era was used by both Dissenters and Royalists for their own political purposes.  
While these formal details are meaningful, even more important to understanding 
the new sense of honor that emerges in the twelve-book Prelude are the biographical 
developments surrounding its composition. In 1802, Wordsworth at last recovered the 
thousands of pounds owed to him by Lord Lonsdale, who had died of gastrointestinal 
distress in May of that year The noble presiding over the Wordsworth family home in 
Cockermouth, Lonsdale had been indebted to Wordsworth’s father John after his passing 
in 1783, and had in effect held out on the patrimonial inheritance of the entire 
Wordsworth clan for nearly two decades.44 (In a poem written in 1795, Wordsworth 
reflected upon the situation with bitter satire: “Must honour still to Lonsdale’s tail be 
bound? / Then execration is an empty sound”).45 While the Lonsdale affair accounts for a 




gives the honor ethic a less ancient connotation. Later that year, Wordsworth travelled to 
France to reunite with Annette Vallon and their daughter Caroline. A recommitment to a 
part of his life that had remained hidden for many years, Wordsworth’s renewed 
obligation to his illegitimate family aligns with the progressive definition of honor that 
had permeated much of his poetry in previous years: a moral duty to recognize the 
inherent dignity in all persons—“the honourable characteristic…in every subject”—even 
if they were illicit or had been ostracized from conventional public life. 
The professional credibility of the epic genre; the partisan war of ideas being 
waged at the turn of the century; a recovery of contested inheritance; a renewed 
commitment to an illegitimate family—all of these issues converge in a single section of 
The Prelude, which provides Wordsworth with a new way to theorize the ethic of honor 
for the modern age. With a narrative that touches on thwarted inheritance, troubled 
patrimony, and shame and redemption, the Vaudracour and Julia episode included in the 
ninth book of The Prelude wrestles with conflicts about financial wellbeing and public 
reputation similar to the ones that had informed Wordsworth’s poetry and poetics over 
the last five years. However, in the end the episode remodels the concept of honor so that 
it will emphasize individuals’ commitment to one another regardless of status. Despite 
the political rancor precipitated by the Napoleonic conflict, and a creeping cynicism that 
attended a society increasingly determined by market relations, the Vaudracour and Julia 
episode tries to conceive of honor as a pure ethical practice, one that could balance 
private worthiness with public responsibility.  
Out of all the sections in The Prelude that deal with the civic ideals of the 




the story of Vaudracour and Julia, the poem focuses on a conversation between the poet 
and his compatriot Michael Beaupuy concerning the “true personal dignity” of all 
persons—a quality of individual worthiness that was not determined by the ruling classes, 
and could not be tarnished by affronts to one’s reputation or the contingencies associated 
with “language, country, love, and hate.”46 While recalling Paine, Wollstonecraft, and 
Godwin’s radical uses of the terms “honor” and “dignity” throughout the 1790s, 
Wordsworth also takes direct aim in this passage at Burke and his chivalric revival of 
honor in the Reflections. Parodying Burke’s oft-mentioned set-piece of Mary Antoinette 
arising above her subjects “glittering like the morning star,” it is instead the “people [who 
rise] up / Fresh as the morning star,” asserting “in the rudest men” a “sense of right / 
Uppermost in the midst of fiercest strife.”47 Beyond a mere political discussion, 
Wordsworth and Beaupuy’s thoughts about the “true personal dignity” of the common 
people bears a family resemblance to other anecdotes in the ninth book about the role of 
honor in modernity: Wordsworth idealizes the merit-based system of honor in his 
Cambridge days, where for his “brothers all in honour…wealth and titles were in less 
esteem / Than talents and successful industry;” and, after defecting from the ranks of 
predatory nobility, Beaupuy devotes himself “[w]ith like persuasion honoured” to the 
credo of republicanism.48  
The most complex meditation on honor and nobility, however, can be found in the 
closing tale of Vaudracour and Julia. A pessimistic retelling of Helen Maria Wiliams’s 
well-known narrative from her Letters Written in France (1790), the episode is not 
uplifting on the surface. Driven from his household by a cruel father, the aristocratic 




family was “[u]nhonoured of nobility.”49 During a conflict over his birthright, 
Vaudracour slays a household guard, flees, and becomes an outlaw. Yet, despite his 
repeated attempts to build a family with his beloved, Julia ends up being forced by her 
own family into a convent, leaving Vaudracour to care for their illegitimate child—who 
dies eventually, sealing Vaudracour’s fate to live as a recluse with “an imbecile mind.”50 
Because of its gloomy outcome, the story could be read as an anti-Jacobin parable 
advising readers to abide by tradition and convention: Vaudracour should have listened to 
his patrician father, which would have allowed him to inherit his birthright; he should 
have been less rash in his pursuit of true love and avoided the dejection that inevitably 
comes with unchecked sensibility; he should have shown his offspring more manly 
distance and thus thwarted his insanity. Due to these missteps, Vaudracour never lives up 
to his name: he cannot be worthy (vaudra) of the court (cour).  
But the name could also translate into worthy (vaudra) heart (cœur). Given this 
interpretation, the episode looks less like a fable warning readers about forsaking 
aristocratic conventions, and more like a parable about the inherent dignity that can exist 
beyond one’s noble status or material wealth. A closer look at an excerpt from the 
episode reveals a similar attention to a type of honor based upon a fundamental 
commitment to others instead of the hierarchies of economic status (which was part of 
both aristocratic and bourgeois notions of honor). The poet tells how Vaudracour and 
Julia were connected 
 
 …[f]rom their cradles up, 
With but a step between their several homes 
The pair had thriven together year by year, 




And petty quarrels had grown fond again, 
Each other's advocate, each other's help, 
Nor ever happy if they were apart: 
A basis this for deep and solid love, 
And endless constancy, and placid truth; 
But whatsoever of such treasures might, 
Beneath the outside of their youth, have lain 
Reserv'd for mellower years, his present mind 
Was under fascination; he beheld 
A vision, and he lov'd the thing he saw. 
Arabian Fiction never fill'd the world 
With half the wonders that were wrought for him. 
Earth liv'd in one great presence of the spring, 
Life turn'd the meanest of her implements 
Before his eyes to price above all gold, 
The house she dwelt in was a sainted shrine, 
Her chamber-window did surpass in glory 
The portals of the East, all paradise 
Could by the simple opening of a door 
Let itself in upon him, pathways, walks, 
Swarm'd with enchantment till his spirit sank 
Beneath the burthen, overbless'd for life.51  
 
From this passage a subtle—but major—difference emerges in Wordsworth’s sense of 
honor. The material qualities that could have determined Julia’s honorable status are 
shed: his “present mind under” the fascination of a “deep and solid love,” Vaudracour 
“turn’d the meanest of [Julia’s] implements…to price above all gold,” and the modesty of 
Julia’s home becomes insignificant, “Her chamber-window…surpass[ing] in glory / The 
portals of the east.”52 Vaudracour’s “endless constancy” to Julia is the higher measure of 
value here, a private commitment to another person that is worth more than any object 




While it can read like amorous tropology—a generic poetic blazon on the 
beloved—this passage is far more profound when read in reference to Wordsworth’s 
struggles with the meaning of honor throughout Lyrical Ballads, caught as he was 
between wanting to make poetry egalitarian but also to “legitimate” his aesthetic 
productions by conforming to certain codes of cultural distinction. Indeed, what stands 
out in an episode written for an epic are not the tropes of legitimacy but illegitimacy: 
Vaudracour’s lost inheritance, Julia’s thwarted chastity, and their illicit child together are 
all outside the mores of propriety. Looking again at the passage, however, such 
illegitimacy appears to be more beneficial than tragic. While the “price above all gold” 
anticipates Vaudracour’s loss of patrimonial security—the inheritance he gives up to be 
with Julia—the “overbless[ing] of life” points to the illegitimate child that Vaudracour 
will gain.53 Trading away his inheritance in order to commit to his child, Vaudracour 
gives up his fiscal patrimony in order to bestow a blessing that is far more fundamental: 
paternal care itself. In other words, Vaudracour gives up the financial honor of his 
birthright for a commitment to another person outside of the traditional structures of 
entailment; for a new ethic that binds each to each through natural piety. And while his 
“inheritance of blessedness” may not remunerate titles or economic security, it does 
provide Vaudracour with greater aesthetic gifts, the ability to make wondrous visions out 
of the “meanest” substances.54 Thus, when Vaudracour returns to his father in the hopes 
of reconciliation, it is the beauty of his illegitimate child that he hopes will strike his 
father’s heart “[s]o that it shall be soften'd” into understanding.55 Despite the tragic 
conclusion of his story, Vaudracour’s commitment to life no matter its rank is a positive 




When placed in the context of Wordsworth and Beaupuy’s radical conversations 
about the “true dignity of man”—and in the larger perspective of The Prelude as a poem 
about “the growth of a poet’s mind”—the Julia and Vaudracour episode allegorizes 
Wordsworth’s artistic development in relation to the two versions of honor with which he 
wrestled in the preceding years. Like Vaudracour, Wordsworth realizes that he must 
forego a traditional inheritance from older poets in order to form new aesthetic visions. 
This abdication of honor places a “burthen” upon him because he cannot sustain his 
poetry by relying on inherited tropes or figures that register as dignified in the 
contemporary literary market.56 And, like the end of the story indicates, this rejection has 
the potential to keep Wordsworth’s poetry from reaching “the light of common day”—its 
full recognition by a society of consumers who legitimate certain types of literature.57 But 
this renunciation also allows poetry to flourish outside of strictures of the modern 
commercial order. Like Vaudracour’s obligation to his wife and child, the honor of a 
poem is located in the way it commits to the representation of subjects no matter their 
perceived status or their legitimacy to contemporary cultural opinion. Because he trades 
public acclamation in order to depict humbler themes, Wordsworth can go on to imagine 
an aesthetic project more aligned with the republican vision of equitable representation, 
where systemic hierarchies are undercut, where “inheritance [is] new-fallen” and the 
poetic endeavor seems like “when the first time visited, to one / Who thither comes to 
find in it his home.”58 Wordsworth’s near simultaneous return to Annette Vallon and the 
recovery of his familial legacy supports this allegory: the poet’s renewed focus on his 




private commitment to his daughter Caroline—for such a loss there can still be abundant 
recompense. 
And yet, until the Ernest de Sélincourt edition of 1928, the Vaudracour and Julia 
episode was never included in the published text of The Prelude, removed from its ninth 
book perhaps as a way to preserve the conservative nature of the epic form. (The 
narrative poem was however published independently in Wordsworth’s 1820 chapbook 
The River Duddon). Without the episode, the 1850 Prelude would thus be read as it 
commonly is today: a story of a young man’s journey from defiant revolutionary to sober 
nationalist. While such a vision would have been agreeable to Victorians reading the epic 
after Wordsworth’s passing in 1850, the decision to avoid details about an illegitimate 
relationship in an autobiographical poem also protected Wordsworth’s professional 
reputation in the years following the release of the fourth edition of Lyrical Ballads 
(1805), when his star started to rise. His honor as a literary gentleman was safe, and by 
extension, his ability to speak with manly authority about the political honor of England 
in nationalist polemics such as The Convention of Cintra (1809) was preserved. However, 
this very disavowal of the episode seems to accentuate the message it provides: set 
outside the grand genre of the epic—and the poetry from 1798-1805 that brought him the 
most recognition—the intimate folktale of Vaudracour and Julia is one of the poet’s most 
intense and private attempts to find the “honor of poetry…in all subjects” regardless of 
popular approval. Informed by a long, internal debate about commerce, political 
ideology, and aesthetic legitimacy, Wordsworth’s sense of honor could not be wedded 






This was not just the resolution of a private crisis of values—a way for 
Wordsworth to alleviate the personal trauma of the revolution by importing some of its 
“leveling principles” into his poetry and poetics; to navigate the waters of public opinion 
while staying true to his own moral code. His development of a modern honor system to 
stand against the dictates of the market and the opinions that were formed therein was 
also a very public response, one precipitated by the rising influence of capitalism in civic 
life—especially the way in which industrial-era England started to rely on the 
prescriptions of political economy (and the language of utility) to organize social 
relations. As Raymond Williams indicates, this impulse to advance an alternative 
paradigm of moral value to stand against the social dislocation caused by agrarian 
capitalism was widespread.59 It is in Goldsmith, Crabbe, and especially Cowper, whom 
Wordsworth read with great delight.  
However, Wordsworth’s new form of honor seems more modern than the ethics 
of these mid-century poets, who tried to assert old “rural Virtues” against the new 
“business of destruction” (or, more appropriately, the destruction of business).60 First, 
despite the persistent identification of Wordsworth as a champion of the rural 
dispossessed and their time-tested beliefs, his sense of honor does not endorse a return to 
the communal virtues of an agrarian past. Instead, Wordsworth’s honor ethic tries to 
account for the development of civic behavior based around the rise of the city and the 
emergence of the urban marketplace—the place where virtue and capital found their most 
complete synthesis. In this sense, Wordsworth’s reliance on honor was not an 




Secondly, this notion of honor was current because it was informed by two voices that 
were still at the center of the war of ideas in the early-nineteenth-century: Godwin and 
Burke. Wordsworth’s view that honor should be inviolable, available to everyone, and 
removed from the prejudice of rank derives in part from Godwin, who while using the 
idea of “true honor” throughout his canon to indicate the inherent dignity of all people, 
recognized the need for a communal virtue to check the possibly alienating effects of 
republicanism, a system that had the potential to put the individual above all else. (Like 
Wordsworth, Godwin was also shocked by the terror and the dictatorial turn taken by 
Napoleon). However, despite Wordsworth’s wariness of hierarchy, the anti-
commercialism in his sense of honor comes from Burke, who famously excoriates the 
culture of “sophisters, oeconomists, and calculators.”61 Lamenting the loss of ancient 
chivalry that bound together the polis, Burke also presents a fresh critique of the 
commercial society. For Burke, it was not that commerce was completely bad; it could 
not be for a politician weaned on the Whiggish ideas of “civilizing” market exchange.62 It 
was instead that the increasing mobility and prolificacy of capital—and its incarnation 
within industrial commodities, paper money, and writs of credit—accelerated the 
development of a solely utilitarian outlook in citizens, converting sensible, civic-minded 
burghers into rational calculators of their own private advantage. 
Wordsworth’s synthesis of these two thinkers into a single virtue—eccentric as it 
may have seemed in his own day—looks perfectly logical now. The poet saw in honor a 
way to resolve (or at least negotiate) one of the major contradictions inherent in emerging 
bourgeois ideology: while Wordsworthian honor holds onto the revolutionary promise of 




the stratifying nature of a value system derived from the commercial classes, whose 
empowerment the revolution had largely based itself upon. He recognized the 
contradictory role that capital played in a civic order that was supposed to value all of its 
members—from the lowest wandering peddler to the highest railway industrialist whose 
“bold hands…triumphs o'er…Space.”63 Another way to put this is that Wordsworth did 
not simply “turn Tory” when he enters the nineteenth-century, as many of his 
contemporaries insisted. Instead, the poet became in his moral opinions a visionary critic 
of the liberal society, which was just starting to convert the language of political 
economy into the language of ethical righteousness. 
To our early-twenty-first century ears, this sounds familiar. The transformation of 
moral vocabulary that began in the mid-eighteenth-century has been naturalized by 
neoliberalism, where notions of value in public discourse are now reduced to their 
financial appeal: “freedom” is the untrammeled operations of the market; 
“accountability” is one’s overweening responsibility to the balance sheet; and even 
honor—defined as a private responsibility to others—can be quantified as a credit score. 
Twenty-five years before John Ruskin challenged the economists’ assumption that man 
exists as a “covetous machine” in his introductory essay from Unto This Last 
(appropriately called “The Roots of Honour”), Wordsworth foresaw how the dependence 
of liberal policies on the vocabulary of political economy would lead to the reduction of 
men and women to homo economicus—and to laws that treated them as such.64 In his 
1835 Postscript to Yarrow Revisited, the poet returns to the language of honor and shame 
in order to excoriate the New Poor Law, which had been passed just a year before. Citing 




“pauperism,” Wordsworth says that “[t]here is not…sufficient cause for doubting that a 
like sense of honour may be revived among the people…without resorting to the 
severities which the new Poor Law Act had introduced.”65 The example Wordsworth uses 
to illustrate his point is telling: a couple “once in prosperity” who are now unable to bury 
their dead child due to rapid financial misfortune, but who nevertheless cling to a sense of 
honor that is slowly dwindling. This is Vaudracour and Julia reconsidered. Here, 
however, honor is no longer something that has to be detached from bourgeois ideas of 
cultural capital. It must be saved from the whims of real capital. 
 
VI. 
As I suggest above, the inherent conflict between bourgeois social values and 
economic values eventually became undeniable for Wordsworth—and political writing 
and poetry in the later part of his career especially attests to outright power of capitalism 
to simultaneously transform landscapes and displace its most venerable inhabitants. 
However, in this coda, I want to consider a period in Wordsworth’s life where he was 
actually able to mitigate the contradictions in liberal modernity. I take a step back to look 
at the 1809 political pamphlet, The Convention of Cintra, a document written in the thick 
of the Napoleonic wars and one that shows an uncharacteristically strident Wordsworth 
arguing about the potential for the loss of Britain’s national honor. Instead of showing the 
poet’s rising discomfort with the paradoxes of the modern political system, however, The 
Convention of Cintra shows how the logic of crisis—presented by a threat of military 
invasion—can allow even the most perspicacious thinker to put aside their critique of a 




started to become obscured in the post-revolutionary period: the incongruity between 
conservative national protectionism and the spread of progressive republicanism on a 
global scale. While Wordsworth’s pamphlet sheds light on the early credo of the liberal 
Empire, it is also singular for the way in which avoided the very problem at the core of 
this contradiction: how does one command the liberation of others by the appeal to a top-
down authority? Wordsworth’s temporary quietus to this problem can reframe the way in 
which critics have approached the civic commitments of the poet, which are often 
described at this point in his career as fully Burkean, evincing an apostasy from the 
revolutionary republicanism of the poet’s youth. 
For some critics, there is no debate: The Convention of Cintra is a strictly 
conservative document. Historicists who have tracked the poet’s conservatism to a very 
early stage in his career (as early as 1793), the 1809 political pamphlet finally confirms 
Burke’s sustained influence on Wordsworth for well over fifteen years, and that the 
poetry of the “great decade” is, by most accounts, an exercise in the priority of Burkean 
sentiment to metaphysical reason. And even if one is not prepared to accept the thesis of 
Wordsworth’s early conservative leanings, one could easily see The Convention as 
signaling the beginning of Wordsworth’s apostasy from republican politics. Recent 
scholarship, however, points out the latent revolutionary principles in The Convention: 
Deirdre Coleman notes that Wordsworth’s reliance on liberty is a major—if not crucial—
part of the pamphlet’s argument for Spanish sovereignty, and, in a paper that synthesizes 
the two extremes of Wordsworth’s political views, Brian Folker argues that The 
Convention “can be regarded as the greatest point of complexity in Wordsworth's 




This political antinomy is captured once again by the virtue of honor. While a 
hawkish, Burkean version of the honor ethic serves as an ethical foundation in The 
Convention, the pamphlet is also influenced by the other progressive version that had 
emerging influence in the early-nineteenth-century. Thus, while there are strident 
moments of elitism in The Convention, Wordsworth also reminds readers of honor’s 
broad social-consciousness, the egalitarian “honorable characteristic [found] in every 
subject” that informed Lyrical Ballads and the tale of Julia and Vaudracour.67 Even as 
late as 1809, honor mediates between the poet’s political fascination with conservative 
distinction and progressive egalitarianism.  
Historicist critics (and Wordsworth’s own contemporaries) have argued that the 
threat of Napoleonic invasion decisively turns Wordsworth away from republican causes. 
As a result, the conservatism latent in Wordsworth’s poetry from 1793-1805 becomes 
outwardly manifested. For the most part, Wordsworth’s writing about honor writing 
reflects this turn. Although the 1806 sonnet “Say, what is honor” may have taken a cue 
from Godwin by equating honor with “the finest sense of justice,” it also sees honor as 
the final line of national defense, that which “guard[s] the way of life from all offence / 
Suffered or done.”68 Here, Wordsworth returns to a tribalist notion of honor as external 
reputation and military prowess, arguing that while wartime defeat may lower a nation’s 
“proud heads, but not unto the dust,” national “infamy doth kill.” This atavistic militarism 
is softened in some way by the way in which modern honor separates reputation from 
sheer physical might, a public version of honor—what Burke repeatedly calls “national 
character” in his Reflections. With its appeals to Britain’s military triumphs and to its 




But the pamphlet also hopes to project British honor outwards to the other nations 
involved in the Napoleonic conflict. Part of the goal of The Convention is to set a 
sociopolitical paradigm for the other European nations to follow: 
 
The spirit of Buonaparte’s government is, and must continue to be, like that of 
the first conquerors of the New World who went raving about for gold—gold! 
and for who rapacious appetites the slow but mighty and sure returns of any other 
produce could have no charms. I cannot but think that generations must pass 
away before France or any of the countries under its thralldom, can attain those 
habits, and that character, and those establishments, which must be attained 
before it can wield its population in a manner that will ensure our overthrow.69   
 
By presenting a universal ethos upon which other nations are judged, Wordsworth seems 
to return to a version of honor as a hierarchizing formation, one which is close to being 
theorized as a species of cultural capital in Bourdieu’s most basic sense: that which 
classifies a “socially recognized hierarchy” through intangible habits and manners.70 In 
fact, in the passage’s comparison of Britain and France, Wordsworth almost literalizes 
the concept of cultural capital itself, using financial metaphors in his discussion of more 
intangible national values. For Wordsworth the currency of the British character stands 
against Napoleon’s “rapacious appetite” for gold, expansion, and plunder. With Britain’s 
national morality on guard against French rapine, it is “habits” and “establishments” that 
ring out with Burkean conviction, the “produce” which “charms” the population into 
solidarity and resolve. In other words, if Napoleon wants to conquer Europe for sheer 
material gain, then Wordsworth wants Europe to fall under the sway of Britain’s 
venerable morals and their “slow but mighty and sure returns.”71 Taken as a whole in this 




worth. Even though Wordsworth chides Napoleon for his materialistic ambitions, the 
language of virtue and commerce seem to be once again operational, hearkening back to 
Wordsworth’s sense of honor as a marker of bourgeois professionalism, patrimonial 
inheritance, and other proprietary phenomena. Against these operations of bourgeois 
propriety, the French have simply turned to plundering.  
Yet, even during such reactionary surges in his writing, Wordsworth reminds 
readers that honor can still be inflected by social egalitarianism, the “honorable 
characteristic…in every subject” posited in the first edition of Lyrical Ballads and 
strengthened by the episode of Julia and Vaudracour. Right after praising Spain’s military 
resilience, Wordsworth turns his attention back to British citizens. Describing the 
ongoing conflict as generating “question[s] of virtue and moral sentiment,” Wordsworth 
proposes to  
 
[l]et [fellow countrymen] know, there is no true wisdom without imagination; no 
genuine sense;--that the man, who in this age feels no regret for the ruined 
honour of other Nations, must be poor in sympathy for the honour of his own 
Country; and that, if he be wanting here towards that which circumscribes the 
whole, he neither has—nor can have—a social regard for the lesser communities 
which country includes. Contract the circle, and bring him to his family; such a 
man cannot protect that with dignified loves. Reduce his thoughts to his own 
person; he may defend himself,--what he deems his honour; but it is the action of 
a brave man from the impulse of the brute, or the motive of a coward.72  
 
James Chandler has commented that the “concentric circles” of virtue mentioned by 
Wordsworth are lifted directly from Burke, an experiential system of relationships that 
Chandler calls Burke’s “love of kind,” which is the first principle to Burke’s social and 




Wordsworth, we might be content to designate this passage as a Burkean echo and 
nothing more. Here, however, Wordsworth seems to use the Burkean model of collective 
social relations to posit a version of honor that is strangely progressive. In this passage, 
instead of moving downward in an archetypical way— descending from the royal 
“fountain of honour,” the early modern trope Burke continued to rely on in his 
Reflections—the “circumference” of honor expands outward to include a multitude of 
various classes and stations.74 A form of intersubjectivity, honor grows out of local 
concerns with a nation’s “lesser communities,” and is founded on the single person’s care 
for all of their fellow citizens’ dignity, not embedded in a sovereign that disseminates 
honor from a position of superiority. Not only does honor give individuals a sense of 
national kinship, but it allows them to feel like they are part of an international 
community: someone who cannot see beyond the grand, public value of national honor is 
equally someone who “feels no regret for the ruined honour of other Nations.”75 Those 
without this “genuine sense” cannot ascertain Wordsworth’s initial claim about the 
egalitarian nature of honor made in the Advertisement to the Lyrical Ballads, that there is 
an “honorable characteristic…in every subject” which leads to greater “social regard.” 
It could be contended that Wordsworth’s message doesn’t actually depart from 
Burke. Burke never disregards the egalitarianism of honor—this is, in fact, one of the 
main points of the Reflections. But, in a subtle maneuver, Wordsworth amplifies Burke’s 
egalitarianism in order to modify the standard definition of honor itself, a naturalized 
“loyalty to rank” and distinction.76 While the word “honor” sounds unmistakably 
conservative—and give us that old chivalric feeling—Wordsworth amplifies the 




elitist and hierarchical, but they are also built upon ever-expanding circles of social 
awareness; honor still appears to elevate British “national character,” but it also binds 
different nations together. Thus, honor becomes a figure for both conservative and 
progressive political positions, mediating between egalitarianism and hierarchy, intrinsic 
worth and extrinsic classification, republican dignity and conservative distinction —
sometimes simultaneously articulating those positions without discord. 
Not only does The Convention allow for the conflicting versions of honor traced 
in the Lyrical Ballads years to function simultaneously, but it also seems to reinforce the 
gender dynamic in the Vaudracour and Julia episode of the Prelude—where honor was 
divorced from the idea of patrimony. In another metaphoric passage, Wordsworth starts 
to describe honor as “a benign ordinance of our nature,” a phrase that represents nicely 
Burke’s conflation of nature and ancient custom.77 However, Wordsworth goes on to say 
that 
 
genuine honour is the hand-maid of humanity; the attendant and sustainer—both 
of the sterner qualities which constitute the appropriate excellence of the male 
character, and of the gentle and tender virtues which belong more especially to 
motherliness and womanhood.78  
 
The “genuine honor” of the nation is not just predicated on traditional models of 
masculinity or patrimonial legitimacy—the “appropriate excellence of male character.” 
Like Vaudracour’s commitment to his child, honor is also figured as a maternal 
“attendant and sustainer,” a form of obligation that acts as “the hand-maid of 
humanity.”79 Instead of honor’s being represented as both father and mother (the dual 




maid,” a feminine figure that provides humanity both the “sterner qualities” of 
masculinity and the “gentle and tender virtues [of]…womanhood.”  
This lone personification is consequential. By making honor a woman, 
Wordsworth seems to abandon the Burkean idea of patrimony/masculinity as a standard 
for political legitimation and national recognition. Additionally, by making honor a 
“hand-maid” and not a natural or legitimate mother, Wordsworth seems to suggest that 
the honor of nations can be formed outside the bounds of the traditional family 
relationship, that national virtue must be constructed on the affirmation of responsibility 
regardless of biological connection. Burkean national honor, founded on patriarchal 
legitimacy and figured by an “entailed inheritance derived…from our forefathers,” is 
replaced by a feminine honor that doesn’t distinguish between the legitimacy of persons, 
and even seems suspiciously constructivist in its makeup.80 (Of course, the “hand-maid” 
of honor could just be a nationalist codeword for “motherland,” a version of subservient 
feminine virtue to be defended by Britain’s cavaliers, or, as Anne Mellor has pointed out, 
one of many the maternal personifications throughout the era that rationalized the British 
imperialist project.81) The passage as a whole again emphasizes Wordsworth’s political 
holism when he gets to The Convention of Cintra. As a sign rich with signification, honor 
allows for the coexistence of Wordsworth’s royalist conservatism with his residual 
republicanism without provoking questions about these positions’ inherent 
contradictions.  
 Wordsworth vision of honor in The Convention seems to allow for two 
contradictory political impulses to function seamlessly. Does this mean that honor is an 




for Wordsworth as the threat of invasion increased, a metaphor that—in the face of 
another geopolitical trauma—started to lose any dialectical nuance. Such a reading allows 
for a circumspect return to McGann’s Romantic ideology and the broader critical 
impulses of Romantic New Historicists from the1980s, whose scholarship about 
Wordsworth often argued for the poet’s substitution of actual, social conditions with 
imaginative tropes and figures.82 However, Wordsworth’s more critical engagement with 
honor in the years leading up to The Convention proves that honor was not always a 
figure for imaginative escape. If anything, during those years, honor is a touchstone for—
not an escape from—Wordsworth’s incongruous political positions, and an ethic whose 
sociopolitical contradictions presented the poet with a genuine dilemma. But why would 
Wordsworth avoid this critique of value in The Convention even though the political 
paradox between the two modern versions honor still exists? Perhaps, with the trauma of 
revolutionary violence was still fresh in his mind, Wordsworth acceded to the demands of 
a country at war, rallying behind old British values with outward displays of nationalism. 
If this is the case, Wordsworth’s politics might be viewed less as an abrupt replacement 
of political reality with the Burkean imaginary then as an abrupt move towards quietism. 
The conservatism that is usually attributed to Wordsworth thus takes on a slightly 
different shade—registering not so much as a political outlook brought on by traumatic 
break with youthful radicalism, but as an acceptance of the status quo, which is 
oftentimes seen as necessary during wartime. 
When we allegorize honor as a larger story about Wordsworth’s politics—as a 
story about how he temporarily learned to stop worrying and accept the contradictions of 




scholarship over the last thirty-years: a McGannian line that sees Wordsworthian 
Romanticism as a mystification of real social conditions, and a de Manian line that 
locates in Romanticism a constant, deconstructive will to self-critique and, hence, 
ideological destabilization. Wordsworth might begin his “great decade” as a de Manian, 
skeptical about modern honor as a stable political and aesthetic formation. But he ends up 
a McGannian, comfortable with the contradictions inherent in modernity.83 However, 
pace McGann and others, it is difficult to think that the idea of honor becomes totally 
mystified in The Convention, given all of the critique it had endured during the Lyrical 
Ballads years. If there is one final glimpse of radicalism that not lost after The 
Convention—an enduring revolutionary instinct in Wordsworth that continues to resist 
the status quo—it is that such legitimacy is a fragile thing, something that Hazlitt picks 
up on when he in The Spirit of the Age and his reading of Wordsworth’s honor ethic that 
served as my epigraph. As a plea for the poet to re-dedicate himself to private friends and 
admirers—and not to engage with petty critics—Hazlitt takes to heart the lesson from 
Wordsworth’s “great decade,” realizing that modern honor might be less of a submission 
to authority then it is an affirmed commitment to others regardless of their legitimate 
status.  
Another word for legitimacy is credibility or credit—a concept that binds 
economics to politics (and, with the resurgence of volatile financial speculation on a 
global scale, one that it is at the heart of the crises of our own moment). In my next 
chapter, I turn to the figure of credit in the writing of Jane Austen and Walter Scott. 
Because of Austen and Scott’s focus on manners and chivalry, the two novelists have 




novels during a major nineteenth-century credit crisis. Austen and Scott expanded upon 
and reconceived a literary tradition that links honor to finance in two of their best-known 
works: Emma (1815) and Rob Roy (1817). Framed by contemporary economic concerns, 
both novels show how credit becomes an increasingly prolific way to announce one’s 
honor, how it binds characters together in speculative exchange, and how unsubstantiated 
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Full Faith and Credit: 
Finance, Honor, and Social Trust in Rob Roy and Emma 
 
We trust with perfect security that the freedom of trade, without any attention of 
government, will always supply us with the wine which we have occasion for: and we 
may trust with equal security that it will always supply us with all the gold and silver 
which we can afford to purchase or to employ, either in circulating our commodities, or 
in other uses.  
—Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations  
  
The peculiarity of this philosophy of avarice appears to be the ideal of the honest man of 
recognized credit, and above all the idea of a duty of the individual toward the increase of 
his capital, which is assumed as an end in itself. Truly what is here preached is not simply 
a means of making one’s way in the world, but a peculiar ethic. The infraction of its rules 
is treated not as foolishness but as forgetfulness of duty. That is the essence of the matter. 
It is not mere business astuteness, that sort of thing is common enough, it is an ethos.  





Since their publication, the novels of Walter Scott and Jane Austen have been 
synonymous with manners, customs, and “honorable” behavior. In fact, if honor is 
mentioned at all in conjunction with Romantic literature, we’re most likely to think about 
Scott and his passion for maintaining chivalry and antiquarian moral codes—when 
Scott’s most famous protagonist Waverley calls the fearsome highlander Fergus McIvor a 
“‘chief thief-taker of the district,’” he is quickly corrected by his love interest Rose 
Bradwardine, who dubs McIvor “‘a gentleman of great honour and consequence.’”1 
While Austen’s novels tended to modernize these moral codes—updating for Regency 
life what Scott called the “romantic cast of the sentiment[al]”—honor inflects her work in 
a variety of ways as well.2 In Austen, the honor ethic is most often constitutive of 




(as it was for Wordsworth in my second). But honor is also an important ethos with 
regards to the patriarchal structures of Austen’s novels. For instance, the sexual peril in 
which Willoughby puts Marianne in Sense and Sensibility is repeatedly referred to as a 
breach of honor and feeling, while by the end of Northanger Abbey Henry Tilney is 
bound “in honour [and] in affection” to Catherine Morland, that traditionalist code of 
conduct between man and woman that Austen ironizes in the novel’s send-up of gothic 
and chivalric pretense.3 Whether or not it is ironized or taken seriously, the ethic of honor 
in Austen and Scott can be seen as conservative, resting as it does on a foundation of 
sentiment, chivalry, and patriarchy largely connected to Burke, whose principles 
continued to influence the counterrevolutionary years of the early nineteenth-century. 
According to Burke, venerable codes of honor are what bind society together as a “trust 
in the hands of all those who compose it.”4 Here, honor stands for a type of social trust 
that is rooted in the past, and it is an ethos vital to conservatism during times of 
international upheaval and domestic discord. Although shades of radical thought have 
been attributed to Scott and Austen by major scholars such as Ian Duncan, Marilyn Butler 
and Claudia Johnson, there is still a sense that a Burkean foundation of social honor and 
trust adheres in the work of both novelists.5 
However, the last twenty years of literary criticism have broadened our sense of 
the political and social paradigms used by both novelists. With the predominance of the 
New Historicism, critics have read both Scott and Austen in the light of cultural 
institutions. An especially popular institution has been the state-backed credit economy 
propagated by the New Whigs, which saw increasing influence in the late-eighteenth- and 




historians such as Pocock—who argue that the rise of bourgeois modernity can be traced 
to a blend of civic virtue and market commerce—these critics have shown how finance 
and political economy provided novelists with a new, comparatively progressive, 
vocabulary for ethics and social binding.7 Thus, these last two decades have also 
produced a variety of readings that seem to place both novelists on a broad spectrum of 
modern political economy, from Smithian global capitalism to proto-communist 
revolution. There is a Scott whose idea of the “gentile” feudal societies can be esteemed 
by Marxist theorists and an Austen whose heralding of “tact and propriety” and the 
imaginary sympathies required of those participating in a finance economy would be 
heralded by classical liberals. In other words, Scott and Austen’s allegiances to 
nineteenth-century progressivism are displayed through a multitude of commercial 
contexts like the credit economy, an institution based on a classically Whiggish 
confidence in the future, where people who never meet are bound together through 
mutual exchange and the hope for a good, stable future.8 
Instead of totally supporting these new progressive readings, however, I want to 
argue that Scott and Austen oftentimes show the larger problems associated with 
fantastical investments in progressive, public life, what Lauren Berlant has brilliantly 
called a “cruel optimism…when something you desire is actually an obstacle to your 
flourishing.”9 Berlant’s diagnosis resonates particularly well with Scott and Austen’s 
novels. Not only are these texts informed by early-nineteenth century ideas of political 
utopianism—like the promises of revolutionary modernity, or the organization of a fiat 
currency based on fantasies of limitless prosperity—but each novel tends to critique these 




seemed tantalizingly unsettled in their ideological commitments to political history, 
writing characters whose buoyant optimism about its progress is oftentimes mixed with a 
sober evaluation of its outcomes.  
Relying on honor once again, this chapteressay problematizes both of the 
established models of reading the ethics and social values of Scott and Austen—the old 
Burkean model based upon the manners and virtue inherited from the past, and the newer 
utopian model that dotes upon the future that will confirm our collective hopes. Using 
Scott’s Rob Roy (1817) and Austen’s Emma (1815), I show how the honor ethic—once 
associated entirely with ancient chivalry and manners—mediates between these two 
competing political outlooks post-Waterloo.10 As another version of the Romantic honor 
ethic that I have been tracing, honor in this chapter comes to stand for one’s private 
awareness of public responsibility that can be based on the demands of the present—not 
upon a sentimental past or a utopian future.  
 While my previous chapters critique the problems encountered in the Romantic-
era when moral life is dominated by archaic, Burkean structures of honor—an ethics 
based on a bygone era—this chapter uses the credit economy to critique one of those 
ubiquitous ways that honor and social trust have been connected to the future. Indeed, 
credit is by its very nature predicated on fantasies of unlimited gain in the future (and a 
good example of Berlant’s “cruel optimism,” one of which we have become well aware 
after the global financial downturn).11 As was mentioned above, credit has been a focus 
of Romanticists for some time. While Christensen’s Lord Byron’s Strength used 
individual credit to signal the move from Byron’s aristocratic honor to his prestige in a 




the credit economy as a phenomenon against which Romantic-era writers reacted by 
intensifying their sympathy with one another in the face of an unknowable future.12 But if 
Scott and Austen also react against credit—as Mitchell posits about many Romantic 
writers in his Sympathy and the State in the Romantic Era (2007)—I argue that they do so 
on an ethical as well as affective level. Set against a backdrop of eighteenth-century 
political economy that put public credit at the heart of bourgeois modernity, Rob Roy and 
Emma show how the phenomenon can be a naïve and fantastical ethical practice that fails 
to account for trustworthy behavior between persons.13 Even though a tradition of Whig 
political economy lies behind Scott’s honorable man of credit in Rob Roy—and behind 
Emma’s own repeated accreditations of others—the novels are ultimately skeptical about 
the interpersonal connections created by the credit system. They illuminate how 
relationships based upon fantastical speculation break down when faced with 
contingencies, history, and direct shocks of reality.14  
Of course, these local problems with the ethics of credit speak to larger concerns 
in the Regency about the preservation of trust in the British state and the continuation of 
its values into the future. Although those values had been facing challenges for over 
twenty years through a radical politics associated with Jacobin "outsiders," the critique of 
a government-backed credit system had been a decidedly more focused affair in the years 
of the Napoleonic conflict. While conservatives such as Burke railed in 1793 about the 
social precariousness created by a credit system without stable value, by 1815, radicals 
such as William Cobbett were worrying about the looming collapse of the state if writs of 
paper credit could not be paid.15 Instead of aligning themselves with either the 




anxieties of a nation whose sociopolitical trajectory pointed in two different directions at 
the same time—backwards to the old, chivalric heritage of the landed gentry whose 
values were stabilized by property, and forwards by way of a faith in the unmitigated 
"good" of ever-expanding financial gain. The anxiety about credit thus represents a larger 
anxiety about the temporal stance that British politics would take following Waterloo—
an event that simultaneously evinced the superiority of England’s conservative, cultural 
legacy over the impoverished theories of the Jacobins and kept in place modern, 
contemporary structures like a robust paper currency and an income tax, both of which 
were necessitated by the Napoleonic wars.  
I start with Scott’s Rob Roy, which literally connects commercial credit to ancient 
chivalric honor. While the novel’s protagonist Francis Osbaldistone narrates the events of 
the gallant 1715 Jacobite rebellion, he does so from a perspective fifty years in the future, 
securely positioned in a successful London speculation firm during the height of Scottish 
political economy.16 Notwithstanding various contingencies connected with the uprising, 
Osbaldistone eventually recovers his family’s honor by trusting those who are involved in 
the world of credit. Given this narrative and Scott’s own support of the speculative 
financial system in the nineteenth-century, we could read Rob Roy as establishing a 
strong belief in credit and its utopian outlook. But instead of evincing the protagonist’s 
moral constancy, credit is shown to be riddled with Osbaldistone’s sentimentality and 
naïve fantasies.17 In doing so, the novel dislocates ethical virtue from commerce. 
Alternatively, the mythic highlander Rob Roy Macgregor represents a different system of 
trust and social commitment, outlawed and ostracized as he has been from the 




Instead of participating in the contemporary world of exclusively private gains, Rob Roy 
dedicates himself In my first section, then, I claim that to public causes that are outside of 
his own self-interest and practices a version of honor rooted in his tribal past. In the end, 
however, Rob Roy’s honor code seems powerless in the face of a modernity obsessed 
with financial gain and the utopian promises made by a commercial system. For Scott, 
neither Rob Roy’s highland honor nor Osbaldistone’s commercial credit can fully 
recapture the type of sociopolitical trust that England yearned for at that time.  
Austen is also skeptical of credit’s ability to represent trust and social virtue in 
modernity. But in the next section I argue that Emma offers a viable solution to the 
problem of sociopolitical trust during this moment of British history, a problem that in 
Scott seemed to be stuck between old honor codes and the new credit system. Unlike Rob 
Roy, Emma outlines an honor code that works for modernity; a private commitment to 
public life that can function in the present day. As a self-proclaimed matchmaker, 
Emma’s own identity is based on trust, and, like the credit system, she brings diverse 
types of people together her own style of whimsical speculation, betting on their 
prospective happiness. This speculation is, of course, Emma’s own fantasy of future 
gain—and not a staid measurement of risk and reward. But where Emma begins the novel 
believing in the ability of credit to signify moral conduct of others in the future, 
eventually she learns to distrust its application to others. Emma abandons the “fantasy” of 
speculation but uses her imagination to generate a new form of social trust that doesn’t 
have to be based on future projections or the desire for private esteem. Mediating 
between the moral imagination and the demands of reality, the novel demonstrates 




conservative calls for stabilized values and the progressive bids for imagined ones. When 
based on this new form of honor and responsibility, Emma’s own social politics can 
actually be seen as a kind of Burkeanism-without-Burke. Emma abandons credit (as 
Burke would have wanted), but also relies on the demands of the present instead of the 
traditions of the past; if she continues to hold a Burkean affection for local community, 
such a desire does not mean her subjugation to a patriarchy, whether by inheritance or 
marriage.  
 A coda turns to the 1990s, our own recent decade of easy credit and hyperactive 
commercialism. Addressing the ethics of credit today, I look at two Hollywood 
adaptations of Scott and Austen’s novels that were released within four months of each 
other, Amy Heckerling’s Clueless (1995) and Michael Caton-Jones’s Rob Roy (1995). 
Even though they were produced in the neoliberal era—a time that proves the ascendency 
of commercial speculation begun well before Scott and Austen’s time—these two films 
nicely capture both writers’ doubts about the moral validity of credit and its capacity to 
stand for honorable behavior. 
 
II.   
In Rob Roy, the pursuit of credit is a personal adventure. In a plot based on an 
ancient archetype—the quest to recover familial honor—Scott has his protagonist Francis 
Osbaldistone trek across northern England, Glasgow, and the Scottish highlands to 
recover his father’s writs of mercantile credit—government securities which have been 
intercepted by Jacobite rebels just before the 1715 uprising. Osbaldistone stands to inherit 




major personal problem to overcome: just off a “Frenchified” liberal education that he 
acquired in Bordeaux, Osbaldistone is more committed to the verses of Ariosto than he is 
to business, arithmetic, or any other pursuit allied with “common-sense.” (In fact, the 
name “Frank” has this very tension built into it, synonymous as it is with a French culture 
of affectation and with direct, plain-speaking).18 When his father reviews Frank’s finance 
homework early in the novel, he finds that it has devolved into Spenserian imitations. 
“Why, Frank,” says the elder Osbaldistone, “‘you do not even understand the beggarly 
trade you have chosen.’”19 With commerce and romance set at odds the protagonist 
realizes that “‘[he] must soon lose the charms of literary society for the drudgery of 
commerce, and the coarse every-day avocations of the world.’”20    
However, this antithesis between commerce and moral sentiment soon synthesizes 
in Rob Roy and plays a major role in the novel’s ideological development. Specifically, 
Osbaldistone’s Romantic imagination starts to convert the uncontrollable vicissitudes of 
modern exchange into a kind of moral providence. Rob Roy is not then just a novel about 
a young man who accepts the commercialized future by surrendering to its inevitability; 
not simply a text about someone who grows up, learns the lessons of his mercantilist 
father, and finally buys into a modernity wholly organized by finance.21 It is also a text 
about a young man who learns to believe in the morality of that finance economy and to 
trust that its outcomes will be favorable in the future—a guidebook of sorts showing how 
one comes to have faith in credit.    
How does Francis Osbaldistone connect virtue and commerce together? In some 
ways, he is already enthralled with the merchant’s lifestyle. At the outset of the novel 




mercantile speculation as “something captivating to the adventurer, even independent of 
the hope of gain.”22 This “spirit of enterprise” has a visceral appeal to the young man 
steeped in chivalric romance, and offers him the comparable narrative extremes of choice 
and destiny, “whether prudence shall overcome fortune, or fortune baffle the schemes of 
prudence.”23  But Osbaldistone also shows himself to be a realist about trade early on. He 
knows that commerce can be haphazard and arbitrary, a contingent enterprise as well as a 
spiritual one. In the same breathe, Osbaldistone calls the finance economy a “fickle sea” 
(while Scott hints at the South Sea Bubble of 1720, which occurred just five years after 
the history represented by Rob Roy), and says that it features a “mixture of necessary 
attention and inevitable hazard …[that] has all the fascination of gambling without its 
moral guilt.”24 The merchant’s life may be captivating—with its constant testing of 
fortuna and discretion—but it lacks the systemic order and regulation of morality, the 
ethics provided to Osbaldistone by those same romances that gave him his sense of 
adventure.   
If the tropes of literary romance and adventure are one of the ways Osbaldistone 
attaches meaning to commerce, then the protagonist can also be seen to unwittingly 
replicate his father’s sedulousness and religious austerity as his journey commences 
(although he rejects his father’s opinions on the profession of poetry and the “lighter 
exertions of literature”).25 Portrayed as a “dour [protestant],” Osbaldistone also describes 
his father “…as a religious man, and of the dissenting persuasion, he considered all such 
pursuits as equally trivial and profane....”26 Frank may disavow his moral bond to his 
father, but, in the great tradition of the bildungsroman, he still has a psychic connection 




Leaves (1985).27 Whether we read this destiny of choice as the inadvertent fulfillment of 
Burkean inheritance or the psychoanalytical compulsion to replicate the father, what 
Osbaldistone seems to desire in the beginning of the novel is the ethos behind the 
speculative profession, the spirit behind capitalism. It is not that he is against the 
purposelessness of commerce, but that he has not yet found a way to feel such purpose 
deeply.28  
But when his father’s writs of commercial credit are pilfered a sense of 
commerce’s higher calling emerges in Osbaldistone. What he once thought of as merely 
random contingencies in finance become an opportunity for Osbaldistone to recreate the 
chivalric quest to recover an honorable—or creditable—reputation. In recognizing this 
romantic opportunity, Osbaldistone now imbues credit with a sense of meaning beyond 
its empirical representations: 
 
“I grieve not for the loss of the money, but for the effect which I know it will 
produce on the spirits and health of my father, to whom mercantile credit is as 
honour; and who, if declared insolvent, would sink into the grave, oppressed by a 
sense of grief, remorse, and despair, like that of a soldier convicted of cowardice 
or a man of honour who had lost his rank and character in society.”29  
 
Osbaldistone’s use of similes and creative comparisons mark the sentimentalizing of 
fiscal credit, a transubstantiation of mere paper commitments into romantic signs of 
chivalry and virtue. Here, Osbaldistone projects his own imaginative sentimentality upon 
his father (“grief, remorse, despair”) to legitimate the quest for honor in his own way. 
Although this sentimental display indicates Osbaldistone’s growing trust in his own 
private inheritance, it also makes credit the covering sign for sincerity and 




commerce and credit can also become the protective soldier and the authentic, public man 
of honor.30 While Osbaldistone acknowledges early on that commerce “‘connects nation 
with nation’” and structures the “‘general commonwealth of the civilised world,’” here he 
imagines that credit signifies intersubjectivity and community, an emblem for the ethics 
promised by the ideology of political economy that his father has been pushing on him.31 
In this act, Osbaldistone rejects his original ideas about the randomness of finance—
which are also the contingencies of the history into which he’s written—and starts to 
make fiscal credit a sign for trust and reputation. Credit becomes a faultless, enduring 
representation of ethics in part because Osbaldistone neglects to mention the empirical 
causes that determine credit in the first place—the drudgery of calculation and common 
sense that had been so important to his father. Instead, Osbaldistone concentrates on the 
effects credit can have on people in the future, its ability to determine the character and 
self-worth of “[men] of honour.”32 If it was once a sign for moral worth determined 
randomly by the “fickle sea” of commerce and empiricism, credit is now the perfect, 
transcendent symbol of virtue upon which the romantic quest can be based.33 
In addition to his character development, Scott’s narrative choices play a major 
role in framing credit positively—even sentimentally. Because Osbaldistone narrates his 
story fifty years after it occurs—around 1765, in the halcyon days of Scottish political 
economy—Rob Roy can be read as Scott’s well-timed palliative to fears in 1817 about the 
randomness and promiscuity of the credit economy. The novel makes an elegant 
maneuver by responding to a British public that was increasingly skeptical about the 
connection of credit to value—and increasingly suspicious of the dramatic changes in the 




credit as an old, trustworthy sign for cultural stability and ancient honor. The novel might 
thus be read as championing an ethics promised by global commerce from the eighteenth-
century onward, while walking the fine line between the chivalric nationalism advocated 
by the Tories and the global expansion promoted by Whig political economy.34 In other 
words, Scott attempts to secure British readers’ trust in the cultural stability of finance by 
creating a teleology where credit must pay off. In his hands, the Whig institution of 
public credit suddenly becomes a stable, conservative concept.  
And yet, because Scott provides enough insight into the impassioned nature of his 
protagonist—his moralizing, his rash decision-making, and, crucially, his sentimental 
imagination—he also hints that the connection of credit with honor might be both 
impulsive and blindly ideological. Associating the journey with passionate attachment, 
Osbaldistone accepts his quest for credit (almost literally) at the hands of his love-interest 
Diana Vernon, who has already set his “smouldering heart-burning:”35 
 
“Take this packet; do not open it until other and ordinary means have 
failed. If you succeed by your own exertions, I trust to your honour for 
destroying it without opening or suffering it to be opened;—but if not, you may 
break the seal within ten days of the fated day, and you will find directions which 
may possibly be of service to you. Adieu, Frank; we never meet more—but 
sometimes think of your friend Die Vernon." 
She extended her hand, but I clasped her to my bosom. She sighed as she 
extricated herself from the embrace which she permitted—escaped to the door 
which led to her own apartment—and I saw her no more.36 
 
Does Diana Vernon sigh because she feels the same passion as Osbaldistone—because 
she too is involved in her own sentimental quest? Or does she sigh because she is off-put 




embrace which she permitted?”37 Both reactions are possible, but the latter seems more 
likely given the stoicism and masculine traits that Vernon displays in the novel. Like 
Vernon, readers sense the uncomfortable simulacra of sentimental romance established 
by Scott (and his narrator proxy Osbaldistone). All the vows made in the name of credit 
are hackneyed conventions; from the “trust [placed] in [Osbaldistone’s] honour” 
concerning the pivotal object of the story, to the final goodbye that is not really final, to 
the extended hand clasped to the heart—a hand presumably containing the financial 
documents that will resolve the distress of the Osbaldistone countinghouse, literally 
drawing the documents towards the heart of the protagonist. Given all of these 
conventions, Osbaldistone’s conception of credit may not simply be an important 
category of social binding, but the primary symbol of a youthful imagination that yearns 
for romantic escapades and chivalric conviction.  
The larger point here is that Scott dramatizes the protagonist’s faith in credit in 
such a deliberately heavy-handed way that readers may have remained skeptical about 
credit as a faultless sign for virtue and public trust. Here, Scott’s protagonist performs 
what Robert Mitchell has called a Romantic reaction to the contingencies of finance, 
turning unforeseen events into occasions for public sympathy and the creation of new, 
affective identifications between people.38 But Scott troubles this thesis with his portrayal 
of a mawkish, impulsive youth as the savior of the finance economy. In other words, if 
Mitchell illuminates the way that eighteenth- and nineteenth- century writers 
“romanticize the topic of state finance” in order to establish social systems of unity and 
order, then Scott allows us to see just how constructed and naïve such a romantic reaction 




In Rob Roy, Scott’s most ardent supporter of credit and its ethics is not 
Osbaldistone, but Bailie Nicole Jarvie. Unlike Osbaldistone, Jarvie is  not beholden to 
romantic flights of fancy (although he is garrulous)is not a romantic imaginist,  nor does 
he make sentimental claims about the chivalry of commerce. Jarvie is instead an 
established professional in Glasgow, someone who stands for the sober discourses of law 
and finance that supposedly hold together modern society. He also represents the urbanity 
of the Scottish lowlands and—given his arithmetical prowess and amazing factual 
memory—exemplifies the emerging discourse of Scottish common sense.40 Therefore, 
the established expectation is that Jarvie will be sensible and empirical about finance in 
the ways that young Osbaldistone is not. And yet, Jarvie also has a set of assumptions 
about credit that amounts to speculative faith in its perfect, virtuous outcomes.  
At one point in the novel, Frank Osbaldistone returns to Jarvie’s apartment after a 
duel to seek his counsel. Here, Jarvie differentiates ancient honor from modern credit 
explicitly:  
 
"Upon all these matters I am now to ask your advice, Mr. Jarvie, which, I 
have no doubt, will point out the best way to act for my father's advantage and 
my own honour." 
"Ye're right, young man—ye're right," said the Bailie. "Aye take the 
counsel of those who are aulder and wiser than yourself, and binna like the 
godless Rehoboam, who took the advice o' a wheen beardless callants, neglecting 
the auld counsellors who had sate at the feet o' his father Solomon, and, as it was 
weel put by Mr. Meiklejohn, in his lecture on the chapter, were doubtless 
partakers of his sapience. But I maun hear naething about honour—we ken 
naething here but about credit. Honour is a homicide and a bloodspiller, that 
gangs about making frays in the street; but Credit is a decent honest man, that sits 




"Assuredly, Mr. Jarvie," said our friend Owen, "credit is the sum total; 
and if we can but save that, at whatever discount"— 
"Ye are right, Mr. Owen—ye are right; ye speak weel and wisely; and I 
trust bowls will row right, though they are a wee ajee e'enow…”41  
 
For Jarvie, credit is the new, civilized version of honor, a kind of domestic constancy that 
“sits at hame and makes the pat play.”42 It speaks to the steady work ethic of decent, 
honest men, and it is the bourgeois answer to aristocratic excess and irrational 
bloodshed—a marker of virtue that can be arrived at independently and that is available 
to everyone.  
But if Jarvie allows credit to have a humble, commonsensical place in modern 
life—a marker and maker of honest breadwinners—the way that Jarvie discusses credit is 
exclusive, theistic, and supernatural. His advice to Osbaldistone is accompanied by a 
reference to the Old Testament story of Rehoboam, who disregarded the experience of 
old councilors in favor of advice from the young and the foolhardy. Here, Jarvie’s 
anecdote about Rehoboam provokes a larger epistemological question about credit itself: 
is credit an ethical sign of experience or a sign of faith and speculation? After this 
digression, Jarvie is even more explicit in his trust of the perfect virtue of credit. When 
the financier Owen interjects with empirical facts and figures, Jarvie interrupts him, 
allaying his anxiety about the “sum total” that would constitute good credit. Instead of 
coming up with a similarly arithmetical response for Owen, Jarvie says that he “trust[s] 
bowls will row right, though they are a wee ajee e’enow.”43 Much like Osbaldistone, 
Jarvie replaces the contingencies of commerce with a certain credulousness about its 
favorable outcomes. If domestic credit is to replace bloody honor in modernity, it will 




Credit becomes a sign for trustworthiness that must be supplemented by faith and 
sentiment. In many instances throughout the novel, Scott legitimizes Jarvie’s stance on 
credit by making him the forerunner to two major modern intellectual movements with 
roots in Scotland: the “common sense” tradition and the protestant work ethic (whose 
tenets are derived largely from Calvinist dogma). Surrounded by dour Calvinist creditors 
at their central church in Glasgow, and overseeing the city’s debtor prison “tollbooth” 
with joviality, Jarvie embodies an energetic spirit of capitalism that happens to function 
in early eighteenth-century lowland Scotland, complementing an amoral commercial 
empiricism with spiritual rectitude about credit and its virtuousness—a figure right out of 
Weber.44 Even more historically-sound is Scott’s anticipation of mid-eighteenth-century 
Scottish rationalism, which is both prophesied by Jarvie in 1714, and fully realized at the 
time of Osbaldistone’s narrative in 1765. Indeed, Jarvie’s financial acumen, his free-
market ideology, and his sympathetic identification with others highlight the Smithian 
philosophy that inflects much of Rob Roy.45   
However, much like he does with Osbaldistone, Scott undermines Jarvie’s 
connection of commerce to virtue. In fact, the Bailie’s own experiences with commerce 
repeatedly contradict his faith in credit.46 For example, the Bailie abandons all fealty to 
credit when it comes to his old kinsman, Rob Roy—the title character who undermines 
the rather consistent ideology of commerce presented in the novel. As a smuggler and 
blackmailer, Rob Roy represents the underground markets that conflict with the official 
economy in which Jarvie operates. In addition to these illicit practices, Rob Roy supports 
the pilfering of Osbaldistone’s writs of credit that would have pacified the Jacobite 




contingency that believers in the credit economy wanted to disregard through their faith 
in the stable outcomes and future prosperity of commerce. But even when Jarvie 
disparages Rob Roy’s illegal enterprises—and his clan’s old, agricultural vocation—he 
can’t help but express admiration for the integrity that the highlander maintains outside 
the world of credit.47 When Rob Roy defaults on his debts owed to Jarvie—who is a 
creditor in his own right—the Bailie affirms the honorable value that Rob Roy represents 
outside the world of finance. At one point, Jarvie makes collateral out of Rob Roy’s 
history and exploits, stories “[he] like[s] better to hear…than a word o' profit.”48 And 
shortly after, Jarvie commends Rob Roy’s consistency and trustworthiness by referring to 
an oath given to his kinsmen: as Jarvie puts it, “I canna deny but he keepit his word—a' 
men allow Rob keeps his word.”49 Thus, while Rob Roy is exactly the type of aberration 
that advocates of the credit economy would like to be able to suppress as unethical and 
inconsistent, Jarvie sees him as a model of moral constancy. Unlike the writ of credit, 
Rob Roy’s “keeping his word” is a spoken oath of honor, a kind of performative that is 
not built upon an unwavering faith in gain. The opposite of credit—which is a future 
guarantee of reciprocation—Rob Roy’s oath is based on the past, bound up with 
obligations towards a Highland society that is fading rapidly. (The failure of 1715 
Uprising is one of the many ways in which these obligations can be said to lapse into 
antiquity). To Jarvie, Rob Roy represents honor that can be confirmed by undeniable 
history, exploits, and kinship. Old honor is also the ethos that binds together Rob Roy and 
Jarvie, who are split between the highlands and the lowlands, between the agrarian and 
the credit economy, between ties to antiquity and faith in modernity. In the Burkean 




public and a responsibility to community that exists outside of one’s immediate social 
circle.  
Commercial credit, of course, makes a similar claim— but instead of relying on a 
local space to solidify social relations, credit spreads its influence globally (which is 
perhaps why Burke would indict credit in the Reflections as “add[ing] infinitely to the 
dissociation, distraction and confusion of these confederate republics, both with relation 
to each other, and to the several parts within themselves”).50 In this sense, credit does not 
just present temporal problems to the sociopolitical bonds between British citizens, based 
as it is on speculation and utopian optimism, but it presents spatial ones as well, 
dissociating exchanges of virtue between persons. If the sheer geographical scope of 
trade and capital in Rob Roy presages Great Britain’s global imperialism later in the 
nineteenth-century, then the novel also seems to disrupt the universal values associated 
with a single, totalizing financial apparatus that necessitated it.51 While Burke never 
decries the idea of such universal social values associated with political economy, he and 
Scott seem to recognize the functional difficulties in implementing them across an 
empire. Indeed, the very reason Rob Roy engages in blackmail is to provide support for 
highland families who have been dispossessed by British legal and economic expansion. 
Surprisingly, Jarvie agrees with this practice, stating that blackmail “‘[is] clean again our 
statute law, that must be owned…but if the law canna protect my barn and byre, what for 
suld I no engage wi' a Hieland gentleman that can?’”52 Here, even a champion of the 
emerging system of global finance understands at a basic level the ethical imperatives 




Scott distinguishes between agrarianism and finance capital in a grander historical 
way by showing the shadowy credit system at work behind the 1715 Jacobite uprising. 
Scottish Lords, the novel dramatizes, were bribed out of fomenting Jacobite agitation by 
accepting writs of credit from England on a continual basis.54 But Rob Roy seems 
immune to this kind of economic arrangement, content as he is in an agrarian highland 
village.55 Even though Rob Roy is involved in the 1715 uprising which seems to be a 
result of the “mercantile transactions of London citizens” and speculators like the elder 
Osbaldistone, Rob Roy offers an alternative ethics of commitment to the rebellion, 
honoring the public cause of Jacobitism while skirting the private pay-off that had been 
used to pacify the Scottish lords in the past.56 Though it never offers Rob Roy any 
opportunity for direct, personal gain, Jacobitism puts Rob Roy at the center of the 
sociopolitical matrix of the book and leads him to interact with Englishman, lowlanders, 
and highlanders alike.  
As the narrative progresses, Rob Roy’s ethos seems to inspire fellow Highlanders 
to renounce the longtime appeasement of rebellion through credit: “‘D—n my creditors,’" 
the highland chieftain Galbraith says to Jarvie at one point, "‘and you if ye be ane o' 
them! I say there will be a new warld sune—And we shall hae nae Cawmils cocking their 
bonnet sae hie, and hounding their dogs where they daurna come themsells, nor 
protecting thieves, nor murderers, and oppressors, to harry and spoil better men and mair 
loyal clans than themsells.’”57 In addition to his highland kinsmen, Rob Roy also inspires 
loyalty in proto-capitalists like Jarvie. When Jarvie reflects on his connection to Rob Roy 
all of his dedication to commerce and credit becomes subservient to familial allegiances. 




had soon a gallant band; and as it grieved him (he said) to see sic hership and waste and 
depredation to the south o' the Hieland line…Rob engaged to keep them scaithless.’”58 
Not only does Rob Roy’s redistribution of wealth, his stealing of private property, and his 
participation in blackmail run counter to the ethics of the credit economy, but his 
commitment to his clan and to old Jacobitism reestablishes a more public ethos of 
honor—an honor code that binds people together without the intercession of private, 
commercial self-interest.59  
By juxtaposing two representative figures in the eighteenth-century—the modern 
man of commerce in Osbaldistone and the archaic man of honor in Rob Roy—Scott 
demonstrates how historical deeds might back up one’s commitments more forcefully 
than credit, a system whose ethics are shown to be predicated on naïve sentimentality, 
gullible rationalism, and utopian presumption about limitless material advancement. 
Through his title character, Scott also disrupts the private ends for which the credit 
economy fundamentally stands. Rob Roy’s commitment to public goals and to clan 
kinship distinguishes his version of honor from that of credit, which, in the end, focuses 
on individual benefit alone. Thus, even though the novel’s protagonist assures us that 
global commerce “‘connects nation with nation…and contributes to the wealth of all,’” 
another method of intersubjectivity and social binding is latent in the novel.60 Although 
Rob Roy’s method of social binding resembles another Burkean version of public honor 
in its unrelenting loyalty to monarchy and loyalty to smaller social circles, Rob Roy 
actually seems much more worldly and cosmopolitan than Burke’s landed and 
established nobility, moving effortlessly through metropolis, town, and country on his 




the ethical shadow of ultimately amoral global free trade, relentlessly tracking its 
expansion.  
 A practical question about ethics remains, however: would Rob Roy offer readers 
a new moral message in the wake of Waterloo? Could Rob Roy’s honor code still 
function in that new modernity? Or would it remain part of the highland tradition, a 
culture that was itself exoticized in the Romantic era? Due to many of the temporal 
complexities in the Waverley Novels, Scott offers no easy solutions to these questions.61 
Almost all modern critics have argued that Scott is fundamentally committed to history 
regardless of its ethical exigency to contemporary life—what Nietzsche called a mode of 
“antiquarian history.”62 Kathryn Sutherland argues that Scott’s fiction is based upon a 
philosophy of historical determinism—intellectual models inherited from mid-eighteenth-
century Scottish philosophers and anthropologists.63 Therefore, even if Scott glorifies 
Rob Roy for his integrity, the novel—along with several of Scott’s others—makes a 
strong case for the futility of such integrity in the face of advancing modernity. In the 
end, the novel seems to side with the ascending finance economy and its particular ethos. 
Indeed, the fact that finance happen to underwrite every part of the narrative—including 
the seminal historical event of the 1715 uprising—can only confirm what Sutherland has 
also called the inevitability of the “universal norm” of global commerce that Scott brings 
to his novels.64 As Georg Lukács noted over 75 years ago, “[h]istorical necessity in 
[Scott’s] novels is of the most severe, implacable kind.”65  
Because of this historical necessity—Scott’s obligation to the diverse narratives of 
the past—there can be no single ethical prescription in the novel: history both disrupts 




credit because it proves how honor and trust can only truly be accounted for by 
confirmed exploits and deeds—by a historical record of fact—instead of by supposition 
and speculation. But history—especially in the form of a historical novel told 
retrospectively by the main character—supports the ethos of the credit economy by 
showing how unavoidable such a system will be to modernity itself. In short, it is the 
teleology of the historical novel that ultimately supports a messianic belief in credit, a 
narrative strategy that expresses Scott’s surprising Whiggishness (or the assurance of the 
inevitable progress of modern society).  
The inability of Rob Roy’s ancient honor code to affect modernity highlights a 
more general ethical problem produced by Scott’s historicism: it is not that people will 
forget the ethical lessons of history—like highland honor—but that such lessons will be 
uncomfortably relegated to a past that no longer applies to an age fixated on future 
outcomes and utopian possibilities. Indeed, this is Burke’s problem (“The age of chivalry 
is gone!”) as much as it is Fredric Jameson’s (“...this mesmerizing new aesthetic mode 
itself emerged as an elaborated symptom of the waning of our historicity, of our lived 
possibility of experiencing history in some active way”).66 Both Burke and Jameson 
impeach the looming age of “oeconomists, and calculators,” those persons who seem to 
replace the lived , ethical encounter with history with a flattened, sentimentalized 
representation of it.67 Rob Roy dramatizes this very predicament, when finance capital 
runs up against a historically authentic highlander and his antiquated, but functional 
honor ethic.68 Even more striking is the anxious compromise that Scott has to broker 
between new credit and old honor—an anxiety that speaks to the unsure political outlook 




of public credit, or would they come together through a commitment to historical 
propriety? Civic modernity for Scott is decidedly not a comfortable balance of old virtue 
and new commerce.   
Emma, however, demonstrates a move away from the credit system and towards a 
version of honor that actually functions in modernity—and may still function today. Like 
Scott, Austen is skeptical about credit. In her novel she shows how imaginative 
speculations lead to faulty assumptions about future relationships built on honor and 
trust. But if Rob Roy sets the deeds of history (however futile they may seem) alongside a 
speculative idea of the future, Austen argues for the way in which imagination allows 
characters access to their own flawed suppositions in the present. Although the whole 
ethical apparatus of Highbury is based upon the speculation of its residents, in my next 
section I argue that new visions of honor and trust eventually allow a style of social 
cohesion that is more stable than any brought about by global finance. 
 
III.  
Far from being Austen’s least historical novel, Emma allegorizes the pervasive 
skepticism that characterized the sociopolitical climate in England after Waterloo. Time 
and again, the characters in the novel perform the guesswork of many of Austen’s 
contemporaries in 1815, British citizens who faced a temporal disjunction created when 
an erratic credit economy struggled to guarantee a prosperous future and a (literally) 
disturbed monarchy tried to conserve the past. The skepticism of the characters within 
Emma is, however, juxtaposed with Emma’s tranquil setting. Set in the village of 




locale, conveying the uncertainty of a contemporary British populace who, despite the 
tumults of modernity, were still striving to believe in the mythologized space of solid, old 
England. Hence, in his The Historical Austen (2003), William Galperin identifies the 
world of Emma as a dystopia, but one that is bounded-in by a commitment to its own 
perfect normativity, to regulating an “increasingly partial idea of Englishness…on behalf 
of specific class and ideological interests.”69 
Emma is thus an ideal novel in which to explore the values of modernity because 
it so gracefully demonstrates how one can both accept and doubt the functions of 
contemporary institutions (like the fading monarchy and the rising credit system). Like 
Rob Roy, Emma is also concerned with the dichotomy between belief and skepticism 
produced by the credit system. But where Scott makes credit (and the ethics associated 
with it) inevitable by linking it to the historical certainty of the finance economy, Austen 
notes the very capriciousness of credit as a concept of value, and thus resists such an 
inevitability. In other words, if Scott represents credit as a system of honor and virtue 
upon which we will all rely, Austen shows that the idea of credit will always be vexed 
due to its inherent contradictions. The utopian guarantees of the credit economy made 
possible by the teleological narrative of Rob Roy are simply unavailable in the world of 
Emma: when you are a resident of Highbury, accrediting others and speculating about 
them almost always means imagining a moral judgment that will prove faulty 
eventually.70  
Austen’s text does not just deepen Scott’s critique of credit as a virtue, however. 
Rather, she offers an ethos of honor and trust that Scott relegates to the past (through Rob 




departed era or to one yet to come, Emma suggests a form of public commitment 
available to the present; where trust in others does not have to be based on judgments of 
prior esteem or hopes for your own future reward. Although Emma herself relies on the 
figure of credit throughout the novel, at its conclusion Emma begins build an idea of 
social trust around a private satisfaction with public commitments—an inward sense of 
public constancy to the present that abandons the expectation of recompense. Ultimately, 
this new sense of trust intervenes in familiar critical arguments that Emma is rudely 
chastened by the shocks of reality or ideological interpellation—usually in the form of 
Knightley’s reprimand after the Box Hill episode—leading her to “better” ethical 
practices based on patriarchy or conservative norms. Instead of being subservient to 
Knightley, Emma can be seen to incorporate Knightley’s traditional honor practices into 
her own ethics, even while shifting away from a set of values rooted in speculation and 
utopianism. 
the ethics of credit being just one version of a “horizon of possibility” to which 
his argument might apply. In my reading, then, skepticism is vitally important to Emma 
in that it makes way for new models of honor and trust that are not just based on future 
possibilities or utopianism, but upon lived practices. While Galperin argues that Emma 
forecloses utopian possibility by the end of the novel, the novel also shows how such a 
foreclosure might be a necessary intercession into the British political milieu that, in 
1815, found utopianism to be an increasingly unreliable proposition.  In a recent article, 
Robert Miles discusses the novel’s engagement with agricultural speculation and the 
finance economy—proxies for what he calls Austen’s textual interests in “fictitious 




credit raises more ethical questions about Austen’s text: how, for example, might 
Austen’s “fictitious system[s] of value” divest people of more valid connections with one 
another in her work? Is the concept of “validity” even possible in Emma? (Miles would 
probably say it isn’t). If not, how can its characters signify honor and trustworthiness, the 
possibility of deep traits that simply cannot be approximated through financial transaction 
or contractual compulsion? These questions I want to allow readers to see the novel 
outside of the perimeters of strict historicist allegory (which might include the emergence 
of the credit economy, the ongoing debate about the gold standard, or the fictitious nature 
of monetary value in the early-nineteenth-century).  
Another way to avoid such an allegory is by turning to the ethical connotations of 
the word “credit” itself. In his article, Miles points out the frequency of key words in 
Emma like “credit, stock, resources, realize, schemes, speculation, improvement, interest, 
profit, rich—words belonging, semantically, to the same economic or quasi-economic 
field.”72 Beyond just an economic meaning, most of these keywords possess a moral hue. 
Scheme, speculation, improvement, interest, profit, and rich are predicated on a sense of 
individual perfectibility and the idea of future, personal fulfillment, and individualized 
“good”—bourgeois referents all.73 But credit is an especially important ethical term to 
note, because of the way in which credit crystallizes the demands of human social 
interaction. Although the English term for credit has been synonymous with “trust,” 
“faith,” “honour,” or the even more general “belief” since its rise in the late-sixteenth- 
and early- seventeenth-centuries (dates that coincided with financial modernity), it is 
actually not until the late-eighteenth-century that the word credit is used to denote a 




as a form of mutual, ethical exchange and not simply as a moral quality associated with a 
single individual. To illustrate this point, the OED lists the phrase “to do credit to” or “to 
give a person credit for something” as arising in the late 1760s, and marks its first usage 
in the Junius Letters, anonymous and popular polemics printed in the Public Advertiser 
with which Austen would have been familiar.74 In addition, the OED lists 1816 as the 
first date when credit can be given “for sincerity” (this usage occurs in Scottish poet John 
Wilson’s collection City of the Plague), and the Google nGram viewer traces a steady 
climb in the frequency of the phrase “credit for feeling” from the 1780s to its peak around 
1840.75 Thus, not only does the word credit function in a more transactive way in the 
early-nineteenth-century than ever before, but credit also seems to be increasingly 
associated with moral paradigms constitutive of the Romantic era: sensibility and the 
reciprocation of manners.76  
Taken as a whole, then, these data indicate a growing figural understanding of the 
term credit. They point to credit’s increasing association with paradigms like sensibility 
and proper conduct (two categories perennially associated with Austen and—
extraordinarily—Burkean conservatism). Overall, there seems to be a rise in the 
intersubjectivity highlighted by the definitions of credit—something that Margot Finn has 
said aligns with our increasing understanding of modernity as a contractual proposition.77 
If credit had denoted private honor and trustworthiness from the sixteenth-century on, 
then in the Romantic era—and the Regency especially—credit begins to denote more 
explicitly exchanges of esteem and worthiness between persons. It might even be said 





If by the end of Austen’s novel the ethics of credit have been reevaluated, at its 
beginning Emma seems to personify the ties of credit and virtue, a matchmaker who 
repeatedly gives and seeks credit for “sensible” feelings. Not only is Emma a locus for 
credit in her society, but her quickness to accredit people of different statuses makes her 
an embodiment of the figure of public credit—the government-backed debt endorsed by 
early-eighteenth-century Whigs that allowed for the development of an increasingly 
mobile bourgeois. In keeping with Austen’s ostensible allegiance to Burke, others have 
noted that Emma could be less a salutary representation than a Tory caricature of the 
Public Credit Goddess, an archetype usually represented as an equally naïve and 
frivolous young woman who wantonly distributes esteem to others based on imperfect 
knowledge of their reputation.78  
As a matchmaker, Emma plays upon this Whiggish ideology of credit, the 
institution that binds together people from across the socioeconomic spectrum and 
attempts to insure their trust in one another. In fact, the protagonist relies upon the very 
language of accreditation when she contemplates the supposed intimacies of her first 
intended match between Mr. Elton and Harriet, subjects from two different classes. When 
trust and familiarity between two people turn out to be the fabrications of Emma’s own 
imagination, the epistemological problems of credit start to become apparent. Hence, in 
the portrait scene between Emma, Mr. Elton, and Harriet, Emma takes note of an 
exchange between the two supposed lovers, hypothetically giving credit where it is due: 
 
The sitting began; and Harriet, smiling and blushing, and afraid of not keeping 
her attitude and countenance, presented a very sweet mixture of youthful 
expression to the steady eyes of the artist. But there was no doing any thing, with 




stationing himself where he might gaze and gaze again without offence; but was 
really obliged to put an end to it, and request him to place himself elsewhere.79  
 
The entire scene allows Emma to observe and record the familiarities between Mr. Elton 
and Harriet, providing a factual basis about their supposed courtship. An assessment of 
two peoples’ commitment that can be made with “steady eyes,” the scene is also inflected 
with the language of disinterestedness.80 When Emma’s judgment has been satisfied, 
credit is the reward that she bestows upon Mr. Elton “for stationing himself where he 
might gaze and gaze again without offence.”81  
 And yet the credit that Emma gives Elton is not the result of a fair assessment but 
rather fancy acting upon judgment and vision. More specifically, Emma’s act of 
accreditation is destabilized by speculation. The whole conceit of vision, judgment and 
possibility—the specular, the speculative and the spectral—is well arranged by Austen in 
this scene, who invokes credit as a value literally surrounded by flawed epistemology and 
misreading.82 For instance, Emma gives credit to Mr. Elton only because she believes that 
he looks out towards Harriet, to “gaze and gaze again” upon her beauty. But Mr. Elton 
actually stands behind Emma in order to watch her “every touch.”83 Because Mr. Elton is 
literally out of her sight, Emma has no objective basis on which to accredit his courtship 
of Harriet. She can only guess at the propriety of his actions—which are, to the reader’s 
eyes, less than honorable. This is where credit appears, standing in for Emma’s lack of 
sight and fair judgment. A quick, easy substitute for honor and trust, credit becomes the 
way that Emma can bind people together in her own mind without actually authenticating 
the bonds they may have with one another. Indeed, Emma’s misreading of this scene 
between Mr. Elton and Harriet encapsulates the larger social problems that an ethos of 




trust across the different communities in Highbury, here it is shown to stand for the 
speculative imagination and for the naïve desires of the private individual.  
While readers can easily see the misreading that happens in the portrait scene, 
Austen is also canny enough to make Emma herself skeptical about its dynamic of 
judgment. In doing so, Austen hints that Emma—and, by proxy, the entire social dynamic 
of Highbury—might need different ways to structure trust in others, ways that are not 
predicated on private fantasies of esteem, status, or future rewards like credit. Emma’s 
skepticism about credit comes through when Mr. Elton “fidget[s] behind 
[Emma]…watching every touch.”84 At first, Emma “[gives] him credit” for putting 
himself in the position of a decorous lover, someone who can look upon his beloved 
“without offence.”85 But Emma is, almost instantaneously, “really obliged to put an end 
to it, and request him to place himself elsewhere.”86 Although Emma at first accredits Mr. 
Elton for his coy flirtation with Harriet, Emma also realizes subliminally that Mr. Elton’s 
affection is for her, prompting her to ask Mr. Elton to “place himself elsewhere.”87 This 
anxiety about Mr. Elton occurs at the same time that Emma gives him credit for 
honorable behavior. Hence, the moment that Emma uses credit to solidify a social bond 
between persons is the same moment that Emma undercuts credit’s ability to signify that 
bond. Emma is starting to become skeptical—albeit subconsciously—about the capacity 
of credit to represent a connection between the right people. Here, credit does not 
successfully bind together groups of people from disparate social classes (as the 
institution of public credit intended), as much as it stoke the desires of the individual with 




As the novel progresses, Emma starts to see the social problems with credit more 
overtly. One such example takes place towards the end of the novel, when Emma visits 
Jane Fairfax in an attempt to atone for ill treatment:  
 
When Emma afterwards heard that Jane Fairfax had been seen wandering about 
the meadows, at some distance from Highbury, on the afternoon of the very day 
on which she had, under the plea of being unequal to any exercise, so 
peremptorily refused to go out with her in the carriage, she could have no 
doubt…that Jane was resolved to receive no kindness from her. She was sorry, 
very sorry. Her heart was grieved for a state which seemed but the more pitiable 
from this sort of irritation of spirits, inconsistency of action, and inequality of 
powers; and it mortified her that she was given so little credit for proper feeling, 
or esteemed so little worthy as a friend: but she had the consolation of knowing 
that her intentions were good, and of being able to say to herself, that could Mr. 
Knightley have been privy to all her attempts of assisting Jane Fairfax, could he 
even have seen into her heart, he would not, on this occasion, have found any 
thing to reprove.88  
 
In this passage, Emma recognizes that credit might not be such a reliable sign of 
trustworthiness and honor amongst Highbury’s residents, a suspicion that was merely 
latent in her accrediting of Mr. Elton and, at times, Frank Churchill (someone whose own 
imaginative improvisations provide him with faulty credit and esteem on numerous 
occasions).89 When Emma becomes conscious of that fact that she too can be implicated 
in the faultiness of credit—that she can also be “given so little credit for proper feeling, 
or esteemed so little worthy as a friend”—the artifice of credit becomes manifest to her.90 
No longer a system that solidifies public relationships between those with an “inequality 
of powers,” Emma starts to see credit as a fickle instrument for estimating private 
worthiness and esteem. Even if Emma relies upon her imagination to fabricate Jane’s 




how much Emma has divested herself from the ideology of credit as a form of social 
commitment.  
 Given this critique of credit, can Emma change her ways and influence the ethical 
ideals of Highbury? Or will she continue to be bound-in by its normative institutions? I 
want to argue that two scenes at the end of the novel show a practical shift in Emma’s 
ethics, away from speculation—and the utopianism that proves to be problematic for her 
as a matchmaker and arbiter of social trust—and towards an ethos rooted in a private 
awareness of public responsibility that can function in her present day. I propose that 
such an ethical redirection encodes a larger message from Austen about the necessity of 
open civic engagement that might better serve an England torn between the unreliable 
structures of the past and the untenable promises of the future. The first scene is the one 
with Jane Fairfax mentioned above, where Emma finds that social duty might be its own 
reward. The second scene has to do with Emma’s last visit to the Bates’s, where she 
makes a personal commitment to civic life that seems to be both private and public at the 
same time—that seems discreet in its practice while remaining transparent in its aims.91  
When Emma tries to visit Jane Fairfax to apologize for her speculations, she uses 
a small phrase that reflects a larger change in her ethos. Instead of relying upon the future 
hope of gain to solidify her social bond with Jane Fairfax, Emma announces the 
“consolation of knowing that her intentions were good.”92 An admittedly minor 
expression, Emma’s “consolation of knowing” conveys her recognition of a connection to 
the denizens of Highbury that doesn’t revert to the future politics that credit must speak 
to, and that doesn’t have to account for the cultural capital that credit tries to certify 




ethos of other, less prosperous residents of Highbury, including the well-meaning but 
bereft Miss Bates, who—with an unlimited capacity to trust others without a personal 
agenda—is provided the consolation of good intentions again and again.93  
Like Godwin and Wordsworth, Austen begins to posit a better honor code out of 
an existing critique, a change in the individual subject that stands as a private awareness 
of their public responsibility. The introduction of Knightley and Jane Fairfax in this 
passage also suggests Emma’s acknowledgement of public interconnectedness for the 
sake of the individual themselves. After her “consolation of good intentions,” Emma 
“say[s] to herself, that could Mr. Knightley have been privy to all her attempts of 
assisting Jane Fairfax, could he even have seen into her heart, he would not, on this 
occasion, have found anything to reprove.”94 Sometimes read as a moment of guilty self-
negation or penance, Emma’s thinking about Knightley might actually signal a 
breakthrough in her realization of intersubjectivity, a foundational part of ethical 
awareness that Paul Ricoeur has called seeing oneself as another.95 
This introduction of Knightley into Emma’s ethical thinking has presented an 
ideological problem to critics, which is also at the heart of my own argument here: what 
if an ethics based on a renewed commitment to the present is actually a reversion to the 
past, one that Knightley represents in his own fixation on propriety and patriarchal 
authority? This passage can be read as an ultimately conservative renunciation by Emma 
of her own social agency, and not as a pivotal moment of self-awareness amongst her 
society. In keeping with this pessimistic reading, critics might claim that Emma’s 
renunciation of credit here is akin to the recovery of a stable, Burkean principle of ancient 




with the wanton femininity of the credit goddess.96 By repudiating public credit’s 
“fictitious” system of value and social relations, Emma reinforces the critique of values 
leveled against the New Whigs by the Tory patriarchy. 
And yet it is not clear that Emma’s shift is due to ideological domination by 
Knightley—and the restitution of a patriarchal frame of mind—as has so often been 
alleged. Although a long line of critics have asserted that Emma is reigned-in by 
Knightley’s normativity, the line between Knightley’s domination of Emma and Emma’s 
willful incorporation of Knightley into her own ethical outlook is not clear. While 
Emma’s turn to Knightley’s fussy moralism in this passage might sound like a 
compulsive way in which Emma disciplines her own wishes in favor of a dominant 
patriarchal ideology, we should note that Knightley might not be Emma’s superego alone. 
He is a primary figure of desire for the protagonist, over whom she has a modicum of 
amorous influence—Knightley does, after all, see into her heart and not her mind. 
Therefore, while Emma sheds her desires for personal gain and benefit when she 
abandons credit, she maintains a personal, even passionate, investment in the public 
belonging and honorable behavior that Knightley has come to represent for her.97 Instead 
of being the victim of some sort of patriarchal interpellation by Knightley, when Emma 
envisions Knightley “see[ing] into her heart,” it could be a sign of her growing 
attachment to public life mediated through affection, what Lauren Berlant might call a 
“more livable and intimate sociality” that signifies our affective commitment to politics. 
In other words, Knightley can be thought of less as an internalized monitor who can now 




communality that Emma idealizes and fixate upon in order to come up with better ways 
of relating to others in her world. 98 
  Berlant posits a “more livable and intimate sociality” as an affective condition. 
Yet Emma seems to move beyond the mere conditions of affect in the novel, and actually 
acts upon that sense of “intimate sociality” that Berlant posits.99 In a second scene 
towards the end of the novel, Emma goes to visit the Bates’s once again in an attempt to 
apologize to Jane Fairfax. Instead of attempting to regain esteem, credit, or public status, 
Emma announces that she will visit the Bates’s residence “as a duty and a pleasure…It 
would be a secret satisfaction; but the consciousness of a similarity of prospect would 
certainly add to the interest with which she should attend to any thing Jane might 
communicate.”100 Although Emma visits Jane satisfied already with the ethical “duty” 
she is performing, she is now aware of the genuine equitability of their “similarity of 
prospect.”101  What’s important is that Emma keeps such satisfaction to herself, “a secret 
satisfaction.”102 Thus, a new commitment to others seems to become part of Emma’s 
private ethos. She at last seems to avoid speculating on the motives of other by focusing 
on moral satisfaction.  
This “secret satisfaction” is not just another version of self-congratulations we 
might associate with Emma’s character—a change in habit that is not really a change at 
all. As the scene moves on, a sense of the larger significance of this ethos emerges, 
especially as it relates to the larger civic life of Highbury, which is nearly defined by its 
citizens’ speculative judgments about one another (also known as rumor, a key form of 
rhetoric in the novel on which scholars have focused).103 When Emma encounters Mrs. 




discretion and private trust. Discussing Jane’s upcoming governess position while 
stopping just short of details, Mrs. Elton remarks, “‘I mentioned no names, you will 
observe—Oh! no; cautious as a minister of state, I managed it extremely well.’”104 To 
herself, “Emma could not doubt. It was a palpable display, repeated on every possible 
occasion.”105 The exchange is obviously ironic, primarily because Mrs. Elton is 
speculating and spreading rumors that are couched as non-rumors, gossiping about events 
while simultaneously calling herself a serious head of state. (Austen’s own dig at the 
hectic developments of the monarchy is not lost here). Emma, of course, picks up on this 
non-rumor as a “palpable display” intended to advance speculation and gossip “on every 
possible occasion.”106 But buried within this irony there is a kind of sincerity: although 
Mrs. Elton is not a conscientious head of state—she constantly disrupts Highbury’s social 
bonds where she hopes to cement them—there is something to be said for the private 
caution that she knows is crucial to functioning civic relations, something that Emma can 
now start to recognize. Akin to the civic duty that Emma announces as a “secret 
satisfaction,” it is a sense of internalized social commitment maintained by those who 
would actually be “minister[s] of state,” instead of matchmakers and speculators.107  
But perhaps more important than its commentary on Emma’s role as a kind of 
minister of Highbury’s state, is how this statement about “everything that is decided and 
open” speaks to a public consensus on facts, reality, and verifiable conditions upon which 
the citizens of Highbury can base their civic behavior.108 An acknowledgement of the 
power of facts and contingencies counters the speculative logic that had governed social 
relations in Highbury originally, where trust in one another was based upon a speculative 




problem with a utopian ideology based on the assurances of inevitable progress and 
happiness. In this scene, it is especially important that Emma comes to this awareness 
with Jane Fairfax, the character who falls victim to the speculative logic of others most 
frequently in the novel, including Frank Churchill, Mrs. Elton, Mrs. Weston, and Emma 
herself. (In her ability to effect the reform of a civic ethos, Jane Fairfax is not, then, just a 
character who wants to escape from the seemingly pessimistic world of Highbury as fast 
as she can. Instead, she can be seen as a fundamental part of Highbury’s attempts to 
reform itself from the inside.) I would like to close by This disruption of fantasy, 
however, does not by nature deny the power of the imagination to devise better social 
arrangements. If Emma’s imagination does not operate in exactly the same way as it 
would within an “imagined community”—developing a sense of national boundaries 
through the conception of shared subjectivity—then the final reconciliation with Jane 
Fairfax feature two separate ethical minds coming together to agree on civic habits that 
might be “decided and open.” In other words, the honor of each woman is not premised 
on the radical truth of a “real” situation. Rather, it is based upon a private commitment to 
responsibilities that can be illuminated or clarified by a consensus on the real—Jane and 
Emma’s eventual agreement on the conditions of Jane’s engagement to Frank Churchill is 
another good example of this phenomenon.109   
By focusing on Emma’s relationship with Jane Fairfax, Mrs. Bates, and others—
and intimate sense of civic duty made possible through Austen’s emphasis on the 
importance of open, decided conditions—readers might see a solution to the disruption of 
Highbury’s social relations caused by speculation and credit. Framed by the politics of 




nationalism that wanted to pull England back to a regressive, chivalric past, and a Whig 
progressivism based on naïve utopianism. That middle-way is a civic ethos that can also 
be called honor—a virtue that makes private and intimate one’s sense of public 
responsibility, while meeting the demands of the present day. It is worth noting that this 
formulation continues to play out in Austen’s following novel Persuasion, where, as 
Claudia Johnson has pointed out, the ethos of professional naval officers runs up against 
an old feudal establishment.110 Although some critics have read Persuasion as an 
indication of Austen’s increasing pessimism about the ability of social relations to 
navigate the heterogeneous civic values of the Regency, the novel, like Emma, seems to 
offer a solution to the rift between modern credit and feudal honor: in the end, Austen 
reestablishes through marriage the equilibrium between a debt-ridden feudal society 
represented by Sir Walter Elliot and a credit-rich future signified by modern professionals 
like Captain Wentworth. In other words, the novel concludes with a literal reconciliation 
of the values by merging together the economic models of the past and future. More 
importantly, however, is the ethics subtending this reconciliation: when Wentworth 
finally admits his intimate “true attachment and constancy” to Anne Eliot—and, by 
extension, redeems her family’s honor—this is another manifestation of the private 
awareness of public responsibility.111  
A civic attitude predicated on practice, an improvement of moral character, and a 
sober recognition of reality mixed with just the right amount of hope sounds like a 
prescription for the liberal subject—which, given the work of David Kaufmann and 
Amanda Anderson, is a plausible characterization of nineteenth-century figures even 




Emma’s reformed sense of honor does not so much prefigure the emergence of the liberal 
subject as much it demonstrates what I might call an adulterated conservatism, a kind of 
“Burke-without-Burke.” What does this mean? While Emma replicates parts of Burke’s 
critique of credit—realizing the importance of operating within limiting structures or with 
contingencies and shunning the fantastical ideology of speculation—she seems to reject 
the hierarchy implicit in Burke’s politics.113 And, while Emma’s commitment to others as 
a “duty and a pleasure” seems to return to the political sentimentality of Burke, this 
intimate “duty and pleasure” does not seem to be subservient to the patriarchy that Burke 
espouses: Knightley does not so much dominate Emma as he provokes in her a desire to 
act differently to those around her. Another way to put this is that Emma develops a 
theory of trust that might have been inspired by Knightley’s chivalric honor code, but she 
ultimately goes beyond him by solidifying social relations without the intercession of 
property to which Knightley (and Burkean society in general) finds himself tied as a 
landlord.114 If political historians like Pocock have shown liberal modernity to be 
premised on private property and the expansion of the credit system, Emma demonstrates 
how one might do away with these financial foundations even while preserving the 
emerging philosophical norms of liberalism: skepticism, practice, and moral 
improvement.    
This political formulation of “Burke-without-Burke” has institutional 
implications, especially given how much Romantic New Historicists relied upon Burke to 
deepen the scholarly conversation about history, sentiment, and the imagination. 
Essential to the ideology-based readings of the New Historicism was the imagination, 




from the problems facing a newly industrializing England.115 And yet, Emma’s ethical 
imagination is not a solipsistic space, but a domain of private sentimentality that can also 
be communal. Austen is indebted in some ways to Burke for this formulation. But her 
memorable protagonist also disregards Burke’s fealty to historical tradition and 
patriarchal ideology. The present day is not laden with constraints, but with the 
possibility of renewed commitment to others, regardless of their status.116  
 
IV. 
In the last twenty years Emma and Rob Roy have had Hollywood afterlives. 
Riding a wave of enthusiasm for the Scottish period piece, Michael Caton-Jones’s Rob 
Roy appeared just a month before—and was overshadowed by—Mel Gibson’s hyperbolic 
best-picture-winner Braveheart (1995). Amy Heckerling’s Clueless, however, was quite 
popular. It captured a certain 90s fervor for consumer-culture and innocuous adolescent 
drama. Though both films are products of their time—coming out within three months of 
one another—they maintain and even expand upon analysis of political values begun in 
Austen and Scott’s novels. If Scott and Austen envision the ethics of an emerging liberal 
subject without liberalism’s proprietary foundations, then Caton-Jones’s and 
Heckerling’s adaptations describe the neoliberal subject; someone implicated in a 
sociopolitical system based entirely on economic values. Informed by the decade’s 
optimism about unregulated global commerce, both Rob Roy and Clueless show how 
credit and finance bind together different social groups.117 Far from apologizing for 
values of finance capitalism, however, But here I claim that I argue that these two films 




Due to the accelerated pace at which capital seemed to be organizing social relations 
during the Clinton-era, both adaptations make even more relevant the novels’ messages 
about the moral perils of the credit system and its fantasy of unlimited private gain.  
At first glance, Michael Caton-Jones’s film Rob Roy meets all the requirements 
for the big-budget Hollywood epic. It has a recognizable cast, extended shots of the 
sprawling Scottish Highlands sheathed in fog, and a script that does away with most of 
the political and economic niceties in Scott’s novel. It is also a prequel to Scott’s original 
text, and represents a purportedly more honest period in Rob Roy McGregor’s life before 
the 1715 Jacobite rebellion. Here, the highlander is a law-abiding sheep farmer instead of 
a famous freebooter and Jacobite agitator. And unlike the novel, the film is less fatalistic 
about Rob Roy’s place in history. Instead of being relegated to antiquity at the end of the 
movie, Rob Roy triumphs over the foppish modern villain Archibald Cunningham in a 
climactic sword fight. All of this conventionalism reinforces the viewer’s faith in the 
inevitably happy ending of the film. It is tempting to conflate such narrative assurance 
with the same kind of faith we might have had in the inevitable payoff of the strong 
financial markets of 1995. Disregarding peril or contingency, we trust in a Hollywood 
teleology to remunerate our  cruelly? optimistic expectations.  
The film’s central source of conflict is even more explicit about romanticizing the 
unfettered commerce of the 1990s: Rob Roy’s attempt to expand his sheepfold by taking 
out a loan from an aristocratic creditor. The loan is of course stolen, and the highlander 
sets out to restore his reputation, bound as it is now to the fickle credit economy. It is here 
that Jones’s version of Rob Roy remains faithful to Scott’s original. By equating the 




entrepreneurial spirit of the late-twentieth- and the early-eighteenth-century. This is to 
say that the film simultaneously represents Romantic era political economy and its 
contemporary revival in neoliberalism, where promises of private gain are underwritten 
by public confidence in loans, speculation, and global free trade, a fantasy of unlimited 
financial progress. Thus, if the film swaps the historical intricacies of Scott’s novel for 
Hollywood conventions, its structuring thematic is the same as Scott’s own: a pervasive 
reliance on finance to announce the social relations between different groups of people. 
Representing the commercial subtext of both Romanticism and postmodernity, the 
adaptation almost fulfills one of Bailie Nicole Jarvie’s prophesies in Rob Roy; that 
economics will eventually determine all aspects of culture and society.  
But in spite of these connections to eighteenth-century finance and twentieth-
century neoliberalism, Caton-Jones’s adaptation condemns credit more overtly than does 
Scott’s novel. When it comes to Rob Roy’s honor—or his private sense of public 
dependability—financialized codes of conduct are set in stark contrast with the 
Highlander’s familial integrity. In a telling example, Caton-Jones moves right from a 
scene where Rob Roy discusses loans made to him by British investors, to a 
philosophical excursus on honor itself. The first scene about credit has Rob Roy climbing 
up an idyllic hillside with his wife and explaining the financial contract he has just signed 
with unscrupulous lenders—a metaphor, perhaps, for his ascension into their 
entrepreneurial ranks. But when Rob Roy reaches the summit of the hill in the next scene, 
he abandons all talk of finance. Instead, he offers a lesson about honor to his sons. The 
top of the metaphoric hill is not about financial success in the future, but passing along a 




Rob Roy goes on to tell his two sons that “honor is something that no man can 
give you and none can take away.”118 With its play on the rhetoric of financial exchange, 
this line rebuffs the commodified version of honor that Rob Roy discussed with his wife 
just minutes beforehand (and suggests once again Kant’s idea of Würde). In this 
adaptation, highland honor is not “‘a homicide and a bloodspiller’” like it was in Scott’s 
original novel, but “a man’s gift to himself” that “will [not] mistreat a woman or malign a 
man, nor stand by and see another do so.”119 Rob Roy’s speech here modifies the ethics 
of credit: honor is still related to an award or a gift, but unlike credit, it cannot be given 
by another. However, honor is still a part of subjectivity that is linked to social life, a 
private awareness of one’s public responsibility. By making public his private 
convictions to his sons, Rob Roy in fact performs this very formulation of honor.  
By putting a conversation about the shallowness of financial credit next to Rob 
Roy’s theory of honor, Caton-Jones and Sharp’s adaptation reads represents the discourse 
of honor and credit in a fashion similar to I do in Scott’s novel: honor is an internalized 
commitment to the public that stands against the ultimately private ends of the new credit 
economy. But this message is all the more striking precisely because it appears in a 
Hollywood epic that evacuates history and amplifies the consumerist zeitgeist of the 
1990s—Fredric Jameson meets brogues and broadswords. Such a trade makes it easier 
for the viewer to see Rob Roy not as a historical figure whose values can be relegated to 
the past, but as a contemporary subject participating in, and ultimately rejecting, the 
monetized system of honor that easy credit provides.  
Cher Hamilton, on the other hand, is a contemporary subject who is completely 




Emma Woodhouse as a mall-hopping, SoCal valley girl, and she is the protagonist in 
Amy Heckerling’s Clueless. The film’s entire conceit is based on commodification and 
garish displays of capital, examples of which are plentiful in the film: Cher’s father is a 
tough corporate lawyer instead of a valetudinarian; if Cher doesn’t have Emma’s artistic 
abilities, she does have a keen fashion-sense; and Cher’s primary mode of social 
expression and self-soothing is to go shopping at the mall. Heckerling’s film is, of course, 
a great send-up of showy adolescent consumerism, and a satire on its dominance in 
mainstream culture. (“Ew!” says Cher about the counter-cultural grunge kids 
skateboarding around the quad).  
However, like Emma, Clueless is also a satire that offers a strong critique of the 
social value of credit. In this adaptation, of course, such a critique is magnified by the 
setting and its hyperactive consumerism: the contemporary economic optimism of the 90s 
is translated into a kind of teenage naiveté, a faith in the consumer economy symbolized 
by the sacred mall, the “sanctuary,” Cher tells us, “where I [can] gather my thoughts and 
regain my strength.”120 Much like Emma, however, credit in Clueless is still a “fictitious 
system of value” whose ethics are predicated on projections of honor and esteem, and it 
can still—supposedly—create social trust between different types of people.121 At first, 
the fictitious value of credit is unproblematic, even extolled. When Cher winds up 
garnering extra-credit “totally based on [her] powers of persuasion,” her litigator father 
responds that he “couldn't be happier than if they were based on real grades.”122 
Additionally, the scene establishes the relationship between finance capital and the 




But the hope that credit guarantees trust between different persons eventually 
breaks down. One moment in particular literalizes the specious nature of credit as a form 
for social trust: a scene where Cher and her friends play the party game “suck and blow,” 
passing a credit-card in between one another’s lips without using their hands.123 A 
mediating device, the credit card is the public instrument that binds the participants’ 
private desires together. And yet, it is also a prophylactic to these desires, the boundary to 
real interpersonal engagement that Cher and her society will not transgress. As in Emma, 
credit is the fantasy of sociability that is actually a block to that sociability (a cruel 
optimism indeed). When the credit card finally gets passed to Cher, Elton drops it 
intentionally and kisses her. Cher recoils, repulsed by Elton’s presumption, much like 
Emma had been with Mr. Elton, when he “[makes] violent love to her” in the carriage.124 
Cher’s repulsion of course has as much to do with Elton’s act of desire becoming overtly 
public as it does his mishandling of the situation. Credit is a phenomenon that purports to 
create a relationship of trust, but ultimately it cannot mediate between private desires and 
public behavior.  
When Cher and Josh (Mr. Knightley) confirm their amorous feelings for one 
another at last, Cher acknowledges the superficiality of relationships built around credit. 
“Go out and have fun, go shopping,” says Josh, to which Cher replies, “you think that's 
all I do, I'm just a ditz with a credit card.”125 Here, Cher acknowledges that credit, 
shopping, and relationships formed on monetized types of honor and esteem, are 
problematic and obfuscatory—and, given the authentic kiss that follows this invocation 
of credit, there are surely better methods of following through own private desires. In all 




extra credit, and other social mediums of contemporary teenage life—in order to disrupt 
it. She pays homage to the excessive representationalism of 1990s commodity culture and 
to Austen’s own critique. Both adaptations confirm the original Romantic author’s 
argument about credit almost two centuries later: while credit attempts to guarantee trust 
between different groups, it ultimately ends up fulfilling private desires at the expense of 
those relationships. Because they also incorporate the neoliberal ethos and commodity 
culture of the 90s into their polemic on the ethics of credit, Rob Roy and Clueless are 
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Black in Character as in Complexion: 
The Honor and Body of Mary Prince 
 
I. 
In April of 1831, the editor and publisher Edward Moxon released the first edition 
of The Englishman’s Magazine. In its “Monthly Literary Gazette” section, the journal 
made a curious comparison between two well-known texts of the Romantic era that are 
not usually grouped together. Examining a large stack of submissions, the anonymous 
reviewer described the first text as    
a very thin pamphlet…to which we are here led by association of ideas to advert. It 
is the history of one of the working classes in the West Indies, and exhibits as 
clearly as Mr. Thackrah could have done for his life, the effects of certain species 
of taskwork, and the mode of tasking, on human health, happiness, and longevity. 
It is in truth a melancholy picture of the wrongs that man inflicts upon his fellow; 
and all who in soberness peruse it will look upon the History of Mary Prince as a 
moral and literary curiosity. It is as absorbingly interesting in its way as Caleb 
Williams.1  
 
The comparison is culturally relevant: the new Standard Novels edition of Caleb 
Williams had just been released in April of that year. (And, with textual changes that 
heightened its focus on slavery and racial difference, a new edition of Shelley’s 
Frankenstein would be released through Standard Novels six months later).2 But Moxon 
invokes Caleb Williams and its “picture of the wrongs that man inflicts upon his fellow” 
for thematic reasons, as well. Both texts feature protagonists who are pursued across a 
large expanse by seemingly all-powerful masters: in Caleb’s case, it is the aristocrat 




plantation in the West Indies;” in Mary’s, it is the real Antiguan plantationer John Wood.3 
Both also demonstrate the endurance of the language of “rights” and “wrongs” long 
associated with Republican politics, a progressive discourse that held strong even after 
forty years of conservative suspicion about democratic rule and individual sovereignty. It 
is odd, of course, that the reviewer omits any reference to the moral abomination of 
slavery itself—and overlooks the abolitionist campaigns that had been incrementally 
dismantling the Atlantic slave trade for four decades.  
Finally, the comparison between The History of Mary Prince and Caleb Williams 
is also apt because both texts center on the same set of moral values: honor and dignity, 
shame and remorse. They are “absorbingly interesting” in a similar way not just because 
they examine the psychological peril of their protagonists—not just because they paint 
“melancholy pictures”—but because they investigate what the philosopher Charles 
Taylor has dubbed a “politics of recognition;” that is, the modern formulation that “our 
identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence.”4 In his essay of the same title, 
Taylor posits that “a person…can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or 
society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible 
picture of themselves. Nonrecognition can inflict harm and be a form of oppression, 
imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, or reduced mode of being.”5  
Taylor’s words about the “imprisonment” of the self hold true for both text’s 
narrators, who are held captive by those who refuse to acknowledge their individual 
dignity and who eventually engage in legal disputes in which they try to justify their own 
“mode[s] of being.”  In addition, both protagonists produce confession-style narratives in 




private “authenticity” that Taylor argues was essential for public recognition in the 
modern age.6 Though the lives of Caleb Williams and Mary Prince are separated by 
genre, political subtext, and even the tenuous border between fiction and reality, what 
binds them together for the editor of The Englishmen’s Magazine (and what should bind 
them together for contemporary scholars of Romanticism) is a focus on the possibility of 
dignity for all political subjects in modernity. Conversely, each text represents how 
suffering can be inflicted when this individual identity goes unacknowledged by the 
public, or when it is thrown back into a patently hierarchical social order that constrains 
freedom. Remember that in the bleak original ending of Godwin’s novel, Caleb realizes 
his identity is bound to an aristocratic master who has only tried to harm him, and in a 
moment of existential angst declares, “I have now no character that I wish to vindicate.”7  
As we have seen in previous chapters, the term “character” to which Caleb refers 
here was usually synonymous with reputation or public status, and it often signified how 
the politics of recognition operated in Romantic era literature and culture. The entire plot 
of Caleb Williams revolves around the concept of character, as does the compiled text of 
the History, which focuses on the reputations of both slave and slaveholder. Prince’s 
“moral character” becomes a central point of her credibility, contested as it is by Prince’s 
master John Wood and upheld by the Anti-Slavery society. In Prince’s own account, 
however, John Wood is the one with a degenerate character, debasing himself not just 
through his perpetuation of horrific abuse, but by the shame such conduct brings to his 
identity and his family. According to Prince, the actions of a master before Wood were 




Referencing multiple sexual transgressions, Prince’s repetition of “no shame” and 
“flesh” sound like the anaphora and vocabulary found in scripture—no surprise given the 
Moravian church that provides Prince with her first formal education. But the spiritual 
language of honor and shame also points to a wider ecclesiastical idea of the “true dignity 
of man,” a concept that had been circulating in various printed sermons throughout the 
early-nineteenth-century. Appearing in the works various evangelical authors, the “true 
dignity of man” held that “the end of our Saviour’s advent was to release us 
from…humiliation” and to remake the dignified as a representative of “the gracious 
purposes of God with regard to man…espous[ing] the cause of truth, of integrity, of 
freedom”.9 Dignity might here be defined as an innate, irrevocable, and intangible quality 
of individuality, while its opposing mood of shame takes on an almost auratic quality of 
fallenness and degradation, a spiritual blight that slaveholders brought upon themselves. 
(Philosophers might call such a virtue “deontological,” or something unbound from 
worldly phenomena). This rhetoric of transcendental honor and shame in Romantic era 
slave narratives would not just appear in evangelical sermonizing, but in other major 
canonical British texts centered upon spiritual redemption and infamy. In a major section 
in Olaudah Equiano’s famous Interesting Narrative (1789), for example, the narrator 
appeals to the “shame and mortification” of slaveholders who “see the partakers of your 
nature reduced so low.” Equiano drives home his indictment with a quote from Paradise 
Lost, where the fundamentally degraded protagonist Satan announces “[u]ntam'd 
reluctance, and revenge” against those who oppressed him.10  
Passing through a variety of vocabularies and sociopolitical subtexts in the early- 




character” thus preoccupied all types of deontological moral thinkers, from independent, 
religious reformers like William Wilberforce—who said that “our ultimate end should be 
to form in ourselves that character which is to fit us for a higher state of existence in a 
better world”—to pioneering secular humanists like William Godwin, who, as we have 
seen, converted the old aristocratic creed of honor into a fresh, egalitarian moral code for 
moral Republicanism.11   During these years, then, the politics of recognition was often a 
metaphysical affair. Man’s dignity and shame were mostly tied to otherworldly concepts, 
and if you were to suffer a social dishonor or disgrace here on earth, you might later find 
redemption in a higher plane of existence.12  
In Prince’s History, however, the moral value of honor and shame—and its lexical 
cognates in dignity, decency, ignominy, and depravity—are not merely spiritual 
abstractions designed to appeal to the British public; moral pneuma that would later find 
their way later into the more worldly language of jurisprudence and the liberal discourse 
of human rights. Instead, the History suggests that the ethic of honor and its emphasis on 
the public conception of individual identity are deeply connected to physicality and the 
materialization of dignity within the body itself. In the main text of the History and the 
controversy that follows in its supplement, Mary Prince’s own body becomes a location 
for honor, a civic virtue that was a major part of the individual identity of British citizens 
and contributed to the changing character of the state, which had emerged victorious in 
the Napoleonic conflict only to face a new critique of values from domestic reformists. In 
Prince’s case, however, the construction of her public “moral character” through the body 
is profound: it entails the redemption of private dignity after a lifetime of physical 




the sexed female body and its prejudice about the unrestrained licentiousness of black 
women in particular. In addition to highlighting the ability of black women to achieve 
honor and dignity outside of bounds of traditional racial or sexual categories, the text also 
demonstrates how the feeling of shame could be used to impose national unity on the 
topic of abolition. In both its primary and supplementary materials, the History makes a 
keen distinction between private shame—which would relegate a systemic problem to a 
series of individual aberrations—and public shame, a mood that would strike at the very 
core of collective, national identity. 
The place of the shamed, fallen, or dishonored women in British literature had, of 
course, been well-established by this time. In The Secret History of Domesticity, Michael 
McKeon shows how female honor in particular—or the communal sense of a woman’s 
sexual purity and chastity—became a recurring theme in novels from the seventeenth-
century on, and was oftentimes used in narratives to show the arbitrary divide between 
private and public life—between the ethics of the individual and the community in which 
they had to live. McKeon also demonstrates how a dynamic between honor and gender 
reveals an immemorial cultural double standard. As we have seen in the spectacular quest 
for credit that occurs in Rob Roy, a man’s honor could be recovered if it was publically 
squandered. But a woman’s honor—internalized from the beginning as chastity—would 
be irretrievably lost once it was taken. (This is, of course, what happens to Beatrice in 
The Cenci, who is totally condemned—the only real place for her redemption is within 
Shelley’s preface, outside of the boundaries of the narrative).13 While the “tale of honor 
lost and regained” might have been an excuse to include lurid subject matter in novels in 




have the power to manipulate the pliable categories of public and private life in order to 
recover their lost honor.14 They were not always circumscribed by the chauvinistic legacy 
of chivalry, nor were they completely beholden to the sensational or exploitative nature 
of these texts.  
However, unlike the British women protagonists in McKeon’s analysis who 
would unsettle traditional expectations about gender in order to recover public honor, a 
West Indian figure like Mary Prince would have another momentous factor with which to 
contend: her race. Within the ideology that accompanied slavery, all black bodies were 
believed to be fallen from the start, and female sexuality had no private aspects to begin 
with: it was either the property of another person, or it was put on public display by way 
of circulating slave narrative or traveling curiosity shows—sensationalized or 
sentimentalized for consumption—or it was caricatured to support a racist ideology 
premised on physical difference. In any of these manifestations, black female sexuality 
became the public domain of an entire nation of British readers and consumers, 
regardless of the ethical position they took on slavery. Because this ideology prevented 
slaves from even developing a sense of private, integrity related to their sexuality, it 
might then seem like Prince would have no sense of womanly honor to even recover in 
the first place. Even if it was presented to a reading public who was amenable to 
abolition, the demand that slaves be given interiority, privacy, and dignity along with 
their freedom would be undercut by the utterly public and oftentimes sensational nature 
of documents that recorded the physical atrocities they suffered. 
And yet, recent interpretations have held up Prince’s body itself as a site of 




abominations.15 Although the text shows black bodies in moments of overt degradation or 
sexual indignity in order to stir up sympathy, revulsion, or even sensation in readers, it 
also features scenes that hint at the possibility of physical dignity—scenes that register a 
move away from ancient conceptions of corporeal honor based on noble blood and 
towards a more liberal model predicated on respect for physical autonomy. If the History 
marks the emergence of a form of egalitarian dignity available to all bodies regardless of 
class or status, it also challenges a conservative version of British honor that tended to 
homogenize all persons under one ethic. Thus, the emergent version of honor in the 
History seems to ensure that different or exotic identities would not be erased by 
universality. While the text’s balancing of racial identity between community and 
individuality can be read as an integral part of the prehistory of identity studies, the 
narrative also gestures towards the place of the body in early liberalism—a politics 
typically thought to prioritize disembodiment over physicality, detachment over rooted 
identity, and the psychological over the corporeal.16 Not only does the History complicate 
the genealogy of liberalism, but I will argue at the end of this chapter that the text offers 
some solutions to the problems with contemporary liberal politics, especially with regards 
to the use of individual bodies and physical privacy for coercive purposes—a well-known 
critique of the current liberal order. Despite its being nearly two hundred years old, 
Prince’s case might model a new type of a liberalism that can be more communal in its 
thinking, even while retaining the virtues of autonomy associated with classical 
liberalism and the recognition of minority difference that has been one of the hallmarks 




The following section looks at the History as it signifies the ethic of honor 
through representations of the black female body. After a brief overview of the theory of 
recognition in scholarship on the Black Atlantic—focusing on recent reimaginings of the 
Hegelian dialectic between master and slave —I discuss how early scenes link Prince’s 
body to her moral character. Aligning the slave’s beleaguered body with western 
institutions that traditionally instilled virtue and purity, these scenes equate the corruption 
of the black body with the corruption of venerable ethical establishments. By associating 
an abused physique with the degradation of childhood and domesticity, Prince becomes a 
figure of wholesomeness to which others would aspire to defend. Ultimately, however, 
these moments epitomize conservative patriarchal thinking that urged Britons to protect 
black people from their inevitable debasement and lowliness, instead of encouraging 
citizens to respect them for their exertion of propriety, honor, or “moral character.”  
In sections three and four, however, I argue that Prince confronts this benevolent 
condescension towards black women by emphasizing her physical dignity, even after it 
has been degraded by slavery. Prince’s challenge, however, does not come from her 
asserting any sexual distinction or power within the plot—which would be impossible in 
most slave narratives. Instead, it comes from the way that Prince, her editors, and her 
amanuenses shape the text of the History, artfully omitting scenes of abuse and sexual 
shame and reconstructing a sense of Prince’s purity and honorable wholeness through 
careful editing. While the finished text stands as a remade body for which to understand 
Prince as a dignified subject, the practice of textual collaboration reflects the social way 
in which honor and dignity are derived. The narrative thus performs two ideological 




sexual contact brought to women and it shows how changing the dominant 
representations of black female sexuality could be a collective goal, instead of one based 
upon individual willpower or authority. (Indeed, this reading also challenges scholarship 
that has seen the editor of the History, Thomas Pringle, as an interloper into Prince’s 
supposed autobiography, stealing and reshaping parts of her subjectivity in order to serve 
his own professional aspirations).17 
Section five addresses how the affect of shame in the History could stir up social 
change. The rhetorical opposite of honor in some sense, shame features prominently in 
Prince’s original testimony as an emotion that joins bodies to propriety: to be shameful or 
indecent is to breach the customary physical boundaries between individuals; alternately, 
to have a sense of shame is to abide by a tangible, physical feeling that can enforce 
honor, a moral value that is admittedly abstract. Linking bodies to conduct, the text 
features a remarkable series of tactics that convert private, physical shame into a larger 
ethical condemnation of the public institution of slavery itself—including making 
anonymous the most abusive figures within the text in order to show the widespread, 
faceless character of dishonorable colonialism. Although the rhetoric of shame had long 
been associated with slavery—Wordsworth called it “the most rotten branch of human 
shame”—the text unites the personal shame of the body with the more collective remorse 
of the body politic, making the public debate on slavery the very private responsibility of 
the British citizen.18    
A coda addresses the relationship of dignity and the body to liberalism. If the 
History marks a cultural and legal shift towards recognizing and protecting cultural 




then it also addresses how bureaucratic structures of modernity might co-opt and 
manipulate physical sovereignty in a negative way. Prince’s legal ambiguity as a citizen-
alien, however, might offer a new model for liberal subjectivity in the face of 
increasingly coercive, corporatist nation-state.  
 
II. 
 For most literary scholars, the term “recognition” rings Hegelian bells. Arguably 
the most famous part of Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807), recognition (or 
Anerkennung) is the crucial feature of the dialectic between master and slave, and it has 
played a central role in all kinds of sociopolitical and philosophical discourses for two 
centuries.19 Put briefly, Hegelian recognition is the intersubjective activity through which 
individuals approach the concept of a singular, universal truth (or as he puts it “Einheit in 
seiner Verdopplung,” singularity-in-doubleness).20 However, the struggle for such 
recognition is always unbalanced and thus ongoing: for the master, recognition only 
occurs through his dominant relationship to the slave, and for the slave through her 
productive labor, which in its creative capacity eventually results in the reversal of their 
stations. (It would, of course, be easy to literalize Hegel’s dialectic through the conditions 
surrounding Prince’s History: the text becomes the ultimate product of her labor, a 
document that provides the rationale for Prince’s freedom and therefore her recognition 
by others).  
Contemporary writers have followed in the wake of Marx and Nietzsche’s 
interpretation of Hegel. Instead of seeking metaphysical truth or the abstract 
machinations of self-consciousness, they approach Hegel through the material conditions 




between actual masters and slaves).21 Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks (1952) is 
the seminal text in this tradition, claiming that “every ontology [attainable through 
Hegelian recognition] is made unattainable in a colonized and civilized society.”22 Recent 
scholarship of the Black Atlantic continues and expands upon Fanon’s Hegelian 
approach. Paul Gilroy’s extraordinary chapter “Masters, Mistresses, Slaves, and the 
Antinomies of Modernity” (1994) argues that a critical section of the Narrative of the Life 
of Frederick Douglass (1845) “rework[s] the encounter between master and slave…[and] 
inverts Hegel’s own allegorical scheme;” Moira Ferguson’s essential introduction to the 
History of Mary Prince (1997) shows Prince enacting the Hegelian dialectic in a 
confrontation with her masters over self-manumission; and Susan Buck-Morss’s “Hegel 
and Haiti” (2000) does penetrating archival work to make the case that Hegel’s dialectic 
was inspired by newspaper and periodical accounts of actual slave revolts in the West 
Indies.23  
Where does Taylor’s politics of recognition fall in all of this? While it is itself a 
Hegelian theory that ties together disparate Romantic era texts like Caleb Williams and 
Prince’s History— and had major impacts on discussions of multiculturalism when it was 
released twenty years ago—the essay also inspired some well-known responses. Notably, 
Drucilla Cornell and Sara Murphy’s sharp reaction “Anti-Racism, Multiculturalism and 
the Ethics of Identification” (2002), called for a more “primordial conception of equal 
dignity” than the one Taylor puts forth—a conception that they argue is based on 
asserting the impossible authenticity of “already-constituted identities.”24 Even though 
Taylor invokes multiculturalism throughout his essay, Cornell and Murphy find his 




humanism that effaced difference in order to announce a general quality of 
“authenticity.”25 Despite its being written during the very age of Hegel and Romantic 
humanism, the History is one of the few nineteenth-century slave narratives that seems to 
correspond more with Fanon, Cornell and Murphy than it does with Taylor: it shows how 
a collective ethos like honor might also emphasize cultural diversity, thus destabilizing 
the renowned Hegelian dialectic between master and slave and its tendency to efface 
difference under the rubric of universality. As we shall see, however, this radical revision 
of Hegel is not immediately evident in the text, but exists amongst an assortment of 
traditional approaches to recognition in the nineteenth-century.   
For slaves who wrote narratives of their horrific experiences and for the anti-
slavery activists who printed them, one of the most prominent approaches to political and 
social recognition was, of course, through the influential culture of sensibility and 
sympathy. Characterized by shared feelings and mutual, visceral reactions, sympathy 
could make communal the suffering experienced by individual slaves by appealing to a 
shared physiology. To this end, the History is particularly well-suited, featuring as it does 
a multitude of explicit scenes that appeal to the reader’s corporeal faculties. In an overt 
gesture to the reader after one such scene, Prince claims that 
 
what my eyes have seen I think it is my duty to relate; for few people in England 
know what slavery is. I have been a slave—I have felt what a slave feels, and I 
know what a slave knows; and I would have all the good people in England to 
know it too, that they may break our chains, and set us free.26 
 
Prince herself is not being abused in this scene, but she is describing what she saw, and, 
in effect, acting as an interlocutor for British readers. By assuming the place of the reader 




concerned, but perhaps too-complicit people of England and the physical abuses 
occurring in the West Indies. Prince hopes that British readers’ will recognize the 
humanity of slaves when their bodily sensations overwhelm any rationalization of events 
happening thousands of miles away.  
Passages like the one above show how bodies become one of the central points of 
identification between slaves and British readers in the History. The text, however, does 
not just report the negative consequences of slavery and forced labor upon bodies to, but 
offers a sustained argument about the body as a key location of dignity and virtue—
oftentimes doing so by appealing to the ideological predisposition of the work’s 
audience. In the initial scenes of the History, Prince describes her childhood with the 
Williams’ family, what she calls “the happiest period of [her] life.”27 Treated well and 
blissfully ignorant of her status as a slave, Prince’s familial relationship with the 
Williams suddenly ends when her mistress dies. The cruel patriarch Mr. Williams 
subsequently decides to sell Prince in order to raise money for a hasty new marriage, and 
she is then ripped away from Betsey, their benevolent daughter and Prince’s childhood 
companion. Confronted with this domestic turmoil, Prince physicalizes her anguish: 
“[w]hen I left my dear little brothers and the house in which I had been brought up, I 
thought my heart would burst.”28 Although Prince returns to the heart frequently as a 
metaphor for sympathy (urging white people at many points to enlarge their hearts so that 
they may feel for those who do not look like them), its “bursting” here speaks to the 
dissolution of her family, the foundational social unit for Prince’s British readers, 
especially those wedded to conservative maxims that saw the family as the central 




Williams’s: Mrs. Williams is a “kind-hearted good woman” and Prince describes her 
heart “softening” when she thinks back on the Williams children.29 The converse is also 
true—absent hearts mean an absence of familial civility. When Prince is sold a second 
time to Mr. D— (an even crueler master than Mr. Williams), she turns the lack of his 
heart into a sign of tainted patrimony. “I must say something more about this cruel son of 
a cruel father,” Prince exclaims, “—He had no heart—no fear of God.”30 This moral 
chain of being—from son to father to heart to God—links together divine and human 
benevolence through the intermediary of the heart.  
There is a more secular way to read this passage. To have “no heart” is not only to 
be unashamed about one’s brutality, but also to show an utter disregard for the family as 
the foremost site of social decency and the place where one would turn for the earliest 
validation and recognition of individual identity. Even if the heart sounds like what 
Donald Davidson might have called a dead metaphor—an extremely common way to 
denote sensibility and moral rectitude that had long since lost any pointed cultural 
meaning—Prince seems to use it in a specific way, implying that the heart is connected 
directly to familial virtue and stability. Repeatedly using the heart as a sign for domestic 
goodness early on in the History, Prince also establishes a larger association between 
moral value and bodily integrity that will prove key to her representation of status in 
British culture. When Prince’s heart bursts, then, it is not merely a physical allegory for 
the intense pain of separation, but a metonym for the disrupted family itself, that primary 
moral institution to which British readers were loyal.  
A conservative reading public in 1830 would have especially identified with the 




figure—even though numerous critics have shown that “domestic tranquility” was an 
appeal used to justify colonization and enslavement.31 Other instances in Prince’s 
childhood, however, contain more intricate arguments for the body as a site for the 
recognition of public character. After Mr. Williams sells Prince to Capt. I— in order to 
finance his quick new remarriage, Prince recalls an instance of cruel tutelage at the hands 
of the Captain’s wife: 
 
The next morning my mistress set about instructing me in my tasks. She taught 
me to do all sorts of household work; to wash and bake, pick cotton and wool, 
and wash floors, and cook. And she taught me (how can I ever forget it!) more 
things than these; she caused me to know the exact difference between the smart 
of the rope, the cart-whip, and the cow-skin, when applied to my naked body by 
her own cruel hand. And there was scarcely any punishment more dreadful than 
the blows I received on my face and head from her hard heavy fist. She was a 
fearful woman, and a savage mistress to her slaves.32    
 
In an unexpectedly sardonic turn-of-phrase, Prince converts the merits of learning 
domestic chores into a nuanced understanding of pain in all of its different varieties. The 
passage starts innocently enough with Mistress I— “instructing [Prince] in [her] tasks,” 
“household work” that the young Prince might not yet associate with the forced labor of 
slavery. The first real training that she has received in her life, Prince’s early instruction 
seems almost beneficial: the teaching begins innocently as a list of chores assigned for 
household self-sufficiency. However, the content and the tenor of the narrative changes 
dramatically when Mistress I— shifts from guidance to abuse. The body now becomes 
the location of a “cruel pedagogy” as Prince learns to discern the differences between 




tropes of constructive learning that are appropriate for childhood—tasks which engage 
both mind and body—into a type of destruction visited upon the body of a child.  
Here the body uncovers another kind of cultural mystification that pro-colonial or 
even British readers agnostic to the abolitionist cause may have held about the enslaved: 
that the imposition of "good task work" (especially under the auspices of respectable, 
industrious families) would cultivate the moral character of young slaves. As the slavery 
apologist James McQueen writes in his defense of Colonial slavery (which also served as 
another indictment of Prince’s character), “the conduct of [colonial families] towards 
[Mary] partook more of the familiarity and kindness of an alliance by blood than by 
bondage.”33 If the enslaved would not be seen as fully human, then they might be seen as 
productive laborers, known for their contribution to British productive power, and 
recognized as the subordinate kin of the colonists to whom they belonged. 
However, Prince's anecdote about the tutelage provided by a "savage mistress" 
turns McQueen’s proclamation (and others like it) upside down, serving as a parable 
about how slavery, in fact, distorts familial nurturing and care. Under the instruction of 
this “fearful woman” at the head of Capt. I.—’s family, suffering is conferred upon 
generations of young slaves instead of knowledge and cultivation, teaching that stood as a 
perverted form of household inheritance. The brutality of this scene would shock readers 
who may have been predisposed to viewing slavery as a system of beneficent 
paternalism, one that molded the identity of slaves into roles salutary to British domestic 
life. In addition, it would distort longstanding Enlightenment paradigms about the 
prelapsarian nature of childhood and the ultimately impressionable quality of the young 




grim version of the tabula rasa, as the indelible blows mark her first “didactic” moments, 
and remain to remind her of the brutal experiences she endured: “how can I ever forget 
it,” Prince interjects in the middle of the passage, emphasizing the permanence of her 
“education.”34  
Moving from a comfortable captivity to a fearful one, Prince and her editors build 
upon a frame narrative common to confessions: the dramatic loss of childhood innocence 
and its replacement with labor and other physical burdens. Through its representations of 
violence and powerlessness, this passage in particular characterizes Prince’s blighted 
innocence and amplifies the postlapsarian quality of Turk’s island. The quick alteration in 
Mistress I.— from helpful instructor to “savage mistress” reflects the swift and total 
degradation of the environment, from a place of psychological growth to a place of 
physical terror. If Mistress I.— starts as a pedagogue—stern but comprehensive in her 
teaching—then by the end of the passage she is nothing more than a physical instrument 
of punishment, a “cruel hand” or a “hard heavy fist;” a wholly violent body.35   
What do these early scenes of childhood and education have to do with the 
construction of Prince’s “moral character” throughout the History? How does a focus on 
the body contribute to the legitimation of different identities? Furthermore, how would 
the text’s disruption of sacrosanct social arrangements like the family allow readers to 
recognize Prince as someone worthy of approbation and dignity? At the beginning of the 
narrative, Prince’s body is not represented as “dignified” by any standard definition. It 
does not offer up a sense of wholeness, purity, or nobility and it does not heroically resist 
punishment.36 Time and again, however, Prince’s body is allied to kinship and education, 




When linked to the debilitated body of an innocent child, these organizations are 
portrayed as broken in the most primal sense. Even if readers were not affected by these 
scenes because they were suspicious of claims made by anti-slavery organizations about 
the egalitarianism of “true dignity,” they would be forced to see slavery corrupting the 
very social institutions that had long promised to shape the identities of children in 
beneficial ways. In other words, readers would have to recognize slavery’s subtle and 
pernicious effects on the same indelible establishments that were oftentimes used to 
justify the practice in the first place. The link between domestic and educational 
structures and Prince’s body—especially to her young body—is particularly important 
because it also speaks to the “natural” or “innate” qualities that these structures were 
supposed to have (according to Burke, especially), and to their utter vulnerability under 
slavery. Conversely, to save Prince and other slave children like her from physical abuse 
would be to save the bulwark of British social identity and to protect the institutions 
charged with extending it. Preserving corporeal wellbeing meant preserving an entire 
ideology built around the enrichment of moral character. 
The breaking heart, the “pedagogical” impressions on the body, the postlapsarian 
effects of labor—the inclusion of all of these recognizable corporeal figures disrupted by 
slavery makes for a brilliant rhetorical strategy by Prince, her amanuensis Susanna 
Strickland, her editor Thomas Pringle, and any of the other people involved in the 
production of the History. By focusing on foundational British institutions, the text could 
reach out to all sorts of different political constituencies; from colonialist sympathizers 
and Tories who could no longer rationalize slavery through the immemorial greatness of 




the grounds of traditional Western morals, to radical agitators who would see in the 
History the very systemic injustice they had been combating for over a decade.  
And yet, all of these political appeals assume a connection between the individual 
body and old, venerable British ideas about the social body. This is, in fact, a very 
conservative tactic because it insists that the expectations of traditional British readers are 
somehow written into the metaphoric logic of the History. In other words, the body used 
to symbolize British social identity is not an exotic one like Prince’s, but an amalgam of 
different tropes common to centuries of Western—and white—culture. Thus, early in the 
narrative, the dignity of Prince’s identity seems to be shaped only through representations 
that were already legitimate to British readers—or, to borrow from Charles Taylor, 
representations that would have registered as universal and hence “authentic.” Here, the 
politics of recognition do not begin with the appreciation of difference, but with the 
perception of sameness.  
 
III. 
 Later scenes in the History, however, address the racialized and sexualized 
foundations of English character itself, thus challenging how British society might 
determine honor and dignity. While character might be associated with a “dignified” 
physical body—and not entirely with evangelical or spiritual notions of the “true dignity 
of man”—the History critiques the common prejudice about the ineradicable degradation 
of those who lived in the colonies. Especially concerned with the wanton sensuality that 




feminine honor as chastity or sexual purity—what might be called the original moral 
position of women in chivalry.  
 These connotations are particularly apparent in the charges leveled against Prince 
by John Wood—Prince’s final master—who argues that Prince was a wanton and 
licentious woman, degraded by her own actions and unworthy of mutual recognition by 
the British state in which she gains liberty.37 Even if Wood acknowledges that English 
law utterly supports Prince’s freedom to courageously “walk out of slavery,” Wood uses 
these allegations in an attempt to ruin Prince’s public credibility. Her conduct according 
to Wood “was, before marriage, licentious, and even depraved…and unfaithful to her 
husband afterwards.”38 If Wood’s claims were to take hold of public opinion, Prince 
would be thrust into British society as a pariah—legally and metaphysically free, but 
viewed with social derision and scorn. Edlie Wong has carefully noted that the History 
illuminates this “punitive form of freedom” through Wood himself, who taunts Prince, 
challenging her to make it on her own in London without any communal support. While 
liberty in England would be immediately felt by Prince as a loss of social belonging, it is 
also clear that Wood’s testimony would actively perpetuate social contempt for Prince 
even after her escape, adding to the social alienation that she would already feel in being 
“turned out of doors.”39 
On the surface Wood’s claims about Prince’s physical depravity is predictable: 
the object-relationship is the only one he has ever had with his former slave. But Wood 
also plays upon a larger assumption held by apologists and anti-slavery activists alike 
about the moral laxity and licentiousness of the colonies, which should be briefly 




touchstones is the famous “Hottentot Venus” Saartjie Baartman, an African woman who 
traveled from Britain throughout the continent as an exotic curiosity from 1810 to 1815.40 
Not only would white, European viewers view Baartman’s body as an example of stark 
racial difference—fetishizing her body in an aesthetic act of domination—but they would 
also associate what they perceived as Baartman’s exaggerated sexual characteristics with 
her character. Baartman’s identity was thus defined by the perception of her body as a 
field for rampant sexuality and moral wantonness. As Paul Youngquist reminds us, this 
(mis)recognition of identity stemming from perceived physical irregularity contributed 
tremendously to the justification of slavery by supposedly liberal, reform-minded 
proponents of the continuing Enlightenment. “The norm of the proper body enforces an 
ideal [black bodies] materially transgress,” Youngquist says, “making it possible to 
affirm universal human rights while denying their applicability to deviant flesh. Bodies, 
and not rational minds alone, must first qualify for those rights, proper bodies that 
measure up to the standards of raciology.”41   
 While critics like Youngquist and Gilroy have discussed the exemption of black 
people from the legal and philosophical maxims of modernity due to their foreign bodies 
and the strangeness of the environments from which they hailed, a similar logic of 
displacement was at work with regards to the moral status of slaves.42 Alive and well in 
the 1830s, this logic appeared in both manifestly racist, pro-colonial documents and in 
reformist, anti-slavery texts. In February of 1831—the very same month that the History 
was making its initial impact on the public—the popular abolitionist periodical the Anti-
Slavery Reporter showed how such an ideology could function on the progressive side of 




argues for total manumission on the grounds of various religious precepts, including 
withholding one workday for slaves due to the sanctity of the Sabbath. Two other 
condemnations, however, specifically link dignity—and the lack thereof—to the body of 
slaves: the “moral malady…[and]…evil of corporal punishment” and the supposed sexual 
profligacy of the colonies.43 Corporal punishment, or the legal sanctioning of lashes, 
degrades slaves and masters alike but in different ways. For masters, the lash becomes the 
“gratification of a cruel and merciless spirit” or an outlet for sadism and sheer physical 
power. For slaves, on the other hand, even the threat of corporal punishment corrupts 
moral character: “[k]nowing that any infraction, on his part…is to be met by a 
punishment, corporal in its nature, there will be induced a certain recklessness of 
character, a desperate heedlessness of consequences, which no floggings, however severe 
and frequent, can lastingly repress.”44   
 The sexual profligacy of the colonies was an even more prevalent belief than the 
corrupting influence of lashes—the sensationalism of which may have been used tacitly 
to encourage the sale of the History and other narratives like it. In a section detailing the 
debauchery of the Jamaican colonies in particular, both masters and slaves are alleged to 
have “‘an unblushing libertinism” that extends “among all ranks,” and “that from the 
governor…to the slave, an organised system of open and shameless concubinage has 
prevailed for generations past, and still prevails throughout the whole mass of society—
exhibiting a congregated accumulation of the grossest moral putresecence, that perhaps 
any place on the whole earth can present to view.’”45 The excerpt goes on to specify this 
“concubinage” as a perverted form of domestic relations, that “all in short have every 




house or attached to it according to circumstances.”46 Appropriate familial relationships 
are absent in Jamaica and elsewhere according to Trew, and the prevailing system 
extends to the entire colonial social arrangement—which was for the writer—in the most 
visceral of descriptions—a “disgusting picture.”47  
 This 1831 anti-slavery document demonstrates that the depravity of character 
attributed to Prince was not simply part of a prejudice felt by colonial sympathizers and 
apologists, but a pervasive ideology that was held on both sides of the debate. For slavery 
apologists this meant accepting the discomfiting, but necessary indignity and degraded 
quality of the entire colonial operation (a presumption that continued throughout much of 
the nineteenth-century, and continues unabated today under global capitalism). But for 
reformers, a belief in the “undignified” colonial body was much more pernicious. It 
meant that slaves (and their masters, for that matter) carried an indelible physical taint 
that they could only remove by appealing to specific institutions of spiritual 
redemption—most likely the Anglican Church, with its canon-law on connubial relations 
and bodily chastity. It also meant that abolitionist narratives would have to perform a 
tricky double move. In order to convince the public of the righteousness of their cause, 
the narratives would have to emphasize the virtuous nature of their subjects, but in order 
to sell these narratives to a broad audience, their content might have to be sensational or 
even titillating. For instance, when Prince is finally instilled within a community of 
devout Moravian Christians she says that she “prayed God to forgive [her]” for her 
inherent sinfulness and for the transgressions forced upon her by cruel masters—which 
almost certainly included sexual impropriety.48 These confessional scenes would have 




losing ground to more secularist groups bent on reform during the later 1820s and early 
1830s—even while providing a larger public with scandalous media to consume.49 Thus, 
if these scenes seem tailor-made for church-going readers and their tenets about spiritual 
purification, they might also support the widespread licentiousness of the colonial body, 
simultaneously reinforcing the cultural mission to chasten the colonies, and to plumb 
them for more lurid testimony.  
However, not all of Prince’s testimony about her physical identity falls between 
the extremes of piety and sensationalism. Instead, Prince sometimes distinguishes her all-
important “moral character” through acts of physical decency and strength on earth. They 
contest the religious maxims about the need for Britain to chasten the colonial body, 
while intervening in a wider ideology that linked female honor and dignity to purity and 
subservience alone. In addition, they are honorable in the sense that I have been using in 
previous chapters—as a private awareness of public responsibility. In a moving scene 
featuring her third master Mr.D—, Prince tries to free the family’s daughter from a bout 
of physical abuse, and in the process puts her own body in harm’s-way:  
 
I was coming up the hill I heard a great screaming; I ran as fast as I could to the 
house, put down the water, and went into the chamber, where I found my master 
beating Miss D—— dreadfully. I strove with all my strength to get her away 
from him; for she was all black and blue with bruises. He had beat her with his 
fist, and almost killed her. The people gave me credit for getting her away. He 
turned round and began to lick me. Then I said, "Sir, this is not Turk's Island." I 
can't repeat his answer, the words were too wicked—too bad to say. He wanted to 
treat me the same in Bermuda as he had done in Turk's Island.50 
 
Prince’s “[striving] with all of [her] strength” here is notable for many reasons. Not only 




instance of a woman physically resisting a man. Prince’s confrontation with her master is 
also anomalous because it happens in the service of another woman who has authority 
over her, emphasizing what many critics have seen in the History as a pattern of feminine 
(or even feminist) solidarity that avoids the racial and class hierarchies within British 
culture.51 Her invocation of the legal and/or cultural differences between Bermuda and 
Turk’s Island adds a final level of resistance to this scene, one in which the various 
degradations of slavery are systematically shed: from the abandonment of forced labor 
when Prince “put[s] down the water;” to the declaration of physical sameness when 
Prince stands up to Mr. D—; to the powerful assertion of cultural literacy when Prince 
shows her knowledge of the legal nuances separating the two islands on which she has 
labored.  
This scene sounds like other famous Hegelian struggles between slaves and 
masters—most notably Frederick Douglass’s defiance of Edward Covey that has been 
made famous by Gilroy in The Black Atlantic. But if Douglass’s confrontation with 
Covey is made through the body—a sheer physical contest for recognition—then this 
scene with Prince seems to be a Hegelian struggle for recognition in terms of the 
aesthetic quality of the colonial body itself. After Prince drops her water and runs into the 
chamber where Miss D.— is being beaten, she details a series of three images of the 
body. While two of these images speak to the belief about the ignominy of colonial(ist) 
bodies, one is defiant of that belief, the image of Prince, who exclaims that she, “strove 
with all my strength to get [Miss D.—] away from him.” Prince is on one side of the 
physical contest, in the center of the altercation is Miss D.—’s body, “all black and blue 




and almost killed her.”52 Three (not the traditional two) individuals are locked together in 
conflict here, and they each convey different cultural messages about the moral value of 
bodies. In the text, Prince transforms Mr. D.— into a single fist (much like she did with 
Captain. I—’s wife was earlier), representing the ability of colonial brutality to overtake 
the body and convert it wholly into an instrument of violence. Miss. D.—’s body, on the 
other hand, is slowly being turned by her father into a degraded vessel reminiscent of 
abused slaves—her skin color is literally being beaten black. Thus far, the ignominy of 
colonial abuse shows up on the body of both English father and daughter, reinforcing the 
notions about the corrupting quality of slavery on the body itself. But when Mr. D.— 
begins to turn “round and…lick” Prince, the body is no longer equated with moral 
corruption or degradation, but with outright integrity and potency. While an absence of 
any physical description after Mr. D.— turns on Prince may mean that the beating has 
stopped altogether, it is more likely that Prince’s body is absorbing a punishment that is 
ineffectual at debasing her. In other words, while Prince’s body has not been chaste, pure, 
or free of the taint of physical cruelty, it is resilient enough that such assault does not 
register as degradation. This is not to say that Prince has become inured to all abuse. But 
in the moment when the suffering of another comes to the forefront, Prince’s moral body 
becomes irrepressible. 
The sudden interjection that follows the beating—"Sir, this is not Turk's Island"—
is an astonishing reversal in the disciplinary nature of the scene, as Prince replaces Mr. 
D—’s punitive fist with a quick, almost pedagogical command that stops him cold. In 
fact, this passage as a whole alternates between ethical messages like these and 




embodiment, making it difficult to separate the moral implications of the struggle from 
the bodies involved in that struggle. Another prominent example of this alternation 
between corporeal and moral rhetoric occurs when Prince tells the reader that she “strove 
with all [her] strength to” get Mr. D— away from a daughter he has “almost killed.” 
Prince immediately follows this description of Mr. D.—’s intense, violent physicality by 
exclaiming that “[t]he people gave me credit for getting her away.”53 Here, recognition—
Anerkennen— need not be inferred: the general public in Bermuda confers esteem upon 
Prince despite her infringing upon racial and sexual hierarchies, and for her physical 
intervention in the struggle they give her credit—a term that, as we have seen in previous 
chapters, was used extensively as an ethical keyword in the early-nineteenth-century. 
(Credit and credibility feature prominently in the supplement to the History, and are 
mainly used to denote an individual’s reputation for telling the truth). After this 
interjection, the narrative swings back to a sentence featuring another body—Mr. D.— 
begins “to lick [Prince]”—only to be followed by a moral declaration, Prince’s climactic 
retort that “this is not Turk’s island.” This alternation from physical to ethical rhetoric 
shows the resiliency of Prince’s moral bearings even under threat of physical violence, a 
pattern that continues throughout the History as Prince repeatedly refuses to labor or to 
accept humiliation. But this moment is a special instance of refusal because it merges the 
corporeal and the moral aspects of resistance: the defense that Prince uses to successfully 
stop Mr.D.— from beating his daughter actually is an ethical argument. As the 
denouement of a physical conflict, such a response doesn’t so much emphasize the 
separation of the body from the moral being—the triumph of the spirit over the flesh, as 




This unification of ethical and physical rhetoric in the History could carry major 
ideological weight in the abolition debate. Readers on both sides who were predisposed 
to seeing every single body involved in the colonial enterprise as a location for “moral 
putresecence,” would have to acknowledge that the “creditable” depictions of Prince 
offered some sort of rebuttal to the permanent degradation of bodies under slavery.54 
While colonial slavery may  have corrupted the bodies of people like Mr. D—, his 
daughter, and those slaves who were coerced into abusing their own kin, it could also 
give rise to acts of robust confrontation where the body was at the center of moral 
rectitude and dignity. This is not to aggrandize the body of the slave by turning it into the 
location for total moral strength and utter virtuousness in the face of oppression. Such an 
exaggeration merely re-fetishizes black bodies, but rather in a way opposite to those like 
Saartje Baartman, the “Hottentot Venus” whose exotic physique was for European 
viewers a sign of her debauchery and licentiousness. Instead, scenes like this showed how 
Prince and her editors could defy the pervasive belief that the colonial slave trade tainted 
and debauched the physical decency of all those involved, and that, in response, it would 
require the purifying touch of religion or civilizing culture (patriarchal solutions on both 
the left and right side of the debate). These Moments in the History insist that the 
worthiness and dignity of black bodies be acknowledged in terms of the conditions in 
which slaves lived, and the actions that they might have taken against them, not on the 
ideological predispositions of British readers.  
It should be noted again that the resistance here is not just against corporal 
punishment but against a reformist ideology that depicted the colonial body as utterly 




audience in the end of this passage who might recognize Prince’s “moral character”—
those Bermudians who “gave [her] credit for getting [Miss D.—]” away—meant that 
British readers would come to see recognition through the eyes of another society, the 
Bermudean public who had already realized the dignity of Prince’s act. And were they 
themselves to identify with the rectitude of such an act, the British might also come to see 
Bermudians as humane and decent judges of character, rather then excoriate them as a 
large, unfamiliar colonial people with wanton social mores. Fittingly, the passage ends 
with a gesture towards a new, hybrid public—Bermudian and British—as Prince refuses 
to repeat the series of “wicked words” hurled at her by Mr. D— and wards off the 
physical embarrassment readers might have felt if confronted with words “too bad to say” 
and to hear.55  
 
IV. 
But what about the dignity of Prince’s body as it related to her sexuality—
especially considering the pervasive prejudice that saw black femininity as unrestrained, 
or beholden to illegitimate household arrangements like open concubinage (or, as Trew 
puts it sardonically, “housekeeping”)? The earlier scene in which Prince stops the brutal 
corporal punishment of her master’s daughter demonstrates a temporary female bond 
across the color line, a rare instance of female empowerment in the highly patriarchal 
colonies. But the scene could also be read as an elision of racial difference, where 
feminist solidarity erases the real disparity in the way that white and black women’s 
sexuality was treated in the 1830s. Given scenes like this, can there be any positive 




more resolute protagonists in the genre of the slave narrative. Critics have pointed to the 
many instances where Prince shows exceptional resilience by tactfully refusing to labor, 
by taking advantage of insights as to the legal conditions of her own captivity, and by 
using the marks on her body to confirm the horrors of slavery in a way that a printed text 
could not. But is there any instance where Prince affirms her sexuality, a part of identity 
that was circumscribed by an entire colonial world-view legitimating institutionalized 
oppression and the pervasive domination of nineteenth-century woman in general?  
The short answer is no. Despite other prominent associations between “moral 
character” and the body throughout the History, the text seems to confirm Prince’s 
fundamental falleness through her sexual identity. Even if Prince were to find a 
normative place for her sexuality through marriage a “decent” freeman like her husband 
Daniel James, this arrangement would be underwritten constantly by the abuses that she 
suffered—and would continue to suffer—under slavery. Beyond the obvious physical 
maltreatment, Prince would be limited by an entire array of masculine control and 
influence designed to stifle any private, feminine identity. These cultural impediments are 
so strong in the History that they suppress nearly any agency she may have in choosing a 
husband or maintaining her marriage. Directly after Prince describes her marriage to 
Daniel James, a scene reveals the incapacity of West Indian marriage to redeem 
“blighted” femininity or to provide a renewed sense of physical dignity for women:  
 
When Mr. Wood heard of my marriage, he flew into a great rage, and 
sent for Daniel, who was helping to build a house for his old mistress. Mr. Wood 
asked him who gave him a right to marry a slave of his? My husband said, "Sir, I 
am a free man, and thought I had a right to choose a wife; but if I had known 
Molly was not allowed to have a husband, I should not have asked her to marry 




could not forgive me for getting married, but stirred up Mr. Wood to flog me 
dreadfully with the horsewhip. I thought it very hard to be whipped at my time of 
life for getting a husband—I told her so. She said that she would not have n— 
men about the yards and premises, or allow a n— man's clothes to be washed in 
the same tub where hers were washed. She was fearful, I think, that I should lose 
her time, in order to wash and do things for my husband: but I had then no time 
to wash for myself; I was obliged to put out my own clothes, though I was 
always at the wash-tub.56 
 
She might not be on the trading block here, but Prince is involved in a transaction in 
which she is a totally passive object—she narrates, but she is nowhere to be found in the 
conversation between the two men. At the top of the passage, Mr. Wood and Daniel 
James parody the traditional fatherly blessing, a marriage ritual now contorted into an 
argument over the nuptial rights of freemen. Fearing repercussion from a colonialist like 
Wood, Daniel James even comes close to discarding Prince when pressed on his rights to 
marry her. The appearance of Mrs. Wood is an even more disturbing example of feminine 
disempowerment. Angry that her own domestic sphere could be disturbed by the 
marriage of one of her slaves, Mrs. Wood orders her husband to flog Prince, articulating 
her fury through a physical punishment made by a male proxy. Mrs. Wood’s subsequent 
reaction to Daniel James’s physical proximity makes even more intense the potential for 
female dishonor through physical violation: while the mingling of their clothing implies a 
fear of inadvertent miscegenation, Mrs. Wood also hints at her own powerlessness to 
resist “foreign” rape—or the mingling of bodies, the ultimate symbolic breach of the 
distance between colonizer and colonized. When Prince’s own voice finally emerges at 
the end of the passage, she sublimates Mrs. Wood’s concerns about violation and turns 




presence of Daniel James, Mrs. Wood “was fearful, I think, that I should lose her time, in 
order to wash and do things for my husband.” While Prince implies sexual congress with 
her new husband in this statement—“in order to wash and do things for my husband”—
ultimately her final words focus on dismal forced labor, eliminating any implicit sense of 
desire she may feel for Daniel James and removing any hope she made have had for the 
creation of her own, private domestic space. In addition to the relative sense female 
powerlessness that runs throughout the scene, the non-recognition of Prince’s own 
identity runs deep here. Not only does Prince have little influence on the conditions of her 
own marriage—an arrangement that is apparently negotiated by two men—but she has no 
say in any of the actions that could give her any self-worth: she is not privy to the 
conditions of her own marriage, she is not allowed to protest its dissolution, she is not 
even allowed to care for her own appearance, “obliged,” she says “to put out my own 
clothes” from the wash. By the end of the passage, Prince is literally a body without a 
subject, at last conceding that she “no time to [do anything] for [her]self.”57  
 With the all of the physical domination and repression suggested by this passage, 
how would British readers ever see Prince as a woman who symbolized the dignity and 
propriety of the black female body? Could they do anything but sympathize with Prince’s 
fallen condition, which would be the familiar but ultimately limited response to a 
woman’s sexual degradation?  
If Prince does find a way to regain a sense of her own private sexual dignity and 
associate her “moral character” with the body itself, it is not through some redemptive 
event in the narrative—much like Beatrice Cenci, this would be nearly impossible given 




Prince and her editors modify the very textual conditions of her story in order to create an 
uncontaminated account of her physical dignity, keenly omitting much of the sexual 
degradation that she faced and giving readers the impression of Prince’s own private, 
inviolable body. Unlike Beatrice Cenci, then, Prince could have some measure of control 
over the reception of her own identity. This strategy would also allow Prince’s public 
reputation to remain honorable even while it emphasizes the humiliating details of 
Prince’s experiences to illicit “the sympathy of strangers.”58 In turn, Prince could 
represent the fallen, helpless woman that would stoke British sentiment even while 
epitomizing a wholesome body worthy of full ethical recognition.  
 We have already noted how the text may have traded on such sensational content 
to sell copies, but we should also note how the omission of this content could provide for 
Prince a virtuous public identity and vindicate her character. Following her intervention 
in a bout of domestic abuse, Prince refuses to utter Mr. D.—’s “wicked words.” An 
excision of language here allows Prince to adopt the role of public guardian, protecting 
her readers’ ears from the ugly words uttered by Mr. D.—. This move is consistent with 
the pervasive suggestion throughout the History that language itself can be another type 
of physical punishment (a point made by theorists of performative language time and 
again).59 At one point, for example, Prince admits lyrically that “words fell like cayenne 
on the fresh wounds of our hearts,” confounding language, pain, and the physical and 
figural body. Later on, when a domestic servant threatens Prince, she recounts that “the 
threatening [was] so strong of what she would have done to me, that I thought I should 
have fallen down at her feet, I was so vexed and hurt by her words.”60 For Prince, 




language to physical violence extends to the protection of readers’ ears in this scene with 
Mr. D.—. By removing his “wicked words” from the text, Prince not only protects her 
readers’ sense of decorum, but she also defends their bodies from the shocking, 
dishonorable effects of certain types of speech.61 Excising abusive material, the text 
attempts to put British readers under the protective care of a “decent” guardian in Prince, 
a figure who could now be recognized as a representative of feminine propriety, instead 
of a symbol for the debauched body of female slaves. More importantly, however, these 
textual omissions allow Prince to control and shape the private aspects of her own female 
honor by refusing to publicize all the details of the physical degradation that she suffered. 
These intentional exclusions within the text “remake” Prince’s body so that it does, 
indeed, have a private realm that can remain untouched. Ironically, the public circulation 
of the History would bolster the sense of interiority and the physical privacy associated 
with feminine honor—once again recalling how a politics of recognition sees deep parts 
of “identity[as] partly shaped by” others.62  
 Thomas Pringle’s supplementary remarks are also part of the strategy to vindicate 
female honor. Despite his declaration in the preface to the History that “no fact of 
importance has been omitted, and not a single circumstance or sentiment has been 
added,” Pringle makes many major omissions in the supplement. One of the most striking 
omissions, occurs in a document that refutes point-by-point John Wood’s claims about 
Prince’s “troublesome” and “depraved” character—a tactic used by Wood to portray 
Prince as the typical, licentious black women, but also to appeal to the public’s 
sensational appetite for such portrayals. One accusation stokes Pringle’s ire in particular: 




with whom she was in a quarrel. “It would be beyond the limits of an ordinary letter to 
detail her baseness,” says Wood in the original letter reproduced by Pringle, “though I 
will do so should his Excellency wish it; but you may judge of her depravity by one 
circumstance…” At this point, Pringle eliminates the “base” event from the text, telling 
the reader that “it is too indecent to appear in a publication likely to be perused by 
females.”63 On the surface, this bowdlerization could have been used to bolster Prince’s 
credibility; in keeping with the subversive nature of the History, it stands to refute the 
pervasive ideology about the wantonness of West Indian slaves. (And it must be 
mentioned that this tactic could have even been Pringle’s sly attempt himself to suggest 
prurience and sensation through exclusion—but in a way that turns the tables on Wood 
and other slavery apologists by showing how such lurid subject matter could only take 
root in the minds of colonizers and their apologists, not in the actions of the colonized.) 
In a larger sense, the omission of Wood’s offensive anecdote from the compiled text of 
the History seems to emphasize the modesty of Prince’s constructed, autobiographical 
subject—in other words, the text that is the public representation of “Mary Prince” 
refuses to sully its own pages by offering an anecdote about her degraded sexuality, 
whether the incident was fictional or not.  
 This textual effacement is in some ways analogous to the preservation of a 
“private body” frequently associated with female honor, where modesty comes from a 
sense of purity. While Pringle suggests that Wood’s anecdote be omitted because it is 
fraudulent—a “vile calumny,” as Pringle puts it— he also echoes Prince’s own voice in 
the narrative of the History, a type of speech that omits “wicked,” “indecent,” or even 




What’s more, the exclusion is not simply a defense of Prince’s body alone, but of a larger 
social construct of feminine honor. When Pringle proposes to withhold the anecdote 
because the text is “likely to be perused by females,” he expands a defense of Prince’s 
honor to an entire network of proper women readers—those who may have been 
corrupted by hearing Wood’s vile words as well. At first glance, this may look like overt 
chauvinism. But such a tactic allows Pringle to associate Prince with the paradigms of 
self-worth that were at the time reserved for white readers alone. Some might also allege 
that this is merely an instance of the gallant, white male editor stepping-in to save the 
day, and thus upholding traditional gender and racial divisions. Pringle’s decision to 
defend women readers of all races, however, aligns with a pattern of feminine solidarity 
established by Prince herself, who comes to the aid of British and West Indian women 
alike throughout the narrative, and, in doing so, broadens the scope of a “politics of 
recognition” to include both black and white bodies.64  
It should be noted that this extension of honor (or mutual recognition) once 
reserved for white, British women alone does not necessarily mean an effacement of 
Prince’s own identity—what Fanon terms the exclusive ontology of the colonized from 
the colonizer. While Pringle may collaborate with Prince in order to recover a version of 
western honor usually reserved for British women, the History also features a momentous 
critique of British beliefs about black female licentiousness, thus illuminating the very 
assumptions that made up a racist ideology, and consequently opening the door for a new 
paradigm of black identity to take root in Britain. Finally, while Prince might appeal to 
various conservative versions of honor reserved for white British women throughout the 




for the recognition of a common humanity tellingly ends not with her assimilation into 
bourgeois British society, but with a return to Antigua and live out her days with her 
freeman husband. 
 Because the History has so many scenes representing the degradation of slave 
women, it seems impossible that Prince could ever redeem her own feminine honor 
through some momentous event within the narrative itself. The textual organization of the 
History, however, performs the very modesty that Prince wishes to demonstrate to British 
readers. (Remarkably, this is another subtle way in which the History resembles Caleb 
Williams, where modern honor is not a constative, but a performative ethic). In other 
words, even though the events in the narrative make public the sexual dishonor that 
Prince suffers, the structure of the text itself implies that Prince’s dignity might just 
remain private and untainted. 
 
V. 
In the final paragraph of her narrative, Mary Prince moves away from her account 
of the indignities that she suffered and denounces the colonial slaveholders who 
perpetuated them. “The man that says slaves be quite happy in slavery—that they don't 
want to be free,” says Prince, echoing the rationalizations made by slavery apologists like 
James McQueen, “that man is either ignorant or a lying person…Such people ought to be 
ashamed of themselves.”65 Given all of the shame that Prince feels throughout the 
History, this is an appropriate wish for her oppressors, a kind of transference of the 
disgrace that Prince experienced while enslaved. A common emotion in the text, shame 




forced to bathe Mr. D.—, Prince says that her “eyes were so full of shame” and goes on 
to chastise him for having “no shame for his body, no shame for his own flesh;” 
reflecting on the physical acts she was compelled to perform while enslaved, she admits 
to being “too much ashamed to speak” at a meeting of Moravian churchgoers; and when 
she is unable to labor any longer, Prince feels “shame at being obliged to apply for relief 
whilst I had strength to work.”66 Because the text aligns shame repeatedly with 
transgressions and failures of the body—or the boundaries between one body and 
another—Prince’s final rebuke of her tormentors seems deeply personal and retributive.  
But in the concluding paragraph of the narrative, Prince implies that the shame of 
slavery should not just apply to her own tormenters—Mr. Williams, Mr. D.—, and John 
Wood—but to an entire group of apologists, “[s]uch people” that continue to support 
these physical transgressions against other humans. Here, Prince reveals the social 
component that is always a part of shame, the sense that shame always includes some 
break with public custom or propriety.  
If framed in the sociopolitical terms that I’ve been using throughout these 
chapters, shame is the opposite of honor: where honor is the private awareness of public 
responsibility or self-worth, shame is the private awareness of public indignity. Shame 
would therefore apply to both the corporeal and civic life of slaveholders and apologists, 
and makes physically palpable the systemic disgrace of slavery. The History, however, 
does not just shame slaveholders and apologists but also rebukes a wider British reading 
public who would be complicit with their practices. Using shame to connect the public 
dishonor of the body politic to the private mortification of the individual body, the text 




affective state that could no longer be ignored. By concentrating on the faceless nature of 
shameful bigotry and cruelty, the History points to the way that colonialist prejudice 
became part of the structures of British social norms, and manifested itself ubiquitously 
and indirectly—an effectively anonymous ideology that was woven into the very fabric 
of citizens’ everyday life and their material existence.67  
Why even make a case for the physical nature of shame? Isn’t the connection of 
shame to the body self-evident? What role does shame play in the day’s literary culture, 
and what of its potential uses in abolitionist critique? Would its scenes of bodies in 
potentially shameful acts actually serve an amoral, sensational purpose instead of an 
ultimately virtuous one?  
For many texts in the Romantic era, shame is a word with a family resemblance to 
a host of other familiar terms: embarrassment, remorse, guilt, sin, even guilty pleasure. 
Replete in the work of Keats, Coleridge, Byron, and Shelley respectively, such moods 
have engaged Romantic criticism for over a generation. Like shame, they align the 
private feelings or sentiments with a broader sense of social failure, blunder, or discredit. 
(This, of course, might serve as a vulgar definition of Romanticism itself, with its 
emphasis on how passion and self-awareness are precipitated by a collapse of political 
and/or philosophical ideals).68 But moods like shame need not just be the private reaction 
of an individual to the outcomes of history—a despondent turn inwards made by the 
brooding poet after a loss of some ideal, a story often told by the New Historicists of the 
1980s. Instead, a mood might be quite public and constructive, delineating the very 
horizons of a culture’s awareness of itself, what Romanticists like Thomas Pfau have 




consciousness within a given moment in history, and the representations that can arise 
from it.69 While slavery might continue to be defended on rational or ideological grounds, 
a developing mood of shame associated with it could precipitate an expansion of what 
Raymond Williams’s famously called a “structure of feeling,” the foundational 
sentiments to which a culture appeals in their politics and ethics—something like an 
affective version of common sense.70 In other words, an expanded sense of public shame 
about slavery—and its betrayals of cherished civic ideals like liberty and honor—might 
convert the abstract but impotent discomfort citizens felt about slavery into what critic 
Lauren Berlant and social psychologist Jonathan Haidt have called an intuitive, visceral 
response that could precipitate a change in the very nature of the abolitionist debate.71   
While the repeated invocation of shame in the History aligns it with some of 
Romanticism’s most canonical literature (and with its emphasis on guilt and 
transgression, Caleb Williams in particular), the text more importantly indicates a shift in 
the way the concept of shame was used by the abolitionist movement—from a moral or 
religious abstraction to a gut feeling. Originally, the meaning of shame in abolitionist 
literature was largely derived from scriptural language and evangelism. Just five years 
prior to the publication of the History, a popular progressive periodical The Republican 
challenged “true Christians” to view slavery as a moral atrocity worthy of shame: “[t]he 
language of the New Testament begets a certain turn of mind in the true Christian; it 
teaches him to look upon slavery as something base and shameful, and to consider liberty 
as something good in itself, and worthy to be esteemed.”72 Here, slavery tests the very 
spiritual worthiness and character of Christian Britons. The Imperial Magazine was even 




Writing just four months after the publication of Prince’s narrative in August of 1831, the 
periodical noted that “in the bosoms of pious and devout men, a holy indignation at the 
atrocity of those oppressors takes precedence of every other feeling; and thousands of 
honourable Britons feel so greatly ashamed of the actors in slavery, that they hold 
themselves disgraced by their national affinity.”73 While a transcendent sense of shame is 
located once again “in the bosoms of pious and devout men,” this time the pall of 
disgrace is cast over the entire nation. Public shame becomes so strong that it could even 
effect “national affinity”—a danger that would have been tacitly underscored by the 
agitation preceding the Reform Act of 1832. While shame certainly encompassed a wide 
variety of meanings in British society, more often than not the abolitionist periodicals of 
the day aligned it with spiritual culpability and a national reputation that were abstract 
and auratic—important parts of any imagined community, to be sure—but not absolutely 
connected to the visceral or intuitive life of citizens.  
Even Hannah More’s famous “The Black Slave Trade: A Poem” (1788)—
reprinted in a compilation published just months before the History—distinguishes shame 
from other basic affects like sympathy and pain:  
 
Plead not, in reason's palpable abuse, 
Their sense of feeling callous and obtuse: 
From heads to hearts lies Nature's plain appeal, 
Though few can reason, all mankind can feel. 
Though wit may boast a livelier dread of shame, 
A loftier sense of wrong, refinement claim; 
Though polish'd manners may fresh wants invent, 
And nice distinctions nicer souls torment; 
Though these on finer spirits heavier fall, 





For More, shame is not so much tied to the body and to the passions as it is tied to 
reason—to the “livelier dread” of the wit or the intellectual faculties in general. Although 
More’s invocation of shame directly follows her egalitarian pronouncement that “all 
mankind can feel,” shame seems to be more of a rational phenomenon then an emotional 
one, allied more to the juridical “loftier sense of wrong” and to public customs of 
“refinement...[and] polished manners.” More may acknowledge the social status of shame 
here, but it is in no way a “natural evil” like the feeling of pain. For those who are 
enslaved, then, shame is not the primary concern: More does not recognize dignity as a 
natural right because shame is not yet been established as a natural evil—or, put another 
way, shame has not been established as a broad “structure of feeling,” a kind of general 
current of ignominy deeply felt by citizens that would allow its place in abolitionist 
politics to become intuitive. Even more revealing is what the poem says about the nature 
of shame for British citizens. Instead of being a condition that stirs one physically to 
change their consciousness about an issue, the shame of slavery blights the spirit of 
Britain, abstract and quasi-religious as it that spirit may be. Laying the ground for 
periodicals at the time of the History, More goes on to say that shame has been “Inscrib'd 
by Slavery on the Christian name,” and taints the identity of all believers. 75 Such a 
feeling does not yet apply to bodies themselves but instead to the sacred marker of “the 
Christian name.”  
 While the History draws upon this well-established rhetoric of shame and makes 
especially prominent the relationship between individual and national disgrace 
emphasized by More and other abolitionist writers, it also converts shame into a bodily 




indelible blight on Christian identity. No longer tied to spiritualism or abstraction alone, 
shame has a physicalized, almost contagious nature, gaining the ability to spread to 
readers who would ignore the harms of slavery. Here, Prince re-imagines shame as one of 
More’s affective, “natural evil[s],” instead of an abstract lapse of “moral character”: 
 
How can slaves be happy when they have the halter round their neck and the 
whip upon their back? and are disgraced and thought no more of than beasts?...Is 
it happiness for a driver in the field to take down his wife or sister or child, and 
strip them, and whip them in such a disgraceful manner?—women that have had 
children exposed in the open field to shame! There is no modesty or decency 
shown by the owner to his slaves; men, women, and children are exposed alike. 
Since I have been here I have often wondered how English people can go out into 
the West Indies and act in such a beastly manner. But when they go to the West 
Indies, they forget God and all feeling of shame, I think, since they can see and 
do such things. They tie up slaves like hogs—moor them up like cattle, and they 
lick them, so as hogs, or cattle, or horses never were flogged;—and yet they 
come home and say, and make some good people believe, that slaves don't want 
to get out of slavery. But they put a cloak about the truth. It is not so. All slaves 
want to be free—to be free is very sweet. I will say the truth to English people 
who may read this history that my good friend, Miss S——, is now writing down 
for me. I have been a slave myself—I know what slaves feel—I can tell by 
myself what other slaves feel, and by what they have told me. The man that says 
slaves be quite happy in slavery—that they don't want to be free—that man is 
either ignorant or a lying person. I never heard a slave say so. I never heard a 
Buckra man say so, till I heard tell of it in England. Such people ought to be 
ashamed of themselves.76  
 
Shame is associated with the dehumanization of the body, its “disgrace[ful]” conversion 
into a “beast[ly]” form coming from forced nudity and corporal punishment. The 
prolificacy of exposed bodies and the violence under which they suffer show that colonial 




one body and another, a limit that is supposed to regulate the “modesty and decency” of 
British readers. In other words, when British citizens turn into colonialists, they lose a 
sense of the customary division between private and public life—as Prince says earlier in 
the text, there is “no shame for [the] body, no shame for [one’s] own flesh.”77 After this, 
Prince turns to the civic realm, and wonders aloud “how English people can go out into 
the West Indies and act in such a beastly manner,” only to return to England and “make 
some good people believe, that slaves don't want to get out of slavery.” Here, the 
conversion of the slave’s body into something “no more than a beast” is reflected in the 
colonists themselves, who suddenly lose their Burkean manners when they go abroad and 
“forget God and all feelings of shame.”78 At this moment in the narrative, the traditional 
boundaries between individual bodies also relate to national borders, and their ability to 
delineate certain habits of good character. In this way, the very act of imperial 
domination—“when English people…go out into the West Indies”— becomes a kind of 
excessive body, extending itself into the space of others and symbolizing a total break-
down of moral boundaries and social restraint.  
When the colonists return, however, they rationalize their own wanton behavior 
by announcing that “slaves be quite happy in slavery.” Fittingly, the “truth” of such 
beastly conduct is figured as a naked body around which the colonists “put a cloak” of 
ideology in order to cover their shameful practices. In her Cultural Politics of Emotion 
(2004), Sara Ahmed makes a profound point about shame itself, noting that it 
presupposes the exposure of the body as well the impulse to conceal it (the original 
etymology of shame, Ahmed notes, is to hide or cover).79 With this in mind, we might 




brutality is just another part of the process of shame, and that in order to protect their 
individual self-worth—or dignity—the colonists readopt the cloak of propriety when they 
return to England. But Prince’s narrative will also circulate throughout England, and it 
intends to—almost literally—expose the disgraceful behavior of colonists and apologists 
so that “[s]uch people [will be] ashamed of themselves,” feeling “what slaves feel” on the 
body, and bringing up a comparable physical shame in all of those citizens who “heard 
tell of [such a pernicious ideology] in England.” 
 In this astonishing passage from the final paragraph of her narrative, Prince 
depicts shame as a condition affecting the entire social body of England and makes public 
an emotion usually reserved for private life. By removing the cloak of ideology that was 
used to preserve the dignity of a burgeoning empire, all citizens might “know what slaves 
feel” and experience the touch of national shame, a mood tied deeply to identity and the 
recognition of self-worth. Not only does the passage emphasize how shame was 
employed in the fight to recognize the humanity of black colonials, but the entire History 
modifies the way in which abolitionist literature approached the concept of shame itself. 
Once thought of as an abstract lapse in manners or social propriety, or as a theological 
blight on one’s character, shame is figured here as a corporeal state that would unsettle a 
“good” British public’s tacit complicity with slavery, and serve as a corrective to 
injustice. In other words, Prince hopes that shame will turn the disembodied, public 
disgrace of slavery into an embodied, private ignominy that could be felt by individuals 
deeply. This hope for national shame would not be a direct retaliation for all the abuse 
that Prince suffered while in Antigua, Turks Island, and in London with the Wood family. 




rationalized and disregarded by English colonial apologists somatically undeniable. 
“Such people,” Prince reminds the reader, “ought to be ashamed of themselves.”   
A pertinent question arises out of Prince’s final words: doesn’t shaming always 
imply some kind of deep, personal retribution, especially because it involves the very 
identity of individuals, and oftentimes concerns their most profound beliefs or their 
deepest intuitions about moral value? This is certainly the case when shame is used to 
single-out and condemn the actions of lone persons—when people are used as scapegoats 
or censured in acts of public expiation. A good example of this retributive type of shame 
can be found in John Wood’s own accusations against Prince herself, where he presents a 
single licentious event as evidence for people to “judge of her depravity.”80 Through his 
allegations, Wood attempts to shame Prince out of any credibility she may have with the 
public. Interestingly enough, Wood is trading on another “structure of feeling” here: the 
foundational sentiments of the average reader towards the existing colonial enterprise, 
and the supposed domestic tranquility it was supposed to provide to indigenous peoples.  
But, Wood’s retributive shame seems petty and unconvincing when framed by a 
text that repeatedly insists on the communal character of shame and its connection to the 
enterprise of slavery. In short, Wood’s use of shame here seems less like a vast “romantic 
mood” or a “structure of feeling”—what Williams, Pfau, Berlant and others have claimed 
might be employed to constructively reflect on history, politics, or the very values of a 
social system itself—than it does as a brazen legal tactic to be deployed within the system 
itself. Addressing a broad public with its castigations—“such people out to be ashamed of 




retributive, individual variety of shame illustrated by John Wood, and the more valuable 
communal shame invoked by Prince and Pringle.  
Another way the text does this is by omitting the critical mark of individual 
identity: one’s name. The removal of proper names has, of course, been a novelistic 
convention since time immemorial, and readers would have seen the blank spaces in the 
surnames of individual slave masters like Captain I.— and Mr. D.— as a means for 
preserving their anonymity and personal claims to honor. Such anonymity would of 
course protect Pringle from libel charges (beyond the one leveled at him by James 
McQueen) even as it would uphold the character of the abusive slaveholders back home 
in England. But the use of anonymity would also impel readers to view these figures as 
symptomatic of a greater social problem, one that is not attached to discrete individuals, 
but to an insidious belief that could be nameless, faceless, and ubiquitous: “such people 
[who believe in the beneficence of colonialism],” as Prince implies with telling 
imprecision, might be your good English neighbor. Along with Prince, Thomas Pringle’s 
supplemental material offers examples of shame and demoralization that are detached 
from specific identities, but can be ascribed to an entire public system of oppression. 
Sounding almost like a legal brief, Pringle’s supplement to the History makes a case for 
public, anonymous shame as a corrective to injustice:      
 
But there may be some persons into whose hands this tract may fall, so 
imperfectly acquainted with the real character of Negro Slavery, as to be shocked 
into partial, if not absolute incredulity, by the acts of inhuman oppression and 
brutality related of Capt. I—— and his wife, and of Mr. D——, the salt 
manufacturer of Turk's Island. Here, at least, such persons may be disposed to 
think, there surely must be some exaggeration; the facts are too shocking to be 




that account. Slavery is a curse to the oppressor scarcely less than to the 
oppressed: its natural tendency is to brutalize both. After a residence myself of 
six years in a slave colony, I am inclined to doubt whether, as regards its 
demoralizing influence, the master is not even a greater object of compassion 
than his bondman. Let those who are disposed to doubt the atrocities related in 
this narrative, on the testimony of a sufferer, examine the details of many cases 
of similar barbarity that have lately come before the public…which are sufficient 
to prove, independently of all other evidence, that there is nothing in the 
revolting character of the facts to affect their credibility; but that on the contrary, 
similar deeds are at this very time of frequent occurrence in almost every one of 
our slave colonies.81  
 
Pringle’s opening line on “[t]he real character of Negro Slavery” is revealing. Not only 
does it return us to the question of “moral character,” but it does so by personifying the 
very institution around which the History is centered. By turning “Capt. I—— and his 
wife, and of Mr. D—” into manifestations of an entire public personification of “Negro 
Slavery” the passage has the ironic effect of depersonalizing their brutalities. Although 
Prince herself shows how individuals like Mr. D.— could be shockingly distinctive in 
their maltreatment of her—“how could I ever forget,” she says time and again—Pringle 
takes pains to characterize the entire colonial identity as common; in essence, to make 
anonymous people like the nameless Mr. D.— appear as a mere extension of a collective 
ethos and its “demoralizing influence” on the nation and its colonies.82 Certainly, Pringle 
wants to establish the cultural and legal credibility of Prince’s tale by emphasizing the 
similarity of shocking details from multiple slave narratives. But he also wants to show 
that the brutality of colonialism is so prevalent that it cannot be considered an aberration. 




the ultimately paternal benevolence that British citizens believed colonials held towards 
their slaves, but the very public identity of slavery itself. 
 If British readers were unmoved by revelations that ordinary, anonymous citizens 
could be implicated in a vast system of “inhuman oppression”—if they were still unable 
to find private culpability in the public shaming of Britain’s imagined community— 
Pringle emphasizes his point further by recording the consequences of Negro Slavery on 
the identities of these anonymous figures. Under Negro Slavery’s “demoralizing 
influence,” the slave master loses his own sense of private dignity, a result of colonial life 
that is so common that Pringle is “inclined to doubt whether…the master is not even a 
greater object of compassion than his bondman.” Here there is another variation on the 
Hegelian theme, as both lord and bondsmen are subjected to the public character of 
Negro Slavery that steals their private self-worth. With this in mind, the physical shame 
or “demoralization” of Negro Slavery also carried with it an additional, existential type of 
brutality. To be subjected to Negro Slavery as either master or slave would be to risk the 
loss of private identity altogether: a result worse than feeling shame is not being able to 
feel at all. 
 In her study on the role of disgust and shame in legal opinion Hiding from 
Humanity (2004), Martha Nussbaum argues that modern civilization should avoid shame 
as a strategy for enforcing laws and customs. Enforced shame, Nussbaum says, marks a 
citizen as “a member of a degraded class…[where] there qualitative distinctness [can] not 
be seen, and their separateness [can] not be acknowledged.”83 Nussbaum recalls Mary 
Prince’s own appeal for full social recognition and dignity within the History—a text that 




of modernity. And yet the History also uses shame as a viable, constructive affect that 
had the ability to address both national and private identity, to shape public opinion, to 
influence legal action, and perhaps to chip away at a lingering ideology about the 
benevolence of colonial masters and their practices. Pringle and Prince’s shaming of a 
mass, anonymous British readership—which could include colonials, colonial apologists, 
lawmakers, indifferent British readers, even abolitionists whose arguments functioned 
only through condescension—has the seemingly contradictory effect of being a “project 
of reintegration and reparation,” as Nussbaum once again puts it, one predicated upon the 
“inclusion of all human beings in [a] community” that could recognize the mutual dignity 
of the enslaved.84 Stronger and perhaps more tangible than abstract, spiritual guilt, the 
shame of colonial brutality might be felt deeply in the body of the individual reader of the 
History, even as it made clearer shame’s public character, which extended across Great 
Britain and the expansive national boundaries of its colonies in 1831. Such an expansion 
of collective remorse was perhaps one of the driving forces behind the Slavery Abolition 
Act two years later, a document known for its manumission of nearly all slaves in British 




Towards the end of the Romantic era Britons came to recognize the dignity of 
humans who did not resemble themselves in part because of the emergence of a wider 
sense of shame, a structure of feeling that may have been able to go beyond some of the 




tradition, or the disgrace relegated to the single nation-state. This wider relevance of 
shame might have also served as a way for citizens to acknowledge more deeply their 
negligent governance of distant lands that were under their control. But perhaps this 
conclusion sounds too optimistic. The invocation of Hegel as forefather to the politics of 
recognition is, for starters, vexed. Hegelian historiography presupposes a kind of 
teleology were tyranny is eventually defeated and any inherent contradictions will be 
inexorably overcome in a great procession towards reason and freedom. Like many texts 
in the nineteenth-century, the History can thus be said to transmit a Whiggish—and 
therefore ideologically distorted—view of history: Westerners become more global (or at 
least more globally-minded); there is a small but important amplification of secularism as 
it relates to a “shared” or more universal body that disregards sectarian or racial 
divisions; the Hegelian “arc of history bends towards justice,” and so on. The codification 
of physical privacy rights and laws in seemingly ineradicable, written forms is another 
cornerstone of bourgeois liberal history that seems to find expression in the Slavery 
Abolition Act of 1833 and in later treatises on human rights—whose rhetoric of honor 
and shame was in part made possible by texts like the History.85  
 But it is also possible that the History and the Slavery Abolition Act tacitly 
contain a number of illiberal elements. For instance, while the Act granted West Indian 
slaves freedom in the abstract, it also turned them into indentured servants, guaranteeing 
that their bondage would be coerced by way of labor and livelihood instead of by chains 
and punishment. In addition, while the Act may have led to greater British awareness of 
colonial atrocity, and resulted in the extension of British law to the colonies, such an 




legitimacy to the encroachment of imperial power, giving more legal grounds for the 
“civilizing mission” of imperial Britain. Finally, the extension of bodily dignity and 
privacy to slaves in the form of abolitionist legislation puts moral imperatives in the 
safekeeping of the state alone. While the state might beneficially recognize the categories 
of physical dignity, bodily privacy, and corporeal shame—all of those that had long been 
the focus of abolitionist periodicals and slave narratives like the History—they could also 
convert this “bodily morality” into categories to be administered only by legitimate legal 
organizations and bureaucracies. Here, we are a long way from Godwin’s ideals about 
honor and dignity outside of the authority of institutions. 
 In other words, the History can be read as a text that both upholds liberal politics 
and heralds some of its most well-known theoretical problems. In what follows, I want to 
suggest that the text responds to some of liberalism’s current contradictions through its 
radical articulations of political subjectivity and ethical citizenship, thus presenting a way 
to modify and preserve such a system in our time of global crises.86 
 Above I mention how the British state’s legal sanctioning of liberty in Antigua 
also meant the regulation of its bodies. In this way, the calls for physical dignity and 
liberty in the History suggest an early example of biopolitics, where the codification of 
physical sovereignty covertly serves new structures of management, regulation, and even 
domination. In Foucault’s formulation, the state grants physical freedom to subjects so 
that they will take it upon themselves to become healthy, rational workers who provide 
for its markets—so that workers will fixate on “care of self” instead of capitalist 
exploitation.87 Prince’s own statements that manumitted Antiguans would work just as 




Prince says that she “did not like to be idle,” demonstrating that if liberated her labor 
would be made a part of her own, personal ethos.88 (It should be noted, however, that 
Prince also says that black colonials “don’t mind hard work, if we had proper treatment, 
and proper wages like English servants.” She recognizes the potential for the exploitation 
of free laborers, even if confronting it is secondary to her goals of manumission and 
general cultural recognition).89 If this type of biopolitics is at the heart of today’s 
neoliberal order—where individuals are expected to internalize the hegemonic directive 
to add value in all areas of their life—then the History is just one example of how such a 
directive came to fruition well before the mid-twentieth-century.  
Paul Youngquist sees Atlantic slavery through the lens of another philosopher of 
biopolitics—Giorgio Agamben. In Youngquist’s article, “The Mothership Connection,” 
he dubs the slave-ship a vehicle for the spread of the liberal-capitalist order. With the 
ability to convert Agamben’s category of bare life (zoe) into literal human capital, the 
slave ship combines “[g]lobal mobility and economic prowess…[into a] floating factory 
of sovereignty and terror, a constitutive space for the production and circulation of liberal 
democracy.”90 In Youngquists’s ingenious reading, slavery makes possible the spread of 
this system by expanding globally the private property relations that liberalism was, in 
part, intended to protect. While liberal thought later gives rise to declarations of universal 
human rights—which include prohibitions on human trafficking (a central irony, 
Youngquist might point out) and commonly feature the right to bodily privacy, dignity, 
and autonomy—these declarations will inexorably link the body to the nation state and its 




declarations of rights as a central pretense of liberal modernity in his seminal text Homo 
Sacer).91  
 The written declarations of sovereignty central to liberalism—especially those 
that concern the privacy and dignity of the body—are thus revealed by these critics to 
have controversial histories and insidious designs.92 For Youngquist, liberal declarations 
of physical egalitarianism and freedom are underwritten by a legacy of subjugation that 
begins with Locke’s equating of liberty with private property, a socioeconomic 
arrangement that can be spread by way of the slave ship. For Foucault and Agamben, to 
acknowledge bodily privacy through legitimate documents is simultaneously to 
acknowledge the modern nation-state’s power to designate and regulate pure (or bare) 
life. According to Agamben, this is the main paradox of liberal sovereignty, where 
subjects may hold sacred rights like physical dignity inside of the juridical order, but can 
only be provided those rights by an entity outside of that order that may suspend, or 
“except” those rights at any time.93 
 Does Mary Prince ever become fully subjected to this insidious liberal-capitalist 
order, despite supporting it through her labor? Is she ever fully recognized by a state that 
grants her sovereignty? Even after 1833, would she have the same status as other 
Englishmen? If so, would Prince’s body by thrown into the double bind of sovereignty 
that Agamben announces? While the History and texts like it would prompt further 
abolitionist legislation that granted sovereignty to black bodies throughout the colonies—
and eventually lead to a more widespread recognition of their physical dignity—such 
laws in Agamben’s sense would lead to an order that still had claims over physical 




context of an expanding literary industry that banked on the sensation produced by 
graphic slave narratives. Driven in part by the mid-nineteenth-century literary 
marketplace, Pringle may have hoped to claw himself out of debt by becoming a popular 
purveyor of what he calls an “astonishing History.” Thus, for all of its social virtue, the 
History can be seen as Pringle’s somewhat cynical attempt to trade on the scandalous 
content of slave narratives—and to commodify Prince once again—in order to bring 
about greater literary celebrity and financial stability.  
Even if the text hints at the expansion of a liberal-capitalist ideology—through 
Prince’s professions of selfless labor after her manumission, through the expansion of a 
physical sovereignty for which the text advocates, and especially through Pringle’s 
attempts at literary-commercial celebrity through the publication of the History—it also 
gestures towards certain reforms and restructurings of liberalism that might preserve it in 
the face of strong critique. One of the ways in which the History might be seen as 
addressing the problems of liberal subjectivity is through Prince’s political status. While 
a major political goal of the History is to get readers to accept Prince as a citizen worthy 
of full British recognition and liberal sovereignty, at the time of its publication Prince 
would not have been formally recognized by a nation-state or subjected to its various 
ideological machinations. Such illegitimacy is not nearly as disempowering as it might 
first appear: while Prince remains outside of the formal mechanisms of state power—not 
yet given rights by British laws or declarations—she is recognized by the Anti-Slavery 
Committee, a group of British abolitionists and agitators. The Committee acknowledges 
that the manumission of the colonies would be an ideal solution to Prince’s dilemma, but 




privacy. At root, they want Prince to be able to pursue a classically “good life” with her 
husband Daniel James—to fulfill her “[hope] to spend her latter years in domestic 
tranquility with her husband, free from the lash of the taskmaster”—even if that means 
returning to an Antigua where slavery has not yet been abolished.95 In advocating for 
Prince’s dignity outside of the rule of law, the Committee shows how humane recognition 
and the protection of privacy could be extended to persons without having to resort to the 
legitimating structures provided by the state. In other words, they model the way in which 
communal cultural advocacy outside of the law can advance progressive rights usually 
associated with liberal nationhood.  
This group sounds very much like a mid-nineteenth-century version of a modern 
NGO, those contemporary organizations that advocate for specific humane causes 
without the direct involvement of the government.96 But the Anti-Slavery Committee 
differs from contemporary NGOs in some crucial ways. Most importantly, they have 
literary figures like Pringle, who could capture the cultural imagination through 
astonishing texts like the History, instead of simply acting as a bureaucratic manager or 
legal advocate for her struggle (even if he seems to ventriloquize this role at times). 
Pringle’s is a type of humane advocacy not wedded to practical solutions alone, but to 
ideological transformations. In this way, the committee can be seen as far more radical in 
their political agitations then contemporary western NGOs, who tend to evade direct 
ethical prescriptions and advocacy in favor of more practical, seemingly non-partisan 
solutions to global problems. 
 Operating at a time rife with political agitation, the provocations of the Anti-




radical factions to uphold its most cherished values of freedom, egalitarianism, and 
human dignity—illustrating what Slavoj Žižek has called the eternally parasitic nature of 
liberalism. “In order for its key legacy to survive,” Žižek writes, “liberalism needs the 
fraternal aid of the radical left” who remind it of its foundational moral commitments.97 
(This is not to say that Žižek finds totally dubious the “core values of liberalism—
freedom, equality, etc.” It is merely to highlight Žižek’s point that a political system built 
on these values alone has the tendency to undermine itself. Hence, in one of his sharpest 
recent aphorisms Žižek declares that “only communism can save liberal democracy [from 
itself].”)98 
Although she may be torn between two countries, Prince’s unclear legal status 
during the publication of the History also grants her a kind of sociopolitical advantage. 
Neither British nor Antiguan, Prince is a citizen-alien when she arrives in London with 
the Wood family, occupying a liminal space between civilian and exile. In some contexts, 
this non-citizenship can be considered perilous. As Edlie Wong points out, if Prince 
returns to Antigua she is chattel, but if she stays in England she has an unsure, precarious 
life, one without employment or social ties to ensure her survival. But while she may not 
be legally British, she also does not have to concede her sovereignty to the nation—the 
primary threat to any sort of biopolitical rights according to Agamben. In other words, 
Prince seems to have political advantages that a full liberal subject might not have. 
Consider that Prince may in fact represent a kind of global subject: when she invokes the 
statute law of Antigua and England in her narrative, Prince shows a legal savviness that 
operates across national boundaries and addresses the double-standards in British law 




espouses liberal ideals about physical privacy and egalitarian dignity, but that she is not 
bound to a nation who might overrule these ideals in a time of crisis, as Agamben fears.99 
And With regards to Žižek’s argument on the need for a radical moral commitment 
undergirding liberalism, consider finally that Prince’s struggle is based on an ethical 
agenda for cultural recognition instead of on a purely legal or practical push for 
emancipation. In fact, Prince even recognizes the hypocrisy over slavery that exists in the 
law alone, indicating how a liberal-capitalist reliance on formal mechanisms like 
jurisprudence is often inadequate to the task of true justice. (Given that the supplement to 
the History resembles a legal opinion—a kind of amicus curiae—we might also see 
Pringle as the liberal pragmatist who supplements his own practical politics with the 
moral rectitude that only Prince can provide). Prince’s status as an exile may actually 
enhance her political agency today, a position that for theorists like Hardt and Negri 
keeps alive the possibility of “an open citizenship…[that] expand[s] biopolitical 
production,” while remaining self-determining and emancipated.100  
I am not saying, of course, that we should de-historicize Prince so much that she 
becomes a blithe embodiment of the cosmopolitan spirit—with all the material 
advantages that the cosmopolitan is sometimes thought to have. But she does hint at a 
more global, authentically ethical version of the liberal subject to which we might aspire, 
evoking as she does an idealized liberalism without borders, without capitalist manacles, 
and without the imperial designs of the nation-state. Although we cannot forget the 
historical realities of Prince’s enslavement or aggrandize her too much in her own time, 
we might today see Prince as a figure that avoids some of the more insidious restraints 




about the need for “moral character” as an essential supplement to liberalism’s sound 
fundamental principles of liberty and privacy—that the life of honor so crucial to the 
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